购买
下载掌阅APP,畅读海量书库
立即打开
畅读海量书库
扫码下载掌阅APP

历史不可避免地会涉及透过更近事态的棱镜去看更远的过去。美国在随后的冷战历史中不止一次地对想象的苏联和/或“共产主义”扩张威胁反应过度,这一事实无可争辩。但这也在某种程度上让我们看不到一个同样重大的事实,即在战后的头几年里,苏联的行为不只引起了美国人的警觉,而且也引起了其余世界相当一部分人的警觉。但至于警觉的理由有多充分或它多么准确地反映了塑造苏联政策的现实,则是可以质疑的问题。但要否认这种警觉本身的真实性,或否认不止美国存有这一警觉,则是透过棱镜所看到的不必要的歪曲。毕竟,恐惧可以是真实的,哪怕是非理性的。如同西格蒙德·弗洛伊德(Sigmund Freud)曾说过的那样,连妄想狂都可能有真实的敌人。 [112]

注释

[1] Winston S.Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Bantam Edition(Boston:1948),p.vii.

[2] “The 36-Hour War,” Life, XIX(November 19,1945),27—35.关于阿诺德在1945年11月12日的报告全文,参见 The War Reports of General of the Army George C.Marshall,General of the Army H.H.Arnold,Fleet Admiral Ernest J.King (Philadelphia: 1947),pp.419—470,especially pp.452—570。

[3] 对于“大陆主义”最简洁的定义,参见Mark A.Stoler,“From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D.Embick,the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War,” Diplomatic History, VI(Summer,1982),304。也可参见Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935—1941(Ithaca:1966),pp.100—101;和Wayne S.Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932—1945(Lincoln: 1983),pp.6—7。但关于这一军事计划的影响参见Fred Greene,“The Military View of National Policy,1904—1940,” American Historical Review, LXVI(January,1961),354—377;和Michael S.Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941—1945(New Haven: 1977),pp.27—31。

[4] Ibid., pp.8—12,113,243; Robert Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932—1945(New York:1979),pp.12,68,106,152,227.

[5] Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal, XXIII(April,1904), 421—444.也可参见Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York:1919)。

[6] Frederick Sherwood Dunn,“An Introductory Statement,” in Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, edited by Helen R.Nicholl(New York: 1944),p.x.

[7] Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: 1942),p.195.也可参见Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, p.33。代表这一论点的其他著作包括William T.R.Fox, The Super-Powers: The United States,Britain,and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: 1944),和Robert Strausz-Hupé, The Balance of Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States (New York: 1945)。

[8] Walter Lippmann, U.S.Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: 1943),especially pp.49,94,105.对于这本书的观点的起源和好评可参见Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: 1980),pp.404—408。

[9] 对这一进展最好的论述参见Robert A.Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: 1967)。

[10] 例如参见Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, p.60; Lippmann, U.S.Foreign Policy, pp.165—168。

[11] 关于这一点参见Strausz-Hupé, The Balance of Tomorrow, pp.275—276; also Divine, Second Chance, pp.297—298。

[12] Roosevelt meeting with the Senate Military Affairs Committee,January 31,1939,as cited in Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, p.304.也可参见 ibid., p.243; and Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p.321。

[13] 关于这一点参见John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941—1947(New York: 1972),pp.24—25。

[14] 1945年1月6日,罗斯福的国情咨文,Samuel I.Rosenman,ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.Roosevelt (New York: 1941—1950),XIII,498。也可参见1943年12月24日的炉边谈话, ibid., XII, 558。

[15] Waldo H.Heinrichs,Jr.,“The Role of the United States Navy,” in Dorothy Borg and Sumpei Okamoto,eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931—1941(New York: 1973),pp.201—204.

[16] Jefferson Caffery to Cordell Hull,October 20,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FR ): 1944, III,743.也可参见Stoler,“From Continentalism to Globalism,” pp.311,314。

[17] War Reports, pp.452—453,457,463—464.也可参见Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, pp.39—42。令人奇怪的是,阿诺德的未来战争观还伴随着对空军在无土栽培中的经验的热情考虑。这些方法可以在没有土壤的情况下满足对“土豆、萝卜、莴苣和黄瓜”需求。 The War Reports of General of the Army George C.Marshall,General of the Army H.H.Arnold,Fleet Admiral Ernest J.King (Philadelphia: 1947),pp.465—466.

