注释

[1] ．Edward M.Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.viii.

[2] ．Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.361; N.H.Gibbs, Grand Strategy , vol.1, Rearmament Policy , in History of the Second World War , United Kingdom Military Series(London: HMSO, 1976), pp.772—775; Arnold Horelick, “Perspectives on the Study of Comparative Military Doctrine,” in Comparative Defense Policy , ed. Frank B.Horton(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p.195; Paul M.Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers , 1880—1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp.1—22, esp.7; Henry Kissenger, Problems of National Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp.9—10.

[3] ．Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.64.

[4] ．Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30(January 1978):169.

[5] ．Jervis, Perception , p.76.

[6] ．这是一个可溯至修昔底德之作的老论点。该论点以均势理论为外衣，在18世纪再次崭露。就其早期表现而言，这是一个对策性理论，它促使明智的政治家以“制衡”某个扩张性霸权的权力增长的方式去缔结同盟。同样的基本概念和假设广见于肯尼思·华尔兹对均势理论的更具预测性的重新阐述，以及罗伯特·杰维斯对安全困境的讨论。国家被假设成按照合理方式行事以保障它在自助体系中的安全的单一行为体。以无政府状态为背景，如果某国推行扩张政策，他国——如果它们享有自治——组成联盟反对扩张主义强权应属常态。该理论预言，制衡行为在国家间或国际体系中应时常发生，大致类似一架天平的某种权力态势应属常见结果。参见Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War trans. Rex Warner(1954; Harmondsworth England: Penguin, 1972); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp.116—123。

[7] ．Waltz, Theory , p.168.

[8] ．例如参见A.J.P.Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe , 1848—1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)。

[9] ．关于这类行为的一个解释和不那么明显的一个模仿，参见Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 29, 1980), pp.65—83。

[10] ．Fritz W.Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Throught,” International Security 3(Fall 1978): 152；另参见Benjamin Lambeth, “The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence,” International Security 4(Fall 1979); Stanley Sienkiewicz, “SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine,” International Security 2(Spring 1978)。

[11] ．Desmond Ball, “Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?” Arms Control Today , February 1981; Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels—The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration （Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980）, pp.31—34, 195—201; Aaron L.Friedberg, “A History of the U.S.Strategic Doctrine, 1945—1980,” Journal of Strategic Studies 3（December 1980）:37—71.参谋长联席会议主席戴维·琼斯（David Jones）将军在美国国会参议院对外关系委员会的讲话， SALT Ⅱ , 96th Cong., 1st sess. pt.1, p.381; U.S.Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto（Salt Ⅱ Treaty） , 96th Cong., 1st sess., pt.1, pp.169—170; David Alan Rosenberg, “‘A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954—1955,” International Security 6:3（Winter 1981—1982）:3—38; Henry S.Rowen, “Formulating Strategic Doctrine,” Appendix K—Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, June 1975（Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976）, pp.217—235;对这些材料的详细阅读表明，美国的核战争计划一直含有对苏联战略核力量发动大规模攻击的选择。

[12] ．“如果核大战对双方皆是威胁，必须如何行动以实现必要目标，即在本方遭受最小损失和破坏的情况下消灭敌人？美帝国主义者及其西欧盟国给出了如下答案：第一，大力强化军备竞赛，重点是核导弹和太空武器；第二，突然性因素……突然性可保证赢得先机，迅速消灭敌人的武装力量（首先是其战略力量和武器），扰乱对部队和整个国家的控制，并破坏经济和民众的士气。强劲而突然的袭击据信将在各方面令敌人瘫痪，其命运在战争的头几日中就会被决定。”V.D.Sokolovsky, Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts （London: Pall Mall Press, 1963）, p.66.

[13] ．International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance , 1983—1984 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp.3, 11;以及作者的估计。

[14] ．Taylor, Struggle , p.xxix.

[15] ．Jervis, “Cooperation,” p.76; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp.357—375; Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp.221—248.

[16] ．Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1950), p.381.

[17] ．Michael Howard, “The Armed Forces,” in Material Progress and World-Wide Problems , 1870—1898 , vol.11 of The New Cambridge Modern History , ed. F.H.Hinsley(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.217; Taylor, Struggle , p.xxviii, table 4.

[18] ．Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy , p.380.

[19] ．Ludwig Reiners, The Lamps Went Out in Europe , trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston(New York: Pantheon, 1955), p.136; L.C.F.Turner, Origins of the First World War (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), p.76.

[20] ．Henri Michel, The Second World War , trans. Douglas Parmee, 2 vols. (New York: Praeger, 1975), 1:36.

[21] ．Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).

[22] ．Carl von Clausewitz, On War , trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.605.

[23] ．F.H.Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.245.

[24] ．Taylor, Struggle , p.173.

[25] ．Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: Granada, 1979), pp.33—38.为我对普鲁士和法国的军事学说和能力的评论提供了依据。

[26] ．Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, Press, 1978), p.316.

[27] ．Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine , Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No.30(Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July, 1973), pp.65—66.

[28] ．Safran, Israel , p.285.

[29] ．该简述主要依据Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975); London Sunday Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974); Safran, Israel 。

[30] ．Safran, Israel , p.275.

[31] ．Herzog, The War of Atonement , p.271.

[32] ．Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War , p.123.

[33] ．William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p.314. XdiezE+3/J8M05uAU404iTWCq8L3c6M8KA7FZZAhx/I436H/CrEQsx4inLbiHm80