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很奇怪的是,凯南和波伦两人在对苏联行为的解释上意见是如此完全一致,但在欧洲未来的问题上他们却又如此坚决地相互反对,到1949年底他们各自结束了为自己从1945年初就发展起来的有关势力范围的截然对立的观点进行的辩护。凯南一开始主张彻底分裂欧洲大陆,但他改变了最初的观点,这是因为他对有关多极作为一种稳定力量所具有的诸多优点在不断进行着思考,还因为他一方面注意到了美国力量的有限性,另一方面他日益确信,如同在他的《回忆录》( Memoirs )中所指出的,“美国不适合成为一个雄伟的帝国,不管是制度化的还是暂时性的” [83] 。波伦一开始坚决反对势力范围,随着与苏联人谈判的失败,马歇尔计划和北约的成功,以及欧洲人自己欢迎美国向他们展示权威的明显意愿,他最初的反对被逐渐削弱了。重要的是,正是波伦的观点反映了华盛顿官方的主流思维中的每一个方面;而凯南,至少在这一问题上,是一个持久的批评家。

但值得追问的是,为何凯南的欧洲自治的“第三种力量”的观念一开始得到了华盛顿的广泛支持,但最终未能成为现实。几乎可以肯定的是,原因是欧洲人自身并不期望如此。欧洲人在面对他们认为来自东边的对均势的恶毒挑战时,他们开始从西边邀请一个更为友善的对抗性力量,而不是开启一个代价高昂的、耗时长久且成问题的重建自身的进程。尽管有些勉强,但美国对此表示支持。

如同凯南所观察的,时间的确会说明欧洲人的这一选择是否明智。但即使是过了40年,对那一问题的答案仍不明确。可以说,第二次世界大战后在欧洲形成的那一体系,不管这一选择在多大程度上是出于即兴创作、充满矫揉造作和突发奇想,但它被证明要比凯南或任何其他人当时可预见的更为稳定、更具灵活性。 [84] 它会持续多久,任何人都可以对此进行猜测。但考虑到历史的偶然性、非理性和反常性,这种不确定性表明,很小的事情也会对战后世界的稳定产生重要影响。

注释

[1] 本文原是为1983年8月在奥斯陆的挪威防务史中心举办的“欧洲与大西洋防务,1947—1953”研讨会所准备的。后略有修改,收入Olav Riste ed., Western Security: The Formative Year: European and Atlantic Defence, 1947—1953(Oslo: 1985),pp.60—91。

[2] Kennan to Bohlen,January 26,1945,Charles E.Bohlen Papers,Box 1,“Personal Correspondence 1944—1946,” Diplomatic Branch,National Archives. See also Charles E.Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929—1969(New York: 1973),pp.174—176;以及Kennan to Harriman,September 18,1944,George F.Kennan Papers,Box 28,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University.后一备忘录收入George F.Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950 (Boston: 1967),pp.222—223,但年份上却归在了1944年12月16日。

[3] Bohlen to Kennan,undated,Kennan Papers,Box 28.也可参见Bohlen, Witness to History, pp.176—177。

[4] JCS 973/1,“Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements,” August 3,1944,U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, I,699—703.也可参见Admiral William D.Leahy to Cordell Hull,May 16,1944,U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,1945 [hereafter FR: Yalta ] (Washington: 1955),pp.106—108。关于这些档案的重要性评价,参见Mark A.Stoler,“From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D.Embick,the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War,” Diplomatic History, VI(Summer,1982),312—313; and James F.Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945—1947(Wilmington,Delaware: 1979),pp.13—16。

[5] 关于这些观点参见Robert Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932—1945(New York: 1979),pp.389—391, 536—537; and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire,1941—1945 (New York: 1978),pp.259—273。

[6] 这是下面这本书的核心观点Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe,1943—1947 (New York: 1978)。

[7] Bohlen minutes,Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting,February 5,1945, FR: Yalta ,p.617.关于美国战后海外军事基地的政策,参见该书第二章。总司令部参谋长、海军上将威廉·D.莱希(William D.Leahy)曾早在1944年2月便对参谋长联席会议说:“他个人希望美国驻欧洲军队将在和平得以稳定时尽早撤走。”Minutes,144th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,February 4,1944,Combined Chiefs of Staff Records,CAB 88/4,Public Record Office,London.

