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四 结论

“蛮权力”外交具有三个特征:要求即时获益的实用理念、将经济相互依赖武器化作为交易筹码以及粗鲁的对外交往方式。“蛮权力”外交虽然是对特朗普的世界观及其治下美国对外战略的总结,但在经济全球化出现逆流和带有民粹性质的民族主义影响力日益扩大的当今世界,它又具有一定的普遍性。

特朗普当选总统后轻视欧洲盟友,在国际事务中处处以美国的即时获益为外交目标,并将欧美经济相互依赖和国际机制武器化,滥用国家安全理由,使用“长臂管辖”、次级制裁的频度和无理程度达到史无前例的地步,由此创造出一种新的权力类型——“蛮权力”。但在拜登当选美国总统后,他领导下的美国很明显在向奥巴马时代的“巧权力”外交回归。欧洲在其外交“雷达”中的亮度上升,拜登政府一方面以民主意识形态和共有价值观对欧洲盟友进行“绑定”,另一方面在经济和安全领域对欧洲“让利”,力求缓和特朗普时期的美欧矛盾。2021年3月到5月,美国与欧盟暂停双方因波音和空中客车飞机公司补贴争端而施加的进口关税4个月,暂缓征收特朗普时期强加给欧盟的75亿美元的惩罚性钢铝关税;美国国务院宣布豁免对“北溪2号”天然气管道运营公司及其负责人的制裁;五角大楼从阿富汗撤军,但却宣布增加500名驻德国美军。2021年6月拜登将当选总统后的首次出访目的地设为欧洲,连续出席英美峰会、北约峰会和欧美峰会,不断放言“美国回来了”。欧美关系很可能在民主党掌管白宫期间维持相对和谐的局面。


[1] [美] 罗伯特·卡根:《美国的合法性危机》,赵晨编译,《当代世界与社会主义》2004年第5期;[美] 罗伯特·卡根:《天堂与权力:世界秩序中的美国与欧洲》,刘坤译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第159页。

[2] Frank-Walter Steinmeire,“Opening of the Munich Security Conference”, February 14, 2020, http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/02/200214-Munich-Security-Conference.html.

[3] Peter Hays Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy:How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.

[4] Gertrude Himmelfarb, One Nation, Two Cultures: A Searching Examination of American Society in the Aftermath of Our Cultural Revolution, Knopf Press, 1999.

[5] [美] 约翰·伊肯伯里:《大战胜利之后:制度、战略约束与战后秩序重建》,门洪华译,北京大学出版社2008年版。

[6] Charles Kupchan,“Is Liberal Internationalism in Declince”, https://issforum.org/roundtables/2-4-is-liberal-internationalism-in-decline.

[7] [美] 罗伯特·卡根:《天堂与权力:世界秩序中的美国与欧洲》,刘坤译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版。

[8] [英] 提摩许·加顿·艾什:《自由世界:美国、欧洲和西方世界的未来》,张宁译,东方出版社2009年版,第103页。

[9] Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers,“Bush Says ‘Time is Running Out'; U.S.Plans to Act Largely Alone”, New York Times, October 7, 2001.

[10] 认知过程当然影响到外交政策的选择。参见Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976。

[11] Robert A.Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

[12] 也有中国学者将权力分为资源和资源运用两部分,这与本书的阐释相近。参见陈志敏和常璐璐《权力的资源与运用:兼论中国外交的权力战略》,《世界经济与政治》2012年第7期。

[13] 宋黎磊、陈志敏:《中欧对软实力的不同认知及对双边关系的影响》,《欧洲研究》2011年第2期。

[14] Joseph S.Nye,“Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, No.80, 1990, pp.153-171.

[15] Joseph S.Nye, The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

[16] Joseph S.Nye,“Hard, Soft, and Smart Power”, in Andrew F.Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, ed., Oxford Handbooks of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

[17] Joseph S.Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp.32, 147.

[18] Joseph S.Nye,“Recovering American Leadership”, Survival, Vol.50, No.1, 2008, p.64.

[19] CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

[20] Joseph S.Nye,“Recovering American Leadership”, Survival, Vol.50, No.1, 2008, p.64.

[21] CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

[22] Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism”, Foreign Affairs, March 2004.

[23] Christopher Layne, “The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power”, in Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, eds., Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2010, p.67.

[24] 王湘穗:《币权:世界政治的当代枢纽》,《现代国际关系》2009年第7期。

[25] Lucy Madison,“In Farewell Speech, Clinton Calls for ‘Smart Power' on Global Stage”, CBS NEWS, February 1, 2013.

[26] [美] 罗伯特·基欧汉:《霸权之后:世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》,苏长和等译,上海人民出版社2006年版。

[27] Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World, New Haven: Yale University Press 2017.

[28] [美] 罗伯特·基欧汉和约瑟夫·奈:《权力与相互依赖》(第3版),门洪华译,北京大学出版社2002年版,第45页。

[29] Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017.

[30] Maurice Keens-Soper Berridge and T.G.Otte, eds., Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.20.

[31] Robert O.Keohane,“The Old IPE and the New”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol.16, No.1, 2009, pp.34-46.

[32] The Economist, “Weapons of Mass Disruption”, June 8-14,2019.

[33] Hal Brands,“Reckless Choices, Bad Deals, and Dangerous Provocations”, Foreign Affairs, September 27, 2019.

[34] 约瑟夫·奈2019年6月17日在荷兰海牙战略研究中心的演讲。参见 Joseph Nye:“The Future of Power: Hard, Soft, Smart, Sharp?”, June 17, 2019, https://www.hcss.nl/events/future-powerhard-soft-smart-sharp-joseph-nye。

[35] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020.