[18] Ibid., p.464.关于对这一新技术的影响的抽样评估,参见Bernard Brodie,ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: 1946); Dexter Masters and Katharine Way,eds., One World or None (New York: 1946); William Liscum Borden, There Will Be No Time: The Revolution in Strategy (New York: 1946);以及B.H.Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (New Haven: 1947)。

[19] 关于威尔逊从均势角度思考的能力,最有说服力的叙述参见N.Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York: 1968),especially pp.8,36—41。Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston:1977),pp.193—204。丹尼尔·耶金对新的“国家安全的福音”的特征做了简洁的论述。

[20] New York Times, September 9,1945.

[21] H.J.Mackinder,“The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs, XXI(July,1943),595—605.

[22] Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp.41—44.尽管如此,斯派克曼在1942年也提出,美国和英国可能寻求保存某种形式的德国权势以制衡苏联在欧洲的影响,因为“一个从乌拉尔山到北海的苏联并不比一个从北海到乌拉尔山的德国好到哪里去”。Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: 1942),p.460.

[23] Lippmann, U.S.Foreign Policy, p.164.也可参见Fox, The Super-Powers, pp.103—106。

[24] 罗斯福在战时广告委员会会议上的非正式讲话, Rosenman,ed., Roosevelt Public Papers, XIII,99。

[25] 关于这一点参见Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp.533—534;以及John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: 1982),pp.9—13。

[26] Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.206—211.关于杜鲁门对联合国的信任参见Robert J.Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman,1945—1948 (New York: 1977),pp.49—50。

[27] Robert L.Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F.Byrnes,Roosevelt,Truman,and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: 1982),pp.133—134.Robert H.Ferrell,ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S.Truman (New York: 1980),pp.31—32.

[28] Potsdam Briefing Book Paper,“British Plans for a Western European Bloc,” July 4,1945, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin(The Potsdam Conference) 1945(Washington: 1960),I,262—263.关于国务院的观点参见Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service,the Soviet Union, and the Cold War,1933—1947 (Chicago: 1980),pp.81—105。 共和党外交政策首席专家同意这一观点,参见Ronald W.Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: 1982),pp.272—276。关于美国转而将势力范围作为其战后安排的基础,本书第三章将作论述。

[29] 晚至1946年4月,杜鲁门总统自己还公开称美国是英国和苏联之间的“仲裁”。1946年4月18日,杜鲁门在记者招待会上的讲话, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S.Truman,1946 (Washington: 1962),pp.211—212。

[30] JCS 973/1,“Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements,” August 3,1944, FR: 1944 ,I,699—703.也可参见William D.Leahy to Cordell Hull,May 16,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,1945 (Washington: 1955),pp.106—108。关于这些档案的重要性的论述,参见Stoler,“From Continentalism to Globalism,” pp.312—313; Walter S.Poole,“From Conciliation to Containment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Coming of the Cold War,1945—1946,” Military Affairs, XLII(February,1978),12; and James F.Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945—1947(Wilmington,Delaware: 1979),pp.13—16。

[31] JIC 250, “Estimate of Soviet Post-War Capabilities and Intentions,” January 18,1945,Army Staff Records,ABC 336 Russia Section 1-A,Record Group 319,National Archives.也可参见战略情报局研究分析处撰写的关于苏联意图的报告:#1337S,“Russian Intentions in the Mediterranean and Danube Basins,” October 20,1943; #2284,“American Security Interests in the European Settlement,” June 29,1944; #2669,“Capabilities and Intentions of the USSR in the Postwar Period,” January 5,1945,all in O.S.S.Records;也可参见战略情报局主任威廉·多诺万1943年10月所撰写的关于苏联意图的乐观报告, ibid., USSR Division—1945,Entry 1;以及Stephen E.Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier,General of the Army,President-Elect ,1890—1952(New York: 1983),pp.399—404。有关美国军事领导人直到1945年夏仍未开始严肃思考在欧洲大陆建立永久基地的证据,可参见Elliott Vanvelnter Converse III,“United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System,1942—1948” (Ph.D.Dissertation,Princeton University,1984),pp.90—98,137—138,151—154。迟至1945年12月,艾森豪威尔将军告知战争内阁:“朱可夫将军告诉他,苏联决定与美国结成朋友,提高其生活水平,接受每一个协议。”War Council minutes,December 3,1945,Robert P.Patterson Papers,Box 23,Library of Congress.