[8] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941—1947 (New York: 1972),pp.206—211.

[9] Potsdam briefing book paper,“British Plans for a Western European Bloc,” July 4,1945,U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin(The potsdam Conference)1945 [hereafter FR: Potsdam ],I,256—264.

[10] Congressional Record, April 26,1944,p.3719.

[11] 官方的解释参见Cordell Hull to W.Averell Harriman,February 9,1944, FR: 1944 ,IV,826; a State Department Post-War Programs Committee memorandum,“Policy Toward the Settlement of Territorial Disputes in Europe,” July 28,1944,printed in Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation (Washington: 1949),p.593; a State Department briefing book paper prepared for the Yalta Conference,“American Policy Toward Spheres of Influence,” undated, FR: Yalta, p.105。更多背景参见Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.149—157; and Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p.536。

[12] 关于这一点参见Robert A.Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II, especially pp.167—174。战时关于威尔逊主义复苏的最畅销的书是Wendell Willkie, One World (New York: 1943); and Summer Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: 1944)。

[13] 例如参见State Department Division of European Affairs memorandum,“Current Problems in Relations with the Soviet Union,” March 24,1944, FR: 1944,IV,840; in an Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis report,#1552,“The Current Role of the Communist Party in the USSR,” June 12,1944,OSS Records;关于1945年4月20日埃夫里尔大使与詹姆斯·V.福里斯特尔的谈话,参见Walter Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 1951),p.47;以及国务院欧洲事务办公室主任雷蒙德·E.墨菲的备忘录,“Possible Resurrection of Communist International,Resumption of Extreme Leftist Activities,Possible Effect on United States,” June 2,1945, FR: Potsdam, I,267—280。也可参见第二章。

[14] 这显然是罗斯福的想法。参见John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: 1982),pp.9—13。另一强调苏联扩张的防御性文章参见Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis reports: #1337S,“Russian Intentions in the Mediterranean and Danube Basins,” October 20,1943; #2284, “American Security Interests in the European Settlement,” June 29,1944; #2669,“Capabilities and Intentions of the USSR in the Postwar Period,” January 5,1945,OSS Records; also JIC 250,“Estimate of Soviet Post-war Capabilities and Intentions,” January 18,1945,Army Staff Records,ABC 366 Russia Section 1-A,Modern Military Records Branch,National Archives。

[15] Department of State memorandum,“Foreign Policy of the United States,” December 1,1945, FR: 1946 ,I,1139.也可参见OSS Research and Analysis reports 2284 and 2669,cited above;波伦与盖罗德·T.罗宾逊草拟的报告:“The Capabilities and Intentions of the Soviet Union as Affected by American Policy,” December 10,1945,printed in Diplomatic History ,I(Fall,1977),389—399。

[16] 伯恩斯在纽约《先驱论坛报》论坛上的讲话,1945年10月3日, Department of State Bulletin, XIII(November 4,1945),709—711。

[17] Ethridge memorandum,“Summary Report on Soviet Policy in Rumania and Bulgaria,” December 7,1945, FR: 1945 ,V,637.

[18] 关于对苏联态度的转变,参见Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.282—315。

[19] 关于这一问题的备忘录参见Llewellyn Thompson and John D.Hickerson,both dated June 22,1945, FR: 1945,III,528—531。1945年1月10日,在参议院发表的宣布“放弃”孤立主义的著名演说中,参议员亚瑟·H·范登堡(Arthur H.Vandenberg)最早建议缔结德国裁军条约。参见当日的 Congressional Record, pp.164—167。

[20] 条约草案内容参见in FR: 1946,II,190—193。

[21] New York Times, May 6,1946.