[36] Stanley Hoffmann,“Groping Toward a New World Order”, New York Times, January.11, 1976.

[37] [英] 罗伯特·库珀:《和平箴言:21世纪的秩序与混乱》,吴云、庞中英等译,北京大学出版社2007年版,第154页。

[38] Niall Ferguson, Fareed Zakaria and Rudyard Griffiths, Is This the End of the Liberal International Order?The Munk Debates, Toronto:House of Anansi Press, 2017; G.John Ikenberry,“The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs, Vol.94, Issue 1, January 2018, pp.7-23.

[39] Gideon Rachman,“The Trump Doctrine: Coherent, Radical and Wrong”, Financial Times, July 16, 2018.

[40] [德] 海因里希·奥古斯特·温克勒:《西方的困局:欧洲与美国的当下危机》,童欣译,中信出版集团2019年版,“导言”第2页。

[41] Robert Jervis,“President Trump and IR Theory”, H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Series, January 2, 2017.https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5B-Jervis.

[42] 郭凛、余振:《美国贸易政策的历史逻辑与时代特征:特朗普与里根政府政策比较》,《当代美国评论》2020年第1期。

[43] 周琪:《论特朗普的对华政策及其决策环境》,《世界经济与政治》2019年第3期。

[44] Andrew Roth, et al.,“Trump calls European Union a ‘Foe' Ahead of Russia and China”, The Guardian, July 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/15/donald-trumpvladimir-putin-helsinki-russia-indictments.

[45] The White House,“National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, December.2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/.

[46] Rex W.Tillerson,“Remarks to U.S.Department of State Employees,”May 3, 2017, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm.

[47] “次级制裁”指一国凭借其国际优势地位将其单边制裁转变为多边制裁的强制手段。参见杨永红《次级制裁及其反制:由美国次级制裁的立法与实践展开》,《法商研究》2019年第3期。

[48] David M.Herszenhorn,“Trump's Europe Strategy: Nothing”, The Politico, June 4, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/donaldtrump-eu-strategy-nothing-g7-summit-angela-merkel/.

[49] David M.Herszenhorn,“Trump's Europe Strategy: Nothing”, The Politico, June 4, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/donaldtrump-eu-strategy-nothing-g7-summit-angela-merkel/.

[50] 周琪:《论特朗普的对华政策及其决策环境》,《世界经济与政治》2019年第3期。

[51] Robert Kagan:“A New Liberal Order and the Law of the Jungle”, Aspen Review, Issue 03/2019, https://www.aspen.review/article/2019/robert-kagan-new-liberal-order-law-jungle/.

[52] Perry S.Bechky,“Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of International Economic Law”, Missouri Law Review, Vol.83, 2018, p.1.

[53] Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis,“The European Union as a Trade Power”, in Christopher Hill and Micheal Smith, eds., International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

[54] Ian Manners,“Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.2, 2002, pp.235-258.

[55] Andrew Moravcsik,“Europe: The Quiet Superpower”, French Politics, Vol.7, No.3/4, pp.409-413.

[56] [美] 杰里米·里夫金:《欧洲梦:21世纪人类发展的新梦想》,杨治宜译,重庆出版社2006年版。

[57] 参见 [英] 马克·伦纳德:《为什么欧洲会领跑21世纪》,廖海燕译,上海三联书店2009年版。

[58] [美] 罗伯特·卡根:《天堂与权力:世界新秩序中的美国与欧洲》,刘坤译,社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第103页。

[59] 赵晨、赵纪周、黄萌萌:《叙利亚内战与欧洲》,中国社会科学出版社2018年版。

[60] John Mearsheimer,“Bound to Fail: the Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, International Security, 2019, Vol.43, No.4, pp.7-50.

[61] “Munich Security Conference 2020: Westlessness”, https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report2020/?ftag=MSF0951a18.

[62] [德] 托马斯·里斯:《自由安全共同体中的美国权力》,载 [美] 约翰·伊肯伯里主编《美国无敌:均势的未来》,韩召颖译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第274页。

[63] The Economist, “Big Tech's $2trn Bull Run”, February 22, 2020.

[64] Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Michael Peel and Tobias Buck,“EU to Seek Exemptions from New US Sanctions on Iran,” Financial Time, May 9, 2018.

[65] 2018年7月,匈牙利追随美国特朗普政府,退出联合国拟议中的《全球移民协议》,而奥地利总理库尔茨2018年10月31正式表示奥地利不加入此项协议,理由是合法移民和非法移民的界限不明确,波兰也于2018年11月表态拒绝加入此项协议。

[66] Hilary Clinton,“A National Security Reckoning”, Foreign Affairs, October, 2020.

[67] Josep Borrell, “Let's Make the Most of This New Chapter in EU-US Relations”, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/88393/let%E2%80%99s-make-most-new-chapter-eu-usrelations_en.

[68] 赵晨:《全球治理的欧盟方案:涛声依旧还是变成了旧船票》,载严少华、赖雪仪主编《欧盟与全球治理》,社会科学文献出版社2020年版,第14—39页。

[69] “Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation(PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf.

[70] Ralph Ellis,“Marcron's CNN Interview”, November.11, 2018, http://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/10/world/fareed-zakaria-marcon-interview/index.html.

[71] 赵怀普:《欧盟共同防务视阈下的“永久结构性合作”机制探究》,《欧洲研究》2020年第4期。 plsO1Awl56Bu7AdspGKrxc0xBW4qiE5vsGWFnOZ2f5ne6NLT2LvGK+ywJb/BiFSK

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