[32] Sherry, Preparing for the Next War ,pp.102—103.See also Forrest C.Pogue, George C.Marshall: Organizer of Victory (New York: 1973),pp.574—575.

[33] 从来就不对苏联人抱有信心的莱斯利·R.格罗夫斯(Leslie R.Groves)将军认为,苏联可能需要20年才能制造出一枚原子弹。Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapons: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945—1950(New York: 1980),pp.98—99.

[34] 转引自Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace ,1943—1945(Baltimore: 1970),pp.80—81。

[35] Ibid., p.81.

[36] Sherry, Preparing for the Next War ,pp.53,84—87,168.

[37] 类似的考虑导致空军领导人热情地支持由联合国管理的战后国际警察部队的观念,它将很大程度地依赖于空军保持和平。Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943—1945(Balitmore: 1970),pp.43—51。

[38] Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace ,pp.75—83,111; Sherry, Preparing for the Next War ,pp.45—46; Converse,“United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System,” pp.143—145,151—154,191—234.尽管在这一点上,苏联有某种正当的声称,即只是效仿美国人和英国人的先例,当时他们拒绝让苏联人在1943年意大利投降后的占领中发挥任何实质性作用。

[39] Hull to Harriman,February 9,1944, FR :1944,IV,824—826.关于波伦在制定这份文件时的作用,参见DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence ,p.111。

[40] 美国对这些观点的态度参见Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War ,pp.133—173; also Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet American Conflict Over Eastern Europe (New York: 1974),especially pp.369—377。

[41] Harriman to Harry Hopkins,September 10,1944, FR: 1944, IV,989.也可参见美国历史学家对这些事件的重新解读,Thomas T.Hammond,ed., Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War (Seattle:1982)。

[42] 引自W.Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin : 1941—1946(New York: 1975),p.444。关于罗斯福在他生命的最后几个月里对苏联所抱幻想的破灭,参见Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy ,pp.523—527。

[43] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.13—15.

[44] 参见William Hillman,ed., Mr.President (New York: 1952),p.153;以及Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: 1985),pp.132—136。

[45] Wallace Diary,May 18,1945,转引自John Morton Blum,ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A.Wallace,1942—1946 (Boston: 1973),p.451。关于杜鲁门在1945年4月23日与莫洛托夫的会面,参见Harry S.Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City,New York: 1955),pp.79—82,波伦对此次会晤的记录对此进行了补充,发表于 FR: 1945,V.256—258。

[46] “人们头脑中贮存有相当多的‘角色’或认知结构,代表着各种特定人物的性格——拥有一颗金子般的心的渔夫,推手推车随叫随停的女侍者,‘城郊牛仔’,对社会抱有偏见的顽固派,等等。人们往往基于高度相似而将偶尔的熟人或公众人物纳入到这些特定的人物特征中。受彭德格斯特(Pendergast)这个人物的影响,杜鲁门期待从未到访过西方的革命者斯大林能理解美国的公众舆论。”Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: 1985),p.178.

[47] Truman Diary,July 17 and 30,1945,Ferrell,ed., Off the Record, pp.53,58.也可参见Wallace Diary,October 15,1945,Blum,ed., The Price of Vision, p.490; and the Stettinius Diary,October 22,1945,Thomas M.Campbell and George C.Herring, The Diaries of Edward R.Stettinius,Jr.,1943—1946 (New York: 1975),pp.439—440。关于彭德格斯特的比喻,参见Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p.75; Jonathan Daniels, Man of Independence (Philadelphia: 1950),p.285。

[48] 例如参见Truman's campaign remarks in Eugene,Oregon,June 11,1948, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S.Truman, 1948(Washington: 1963),p.239。

[49] 对东欧事件的论述,参见Davis, The Cold War Begins, pp.288—334,358—368; Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo: 1978),pp.127—135,159—164,205—213,235—247,271—278; Richard C.Lukas, Bitter Legacy: Polish-American Relations in the Wake of World War II (Lexington,Kentucky: 1982); and Michael M.Boll, Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943—1947(Lexington,Kentucky: 1984)。

[50] Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.325—331.

[51] Russell D.Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945—1954(Norman,Oklahoma:1981),pp.139—150; Charles M.Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy,the Cold War,and Korea, 1945—1950(Kent,Ohio: 1981),pp.56—83; James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea,1941—1950 (Honolulu: 1985),pp.28—98.