[22] Kennan to Byrnes,March 6,1946, FR: 1946,V,519.也可参见Kennan to Bohlen,January 26,1945,Bohlen Papers,Box 1,“Personal Correspondence 1944—1946”; and Kennan to Carmel Office,May 10,1946, ibid., pp.555—556。

[23] The Byrnes Stuttgart speech of September 6,1946,is in the Department of State Bulletin, XV(September 15,1946),496—501.关于合并占领区问题参见John H.Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition (Durham: 1978),pp.96—101。

[24] 英国方面关于马歇尔与贝文之间谈话的记录,1947年12月18日, FR: 1947,II,824。关于对德和约的谈判,参见 FR: 1946, II,941—965; FR: 1947,II, 1—112,139—502,676—795。

[25] Transcript,Kennan post-lecture question and answer session,Air War College,April 10,1947,Kennan Papers,Box 17.也可参见Walter Bedell Smith to Byrnes,January 7,1947, FR: 1947,II,141; JCS 1769/1,“United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security,” April 29,1947, ibid .,I,741; John Balfour to the British Foreign Office,July 20,1947,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/61055/AN2552,Public Record Office,London; W.Averell Harriman to Truman,August 12,1947,Harry S.Truman Papers,PSF Box 178,“Foreign Affairs: Germany(2),” Harry S.Truman Library; and Robert Murphy to Samuel Reber,November 20,1947, FR : 1947,II,725。

[26] 例如参见Leahy to Hull,May 16,1944, FR: Yalta ,pp.107—108。

[27] Truman press conference,April 18,1946, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S.Truman,1946 [hereafter Truman Public Papers ](Washington: 1962),pp.211—212.

[28] 关于美国在1946年的伊朗、土耳其危机,以及希腊危机中的政策,参见Bruce R.Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran,Turkey,and Greece (Princeton: 1980)。

[29] “Memorandum Regarding Greece,” October 21,1946, FR: 1946,VII,243.

[30] Joseph M.Jones, The Fifteen Weeks(February 21-June 5,1947) (New York: 1955),p.141; also p.36,above.

[31] 关于这些讨论的档案参见 FR: 1947,II,139—471。

[32] 例如参见参谋长联席会议写给帕特森和福里斯特尔的备忘录,1947年3月13日, FR: 1947,V,112; PPS/1,“Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe,” May 23,1947, ibid., III,224—225; William L.Clayton memorandum,“The European Crisis,” May 27,1947, ibid., 230—232;凯南在国家战争学院的演讲,1947年6月18日,引自Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950, p.351; Burton Y.Berry to Kennan,July 31,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 31,“United Nations 1947—1949,” Diplomatic Branch,National Archives; Bohlen to Joseph C.Grew,August 2,1947,Bohlen Papers,Box 1,“Correspondence 1946—1949: G”; Kennan memorandum of a conversation with Clark Clifford,August 19,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 33,“Chronological—1947”; CIA 1,“Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States,” September 26,1947,Truman Papers,PSF Box 255,“Central Intelligence Reports—ORE 1948”。

[33] Minutes,PPS meeting,May 8,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32; Marshall to Jefferson Caffery,June 12,1947, FR: 1947,III,249; Transcript,Kennan National War College lecture,June 18,1947,Kennan Papers,Box 17; PPS/4,“Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Program from the United States Standpoint(Preliminary Report),July 23,1947,printed in Thomas H.Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis,eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,1945—1950 (New York: 1978),p.113; PPS/5,“Planning With Relation to a United Nations Program at the Forthcoming General Assembly,” August 7,1947, FR: 1947,I,594; Forrestal to Chan Gurney,December 8,1947,quoted in Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp.350—351.

[34] Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950, p.342.

