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在任何社会，对民主治理质量的判断都必须基于一系列考虑。选举是否自由和公平？公民是否能接触到评估政治领导人和竞选人的必要信息？政府机构是否以富有竞争性和无偏见的方式来履行职责？
在本书中，我只关注民主治理中的一个方面——政府政策反映被治理者偏好的程度。我的目标是描述和解释在大众偏好和政府政策的关联中表现出来的“代表性”或“政策回应性”（我交替使用的术语）。我的重点在描述而不是开处方上。在描述政策如何不能反映（或者平等地反映）大众偏好时，我并不是要暗示对大众的完美（或者绝对平等）的回应性是最好的。
有多种原因支持政府政策偶尔偏离多数偏好：少数权利也很重要，多数群体有时候是短视的或者是被误导的，以至于政策制定者试图识别和反对。然而大众偏好与政策间的关联，以及这种关联在大众次级团体中的变化——确实提供了可以据此理解民主代表性本质及评价其质量的描述基准。
政策制定者对大众愿望的回应性完全平等是不可实现的，甚至也不可取。大众中的特定分支可能会在具体问题上持有对社区有害、违反重要的民主价值、或者对他们自己的利益有误导的或者有损害的偏好。另外，整体的不平等水平——我在随后的章节中要介绍到——看起来与美国人所欢迎的政治平等概念不兼容。而且，我们在过去几十年里见证了经济资源日益集中分配在最顶端收入人群，这强化了我们对政治不平等的关注。美国最富裕的公民自20世纪70年代以来经历了令人吃惊的收入和财富增长，而穷人和中产阶级的收入却几乎没有增长——而且如果不是因为他们每年都大量增长的工时，收入还会下降。 [50] 其他国家采用了一些政策来改善至少部分是全球经济变动引起的经济不平等的增长。美国却没有。针对富人的减税、弱化金融管制、对工会的打击以及对大众教育资助的削减，恶化了经济不平等。在这些变动面前，在威胁不富裕美国人的持续的经济挑战面前，本书随后所描述的代表性不平等是更加有意义的。
本书所报告的发现至多能提供一个广义的、对美国政治体系能在多大程度上将大众偏好纳入政府政策的认识。我希望能够通过说明会导致更强或更弱、更多或更少平等主义的回应性模式的条件，提供建立规范性评价（以及更长远的经验分析）的基础。在第八章，我讨论了我的发现的政策意涵，重点关注那些看来有望纠正政府回应性不平等的机制。一些读者可能不把现存的不平等视为需要强调的事，但我觉得许多人会有不同的想法。对那些跟我有共同的关注点的人而言，对大众偏好的回应性向最优势的美国人倾斜得太多了，政治改革富有挑战性的任务就在眼前。
在下一章，我讨论了适合于纳入政府对大众偏好回应性研究中的政策变动，并描述了我的偏好测量和政策结果编码的本质。在这个工作基础上，第三章开始分析政策回应性，并提出因果推论的重要议题：大众偏好和政府政策之间的相关关系，是否反映了大众对政策制定者的影响、政策制定者左右大众观点的能力，或者其他未观察到的因素的运作？
[1] ．Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Voting , 308.
[2] ．Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy , 262.
[3] ．Ibid.; Przeworski, “The Minimalist Conception of Democracy”; Riker, Liberalism against Populism .
[4] ．Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections , 5.
[5] ．Kramer, “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior”; Tufte, Political Control of the Economy .
[6] ．Bartels, Unequal Democracy .
[7] ．Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters , 269.
[8] ．Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Voting , 311.
[9] ．Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy , 233.
[10] ．Carmines and Kuklinski, “Incentives, Opportunities, and the Logic of Public Opinion in American Political Representation”; Gilens and Murakawa, “Elite Cues and Political Decision-Making”; Lau and Redlawsk, How Voters Decide ; Lau and Redlawsk, “Voting Correctly”; Lupia, “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias”; Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma ; Popkin, The Reasoning Voter ; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice ; Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion .
[11] ．E.g., Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions .
[12] ．Achen, “Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response”; Converse, “Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information”; Miller, “Information, Electorates, and Democracy”; Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public .
[13] ．Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion ; Zaller and Feldman, “A Simple Theory of the Survey Response.”
[14] ．Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public .
[15] ．Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”; Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public .
[16] ．Canes-Wrone, Who Leads Whom ?; Mycoff and Pika, Confrontation and Compromise .
[17] ．Meyerson, False Consciousness ; Pines, Ideology and False Consciousness .
[18] ．Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don't Pander , 322.
[19] ．Bartels, “Unenlightened Self-Interest”; Bartels, Unequal Democracy ; Graetz and Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts .
[20] ．Gilens, “Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences”; Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare ; Kuklinski et al., “Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship.”
[21] ．Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public , 381.
[22] ．Althaus, Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics .
[23] ．Althaus, Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics .
[24] ．Schuman and Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys , 277.
[25] ．Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare .
[26] ．Schuman and Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys , 281—283.
[27] ．Graetz and Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts .
[28] ．Bartels, Unequal Democracy .
[29] ．Berinsky, Silent Voices .
[30] ．Dahl, Polyarchy , 1.
[31] ．Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory , 90.
[32] ．Olson, The Logic of Collective Action .
[33] ．哲学和社会选择理论方面的大量文献考虑了在比较个体效用时的难点（或者是效用在国家间的差异）。可参见，例如，Nozick，“Interpersonal Utility Theory”；Sen， Collective Choice and Social Welfare 。
[34] ．Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action ; Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy ; Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions ; Zaller, “Coming to Grips with V.O. Key's Concept of Latent Opinion.”
[35] ．Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy .
[36] ．Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action .
[37] ．Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public , 65—66.
[38] ．Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy , 263.
[39] ．Langworth, Churchill by Himself , 573.
[40] ．参见Glynn et al.， Public Opinion ，第九章；Manza and Cook，“A Democratic Polity？”；以及Monroe and Gardner，“Public Policy Linkages”获取该领域的文献综述。
[41] ．Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, The Macro Polity .
[42] ．Griffin and Newman, Minority Report .
[43] ．Bartels, “Economic Inequality and Political Representation”; Bartels, Unequal Democracy .
[44] ．E.g., Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan ; Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda .
[45] ．Binder, Stalemate .
[46] ．Mayhew, Divided We Govern .
[47] ．Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action .
[48] ．Ibid., Fenno, Home Style ; Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions .
[49] ．E.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, The Macro Polity .
[50] ．Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics , 22.