摘要

正犯实质化，是指从存在论角度看，行为人没有亲自实行刑法分则规定某罪的全部构成要件行为，但是经过实质化、规范化的评价后，可以视为行为人亲自实行了刑法分则规定某罪的全部构成要件行为。正犯实质化的出现具有深厚的理论基础。首先，正犯实质化的出现与实质主义法运动的兴起、事实与价值辩证关系的发展以及人类认知模式的转变等重大法哲学命题密切相关。其次，人类朴素法感情的正义表达、刑事政策的现实性要求和社会结构的分工合作化是正犯实质化出现的社会学基础。最后，构成要件的实质解释、定罪量刑的必然要求和正犯的独特评价功能是正犯实质化的教义学基础。

诚然，正犯实质化有充足的正当性根据，但是，这并不意味着一切正犯实质化的做法都是合理的。正犯实质化的标准与限度尤为重要。我们在实现正犯实质化时应遵循合法性原则、等价性原则和类型化原则，尤其要坚持等价性原则，将其限制在合理的范围内。既不能回到形式化的限制正犯概念，认为只有行为人在存在论意义上亲自直接实施某罪全部的构成要件行为方能视为正犯，也不能走向极端的单一正犯概念，认为只要行为人与不法构成要件的实现具有可归责的因果关系即可视为正犯，而应坚持实质化的限制正犯概念，即只有行为人在规范论意义上支配了不法构成要件的实现才能认定为正犯。

间接正犯和共同正犯是正犯实质化的两种基本类型。 “间接”“共同”只是从存在论角度描述了实现犯罪的不同形式，在规范论意义上它们具有相同的本质，即均为符合基本构成要件的正犯。在间接实行的情形中，只要有足够的事实支撑评价主体得出行为人利用工具或者说通过支配他人实现了犯罪，即可从实质上视为符合基本构成要件。换言之，在规范论意义上，若能将被利用者的行为等价于幕后者亲自实行则可认定为间接正犯。被利用人具有意志自由、故意、期待可能性，以及被利用人是正犯或应负刑事责任等客观事实，并不能当然地否定幕后者为间接正犯。

在共同实行的情形中，只要有足够的事实支撑评价主体得出单个行为人支配了不法构成要件实现，即可判定为符合基本构成要件。进言之，在规范论意义上，若能将共同实行人的行为等价于自己亲自实行则可认定为共同正犯。在主观方面，行为人必须具有犯意的联系，方能奠定相互归属的效果；过失这一主观犯意也能满足机能行为支配的心理条件。在客观方面，只要共谋者在犯罪实行阶段实施了与犯罪有关的客观行为即可认定为共同正犯，或者虽然共谋者在犯罪实行阶段没有实施任何行为但其为犯罪集团或者犯罪组织的大人物，则也可以认定为共同正犯。倘若共谋者只是一般共同犯罪中的策划者、积极准备者，则不宜认定为共同正犯。

关键词：正犯实质化；存在论；规范论；间接正犯；共同正犯

Abstract

Substantive Principal Offender means that an actor can be regarded as a principal offender after a substantive and standardized evaluation even if he didn't carry out all the constitutive elements of a crime stipulated in the specific provisions of criminal law in person from the view of ontology. The emergence of Substantive Principal Offender has a profound theoretical basis. First of all, it is closely related to major issues in the philosophy of law, including the rise of the Substantive Law Movement, the development of the dialectical relationship between fact and value, and the transformation of human cognitive models. Secondly, its sociological basis lies in the just expression of human􀆴s naive feelings toward laws, the realistic requirements of criminal policies, and the labor division and cooperation in social structures. Finally, the essential interpretation of the constitutive elements, the inevitable requirements of conviction and sentencing, and the unique evaluation function of the principal offender offer the dogmatic basis for Substantive Principal Offender.

It is true that there is sufficient legitimate basis for Substantive Principal Offender, but this does not mean that all practices of Substantive Principal Offender are reasonable. The criteria and limits for Substantive Principal Offender are particularly important. We should follow the principles of legality, equivalence and categorization in identifying Substantive Principal Offender, prioritizing the principle of equivalence to limit it to a rea sonable range. We cannot return to the formal conception of restricted principal offenders, holding that only the actor directly implementing all the constitutive elements of a crime in the ontological sense can be regarded as principal offenders; nor can we go to the other extreme, the conception of unitary principal offenders, holding that an actor can be considered as a principal offender when there is imputable causality between the actor and the realization of the constitutive elements of a crime. Instead, we shall observe the concept of substantive limited actor, that is, only an actor dominates the realization of the illegal constitutive elements in the normative sense can be regarded as a principal offender.

Indirect principal offender and joint principal offender, two basic types of Substantive Principal Offender, describe different ways of committing crimes from the ontological point of view, but with the same essence in the normative sense, that is, they are both principal offenders meeting the basic constitutive elements. In the case of indirect execution, as long as there are enough facts to support the evaluation subject to conclude that the actor has used tools or committed the crime by domination of others, it can be regarded as conforming to the basic constitutive elements in substance. In other words, in the normative sense, a dominant can be identified as an indirect principal if the behavior of the utilized can be equivalent to the dominant􀆴s personal implementation. The objective facts that the utilized has freedom of will, intention and expectation, or he is the principal offender or should be held criminally responsible, cannot necessarily deny that the dominant is an indirect principal offender.

In joint act of perpetrating, as long as there are enough facts to support the evaluation subject to conclude that a single actor dominates the realization of the illegal constitutive elements, it can be judged that the actor has the basic constitutive elements. In other words, in the normative sense, if the actions of a joint actor can be equivalent to the actions of the principal offender himself, the joint actor can be regarded as a joint principal offender. Subjectively, acts of joints actors can only be imputed to each other given they have the connection of criminal intention, negating the concept of one-side joint principal offender. Negligence can also be identified as a normative connection of criminal intention, affirming the concept of negligent joint principal offender. Objectively, as long as the co-conspirator has committed an objective act related to the crime during the criminal execution stage, he can be regarded as a joint principal, or although the co-conspirator has not committed any acts during the criminal execution stage, he can also be considered as a joint principal offender if he is a major figure in a criminal group or a criminal organization. If a conspirator only plans or actively hatchers in general joint crimes, he shall not be regarded as a joint principal offender.

Key Words: Substantial Perpetrators;Ontology;Normative Theory;Indirect Perpetrator;Co-perpetrator