[35] Berry to Kennan,July 31,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 31“United Nations 1947—1949.”政府内产生的相似观点,参见Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments,“Applying the Truman Doctrine to the United Nations,” July 30,1947, FR: 1947,I,577—583。凯南已经预计到这一提议,如同1947年7月28日的政策设计委员会会议的记录所显示的:“凯南先生已着手准备一份文件,提出了我们当前面临的是两个世界的局势的现实所涉及的政策意义,而联合国宪章的拟定是寄希望于一个世界体系的。”Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32,Diplomatic Branch,National Archives.

[36] Bohlen memorandum,August 30,1947, ibid., pp.763—764.也可参见波伦关于拉维特与战争部部分官员的讨论的记录,1947年8月30日, ibid., pp. 762—763;和the Forrestal Diary,August 31,1947,Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p.307。“United States Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan,” September 17,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32,“Minutes of Meetings—1947”。

[37] Revised summary of PPS/13,“Résumé of World Situation,” November 6,1947, FR: 1947 ,I,770n. See also the Forrestal Diary,November 7,1947,Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 341.

[38] 希克森关于与洛德·因弗查普尔谈话的记录,1948年1月21日, FR: 1948 ,III,11。

[39] F.B.A.Rundall minute,May 3,1947, ibid., FO 371/61054/AN1570.

[40] 关于这一点参见一份关于威廉·L.克莱顿与刘易斯·道格拉斯以及英国议会官员在伦敦谈话的备忘录,1947年6月25日, FR: 1947 ,III,281; Lovett to Clayton and Caffery,August 14,1947, ibid., pp.356—357; Truman speech at Rio de Janeiro,September 2,1947, Truman Public Papers: 1947 ,p.430; Lovett to Inverchapel,February 2,1948, FR: 1948 ,III,17—18; Bohlen to Lovett,August 9,1948, ibid., pp.208—209; and Marshall to United States embassies in Paris and other capitals, August 27,1948, ibid .,p.223。

[41] Kennan to Cecil B.Lyon,October 13,1947,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 33,“Chronological—1947.”关于凯南“五个权力”的观点,参见他在1948年的演讲Kennan Papers,Box 17;以及Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950 ,p.359。

[42] 关于杜鲁门政府对凯南观点的看法参见Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.55—65。

[43] Saltzmann address to the International Council of Women,Philadelphia,September 11,1947, Department of State Bulletin, XVII(September 21,1947),595. See also Secretary of State Marshall's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,January 8,1948,U.S.Congress,Senate,Committee on Foreign Relations, European Recovery Program (Washington: 1948),p.13.

[44] 关于这一点参见波恩与罗宾森的报告,报告日期不详,但早于1946年,Department of State Records,Decimal File 1945—1949,711.61/2-1446; Maxwell M.Hamilton to H.Freeman Matthews,February 14,1946, ibid.; William D.Leahy diary,May 20,1946,William D.Leahy Papers,Library of Congress; Robert Hooker memorandum,September 20,1946,Department of State Records,Decimal File 1945—1949,711.61/9-2046; John Balfour to Nevile Butler,June 9,1947,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/61048/AN2101; Balfour to Foreign Office,July 20,1947, ibid., FO 371/61055/AN2552; Harriman to Truman,August 12,1947,Truman Papers,PSF Box 178,“Foreign Affairs: Germany(2)”; Bohlen to Marshall,March 26,1948,Bohlen Papers,Box 4,“Memos(CEB)January—June 1948”; Willard Thorp to Marshall,April 7,1948, FR: 1948, I,558—559; Carlton Savage draft paper,April 26,1948,filed with PPS minutes,same day,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32; and the discussion in Chapter Six,below。

[45] 有关这一“受邀扩张”的更多讨论,可参见第二章的论述,另可参见Geir Lundestad,“Tmpire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe,1945—1952,” Journal of Peace Research, XXIII(1986),pp.263—277; and John Lewis Gaddis,“The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, VII(Summer,1983),pp.182—183。

[46] Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp.345—346, 381—382.

