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Development of“development transferring finance”districts to promote interregional cooperation

DING Chengri 1, 2 , 3 ,REN Yuhang 4 ,WU Yuzhe 4 ,LIU Peijia 2
(1.School of Architecture,Planning and Preservation,University of Maryland,College Park 20742,USA;
2.School of Politics and Public Administration,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;
3.Research Center for Urban Development,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;
4.School of Public Affairs,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)

Abstract: Since the Chinese economic reform,economic and fiscal decentralization has provided greatly incentives to local governments in economic growth.But it also triggers a race to the bottom for local governments to compete for invest ments through taxes,subsidies and land prices,generating sever development problems like manufacturing over-capaci ty,over-dependency of public finance on land revenues,cha otic urban spatial development patterns etc.This paper pro poses“Development Transferring Finance”Special Districts(DTFs)to eliminate economic and fiscal incentives behind intergovernmental competition.The paper discusses micro foundations,operating scheme,and implementations of DTFs.It is concluded that DTFs have great potentials to promote interregional cooperation during fiscal decentraliza tion.

Key Words: development transferring finance;special dis trict;decentralization;intergovernmental competition;inter regional cooperation bXRxrvHW0SxX5Czgi+W8AmEUa6ab8cZXJMABlLfiVKUxFDNiidwr0Ag46U4hZHRh

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