[52] Alfred E.Eckes,Jr. A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941—1971(Austin: 1975),pp.205—208.

[53] Bruce R.Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran,Turkey,and Greece (Princeton: 1980),pp.270—298.对1945年年底苏联采取的单边行动的两份总结分别是“Summary of Russian Dispatches for the Secretary's Diary,” November 26,1945,James V.Forrestal Papers,Box 100,“Book II,Item 30,” Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University; and a Department of State memorandum,“Foreign Policy of the United States,” December 1,1945, FR: 1946,I,1134—1139.

[54] Forrestal Diary,December 4,1945,Walter Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 1951),p.124.有关苏联在这一时期遵守协议的新近的、且不那么批判性的重新评估,可参见Melvyn P.Leffler,“Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,” International Security, XI(Summer,1986),pp.88—123。

[55] 杜鲁门在1945年10月8日的新闻发布会的讲话,参见 Truman Public Papers: 1946,pp.384,387; and the Stettinius Diary,October 22,1945,Campbell and Herring,eds., Stettinius Diaries, p.437。

[56] 新近对这些发展的最好论述参见Messer, The End of an Alliance, pp.137—166.杜鲁门1946年1月5日的争议备忘录,参见他的著作 Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City,New York: 1955),pp.551—552。

[57] Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp.304—342.

[58] 引自Hillman,ed., Mr.President, p.107。职业外交官艾尔布里奇·德布罗(Elbridge Durbrow)指出了新的强硬路线的意义:“这里有一种总体感觉,即在全面下注后终于认识到,与苏联拥有真正良好关系的唯一途径是,当我们认为自己正确时,要以武力支持我们的立场。如果我们能够在从朝鲜到通布图的一线都保持这一立场,我们可能开始向那一方向发展……史密斯将军表现了恰当的态度,并将尽可能地让那些孩子们得到深刻印象,即我们不是对着自己的帽子说话听回声的。”Durbrow to Charles W.Thayer,April 11,1946,Charles E.Bohlen Papers,Box 1 “Personal(CEB)1946,” Diplomatic Branch,National Archives.

[59] 克利福德的报告全文见于Arthur Krock. Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: 1963),pp.419—482。

[60] Truman memorandum,September 19,1946,引自Margaret Truman, Harry S.Truman (New York: 1973),pp.317—318。

[61] Ibid., p.347.

[62] 引自 Time, XLVII(June 17,1946),26。最同情苏联的一位前大使约瑟夫·E.戴维斯(Joseph E.Davies)在1946年初评论道:“我不知道有什么制度需要如同苏联那样高压的‘公共关系’组织。他们的确似乎不能让其理由得到理解,尽管如同有时发生的,他们有好的理由。”Davies to Clarence Dykstra,January 8,1946,Joseph E.Davies Papers,Box 22,Library of Congress.有关在多大程度上苏联行为使那些愿对苏联表示友好质疑的人被疏远的指标,参见Jonathan Evers Boe,“American Business: The Response to the Soviet Union,1933—1947” (Ph.D.Dissertation,Stanford University,1979),pp.235—237; and,on Eleanor Roosevelt,Joseph P.Lash, Eleanor: The Year Alone (New York: 1973),pp.73—99。

[63] Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.32—62.美国在战时对苏联的态度的全面论述参见Ralph B.Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance,1939—1945 (Chapel Hill: 1976)。

[64] 参见John Lewis Gaddis, Russia,the Soviet Union,and the United States: An Interpretive History (New York: 1978),pp.27—56;也可参见本书第一章。

[65] 对此问题的最好的论述参见Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, pp.37—45。也可参见Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality (New York: 1975),pp.136—139。

[66] 例如可参见John P.Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Princeton: 1972)。

[67] 迈克尔·谢里(Michael Sherry)指出了战时五角大楼领导人的倾向是,下一场战争将是与一个极权国家的战争,尽管并未明确具体会是哪个国家。Michael S.Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941—1945(New Haven: 1977),pp.52—53。有关这一观念的当代表述可参见William Liscum Borden, There Will Be No Time: The Revolution in Strategy (New York: 1946),pp.181,198。有关美国倾向于将极权主义与侵略联系起来的未来观,可参见Eduard Maximilian Mark,“The Interpretation of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States,1928—1947” (Ph.D.Dissertation,University of Connecticut,1978),pp.95—96,326—329。

[68] 引自Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p.181。福里斯特尔自己在1945年6月指出:“并非不可想象的是,世界政治中真正的反动分子将是那些现在自称为革命者的人,因为其哲学的动力全都指向国内集权,其不可避免的结果是通过大众甚或在这一体系中拥有权势的人——如希特勒、墨索里尼和仁裕——来对普通人进行剥削。”Forrestal Diary,June 30,1945,Walter Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 1951),pp.72—73.