[47] Geir Lundestad, America,Scandinavia,and the Cold War,1945—1949 (New York: 1980),p.194.

[48] 马歇尔于1947年11月18日在芝加哥的讲话, Department of State Bulletin, XVII(November 30,1947),1025。

[49] JCS 1769/1, “United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security,” April 29,1947, FR: 1947 ,I,741.也可参见Office of Military Government for Germany memorandum,“A Summarized Analysis of the German Problem,” March 5,1947, ibid., II,229。

[50] Kennan to Marshall,January 20,1948, FR: 1948, III,7. See also PPS/23,“Review of Current Trends: U.S.Foreign Policy,” February 24,1948, ibid., I, 515—516.

[51] 1948年7月9日,凯南在第五次关于安全问题的试探性会谈上的发言, ibid., III,177。也可参见Kennan to Acheson,May 16,1947, FR: 1947 ,III,222。

[52] Lovett to Harriman,December 3,1948, FR: 1948 , III,301.

[53] 马歇尔于1947年11月18日在芝加哥的讲话, Department of State Bulletin, XVII(November 23,1947),1026。

[54] Rundall minute,February 23,1948, ibid., FO 371/68018/AN1702.

[55] Kennan to Marshall,January 6,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 33,“Chronological: Jan-May 1948.”也可参见PPS/13,“Résumé of World Situation,” November 6,1947, FR: 1947 ,I,776—777; transcripts of Kennan lectures to the Secretary of the Navy's Council and the National War College,December 3 and 18,1947,Kennan Papers,Box 17; Kennan to Marshall,February 3,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 33 “Chronological Jan-May 1948.”也可参见苏联使馆工作人员的报告,“Evaluation of Present Kremlin International Policies,” November 5,1947, FR: 1947 IV,606—612; and Walter Bedell Smith to Marshall,December 30,1947, ibid., II,908。也可参见David Mayers,“ Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan's Views,1947—1948,” International Security, XI(Summer,1986),124—162。

[56] JIC 380/2,“Estimate of the Intentions and Capabilities of the USSR Against the Continetal United States and the Approaches Thereto,1948—1957,” February 16,1948,Army Staff Records,ABC 381,USSR 2 Mar 46 Sec 5-B. On the deterrent effect of the atomic bomb,see Forrestal to Chan Gurney,December 8,1947,quoted in Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp.349—351; and NSC 30,“United States Policy on Atomic Weapons,” September 10,1948, FR: 1948, I,626—627.

[57] “Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union,” enclosed in Inverchapel to Marshall,January 13,1948, ibid., III,4—6.也可参见会议记录British Cabinet meeting of January 8,1948,Cabinet Records,CAB 128/12; C.P.(48)6,“The First Aim of British Foreign Policy,” January 4,1948, ibid., CAB 129/23; and C.P.48(72),“The Threat to Western Civilisation,” March 3,1948, ibid., CAB 129/25. See also Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary(New York: 1983) ,pp.513—525。

[58] Marshall to Truman,March 12,1948, FR: 1948 ,III,49—50.关于其他外国领导人对此表示的关切,参见 ibid., pp.6—7, 29—30, 34—35, 52—53。英国驻华盛顿使馆于1947年9月指出:“如果不是针对苏联的嚣张行为,马歇尔可能从来也不会提出他的那一建议,或者即便他提了,也不会得到公众支持。苏联不仅成功地阻止了美国退回到战前的孤立主义,现在还保证了美国将在西欧事务中发挥更为积极的作用。”Inverchapel to Foreign Office,September 6,1947,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/61056,Public Record Office,London。

[59] 拉维特与因弗查普尔的谈话备忘录,1948年1月27日和2月7日, ibid., pp.12—13, 21—23。

[60] Memorandum by George Butler,“Points for Discussion at S/P Meeting,” March 19,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 33,“Chronological Jan-May 1948”;约翰·希克森在第二次美国—英国—加拿大安全对话上的讲话,1948年3月23日, FR: 1948 , III,65; Inverchapel to Foreign Office,April 30,1948,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/71671/N5183。

[61] State Department publication 3462,“The North Atlantic Pact: Collective Defense and the Preservation of Peace,Security and Freedom in the North Atlantic Community,” printed in the Department of State Bulletin, XX(March 20,1949),342—350.也可参见拉维特在执行会议上向参议院外交关系委员会做的证词,1948年5月11日,U.S. Congress,Senate,Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series: The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington: 1973),p.9; FR: 1949, IV,194。

[62] 拉维特在第三次关于安全问题的试探性会谈上的讲话,1948年7月7日, FR: 1948 ,III,157; Hickerson to William J.McWilliams,November 27,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1947—1948”;波伦与挪威和丹麦外交部长的谈话备忘录,1949年2月8日和3月12日, FR: 1949 , IV,70—71,198—199;艾奇逊在众议院外交事务委员会上的讲话,1949年7月28日, Department of State Bulletin, XXI(August 8,1949),193。关于约翰逊的建议,参见他在参议院外交关系委员会的讲话,1949年4月21日, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty, p.228。

[63] Hickerson to McWilliams,November 27,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1947—1948.”关于“兵工厂”的概念也可参见Willard Thorp to Marshall,April 7,1948, FR: 1948 ,I,560。关于陆军的问题,参见波伦给马歇尔的信,1948年11月7日, ibid., p.654n; Marshall to Forrestal,November 8,1948, ibid., p.655;艾奇逊和约翰逊在参议院外交关系委员会执行会议上的证词, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty, pp.216,235。美国人“准备太充分了,可将枪给到任何苏联的天然敌人手中”,一份机密的英国政治报告在1948年夏指出。“有着世界工业能力的50%,但其人口却只有世界的7%”,美国“不可避免地必须采取一种在玩世不恭者看来可比作是雇佣外国雇佣兵的政策。”Confidential Political Report#8,“Military Aid for Western Europe,” June 26,1948,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/68019.

[64] 例如参见 Department of State Bulletin, XXX(March 20,1949),342—350。

[65] 凯南写给马歇尔和拉维特的备忘录草稿,1948年9月26日,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1947—1948.”也可参见凯南在国家战争学院、美国海军战争学院和五角大楼联合会议上的演讲全文,1948年9月17日,10月11日和11月8日,均见于Kennan Papers,Box 17; and PPS/43,“Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact,” November 23,1948, FR: 1948 ,III,283—289。

[66] London Conference communique,June 7,1948, FR: 1948 ,II,315.关于伦敦会议的文件,参见 ibid., pp.1—374。

[67] State Department policy statement,“Germany,” August 26,1948, ibid., p.1298.

[68] 关于凯南观点的全面论述,参见PPS 37/1,“Position to be Taken by the U.S. at a CFM Meeting,” November 15,1948, FR: 1948 ,II,1320—1338. See also Kennan's memorandum of March 8,1949, FR: 1949 ,III,96—102; and his Memoirs: 1925—1950 ,pp.415—448。

[69] Minutes,Acheson-Kennan discussion,March 9,1949, FR: 1949,III,102—103.关于国家安全委员会指导小组的形成参见会议记录The Policy Planning Staff meeting of January 28,1949,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32。关于对“A方案”的接受度,也可参见Wilson D.Miscamble,“George F.Kennan,the Policy Planning Staff and American Foreign Policy,1947—1950”(Ph.D.Dissertation,University of Notre Dame,1979),pp.134—172。“如同你注意到的,凯南在国务院是位很有影响的人物”,英国驻华盛顿大使向外交部汇报说:“我认为他的德国使命(与他的国安全小组讨论相关的)可能尤其重要。Sir Oliver Franks to Foreign Office,March 4,1949,Foreign Office Records,FO 371/74160.

[70] Bohlen to Kennan,October 25,1948,Bohlen Papers,Box 4,“Memos(CEB)July-December 1948.” 也可参见Hickerson to McWilliams,November 23,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1947—1948”; Robert Murphy to Jacob Beam,December 7,1948, FR: 1948 , II,1320n; Murphy to Marshall S.Carter,January 14,1949,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 15,“Germany 1947—1948”。

[71] Bruce to Acheson,May 14,1949, FR: 1949 ,III,878.也可参见Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950 ,p.445。

[72] 艾奇逊所写的关于与参议员汤姆·康纳利(Tom Connally)和阿瑟·范登堡(Arthur Vandenberg)谈话的备忘录, FR: 1949,IV,109。 也可参见贝文向国家安全委员会宣读的一则信息,1948年5月20日, FR: 1948 ,III,122,以及Timothy P.Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport,Connecticut: 1981),especially pp.4—8, 137—141。沃特尔·李普曼在1949年2月给凯南的一封信中提出类似的观点:“西方对我们离开欧洲、撤过大西洋的焦虑可为北大西洋安全条约所填补。事实上,这是其主要优势,它为剩下的欧洲提供了司法基础。”Kennan Papers,Box 28.

[73] Secret conclusions,Cabinet meeting of March 5,1948,Cabinet Records,CAB 128/14.也可参见1948年3月8日会议的会议记录, ibid., CAB 128/12。

[74] Lovett to Harriman,December 3,1948, FR: 1948,III,303.威廉·克莱顿在1948年9月写信给洛维特说:“英国的麻烦在于,他们仍或多或少地寄希望于在我们的帮助下,他们将能够保存英帝国及领导。……我们可能拯救他们,但却不能拯救他们作为帝国集团领袖的地位,我们也不打算这么尝试,我们将开始观察我们将欧洲拉出困境的巨大努力的后果。”Clayton to Lovett, September 17,1948,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1947—1948”.

[75] Jebb to Kennan,April 7,1949, FR: 1949,IV,289—291.

[76] 凯南在1949年6月6日的介绍会上所做的笔记, ibid., Box 27,“Europe 1949”。

[77] Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950 ,pp.426—464.

[78] PPS 55,“Outline: Study of U.S.Stance Toward Question of European Union,” July 7,1949, ibid., Box 27,“Europe 1949”; Kennan to Acheson and Webb,August 22,1949, ibid., Box 33,“Chronological 1949.”

[79] 凯南、尼布尔和史密斯的讲话,政策规划司的会议纪要,1949年6月13日,6月14日, ibid., Box 32。

[80] PPS minutes,meeting of October 18,1949, ibid. “凯南先生……说他认为,我们必须决定我们和我们的朋友是强大到足以作为一个团体掌控苏联人和德国人;还是决定我们不用强大到那样做,进而放弃创建在欧洲的第三种力量,这或许最为可能以这种或那种方式为德国人所主导。他还说,他倾向于第二种观点,并认为欧洲事务司(EUR)总体上倾向于第一种。”Minutes,PPS meeting of October 17,1949,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 32.

[81] David Bruce to Acheson,October 22,1949, FR: 1949,IV,343.对于“是否德国可安全地被吸收进任何不包括美国和英国的西欧国家联合”,约翰·希克森也表达了“严重的怀疑”。Hickerson to Kennan,October 15,1949,Policy Planning Staff Records,Box 27,“Europe 1949”.

[82] Bohlen to Kennan,undated but November,1949, ibid.; Kennan to Bohlen,November 17,1949, ibid.

[83] Kennan, Memoirs : 1925—1950, p.464.

[84] 参见A.W.DePorte, Europe Between the Super-Powers: The Enduring Balance (New Haven: 1979)。 qoOlHjSCwqAKNsBC7PTBjfD9Sgu4cpdTxoCrIxWX9ifBTaKmMopUSI86F7CeK32B

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