[69] Truman letter of November 11,1946,引自Margaret Truman, Harry S.Truman, p.323。也可参见Truman to Margaret Truman,March 13,1947, ibid., p.343。

[70] 杜鲁门在电台新闻协会所做的非正式讲话, May 13,1947, Truman Public Papers: 1947, pp.238—239。

[71] 杜鲁门在贝勒大学的演讲,March 6,1947,Monticello,July 4,1947,and Rio de Janeiro,September 2,1947, ibid., pp.170,324,429。

[72] 杜鲁门就援助希腊、土耳其问题向国会做的演讲,1947年3月12日, ibid., p.178。更进一步的讨论参见Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.65—66。

[73] Gaddis, Russia,the Soviet Union,and the United States, pp.65—145;也可参见该书第一章。

[74] 至少美国是这么看待斯大林的行动的。参见John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941—1947(New York: 1972),pp.47—49。但沃伊切克·马斯特尼怀疑斯大林的首要动机是不是改善与西方的合作。 Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy,Warfare,and the Politics of Communism, 1941—1945(New York: 1979),pp.94—97.

[75] Division of European Affairs memorandum,“Current Problems in Relations With the Soviet Union,”March 24,1944, FR: 1944, IV,840.也可参见O.S.S.Research and Analysis report #1552,“The Current Role of the Communist Party in the USSR,” June 12,1944,Office of Intelligence and Research Files,Department of State Records,National Archives。

[76] Forrestal Diary,June 30,1945,Millis,ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p.72.

[77] 关于这一点参见Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy,Warfare,and the Politics of Communism, 1941—1945(New York: 1979),pp.194,231; also William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York: 1982),pp.75—82。

[78] 由查尔斯·E.波伦和杰罗德·T.鲁宾逊(Geroid T.Robinson)于1945年底草拟的一份国务院报告,以一种无助的公平感指出:“决不能期待未来苏联领导人的外交政策将完全为马克思主义理论所决定。自苏联政府成立以来,这从来都不是事实……另一方面,假设苏联领导人未来对非苏联国家及其内部的力量和运动的态度将完全不会为马克思主义意识形态所影响,也是非常不安全的。”“The Capabilities and Intentions of the Soviet Union as Affected by American Policy,” December 10,1945,后来发表于 Diplomatic History, I(Fall,1977),p.395。

[79] 就此而言尤其重要的是斯大林在1946年2月9日的“选举”演说。该演说明确给出了一种苏联政策重新强调意识形态的印象,无论是有意还是无意的。关于该演说的影响的讨论见Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence:The American Foreign Service,the Soviet Union,and the Cold War, 1933—1947,pp.172—173;有关较早时期的意识形态关切迹象的讨论,也可参见Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.296—299。

[80] Newsweek, XXVIII(September 9,1946),27.有关到1946年夏天,约翰·杜勒斯如何形成苏联行为的近乎完整的意识形态解释的启发性讨论,参见Ronald W.Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: 1982),pp.276—287。

[81] 关于这一点参见Eduard Mark,“American Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War: An Alternative Interpretation,” Journal of American History, LXVIII(September,1981),313—336。

[82] 关于华莱士对此事的参与参见Blum,ed., The Price of Vision, pp.589—601,612—632; also J.Samuel Walker, Henry A.Wallace and American Foreign Policy (Westport,Connecticut: 1976),pp.149—165。杜勒斯对华莱士的评论值得提到:“如果你轻拍狗而它没有咬你,那可说是一个好的开始办法。但如果多拍几下后它仍会咬你,那便有必要想别的办法。华莱士待在幕后,没有太多手被咬的经历。”Dulles to Irving Fisher,September 23,1946,John Foster Dulles Papers,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University.

[83] 凯南在1946年夏指出:“安全可能是其基本动机,但他们对安全是如此焦虑和怀疑,以至于其客观后果与侵略和无限扩张动机的后果完全相同。他们明显试图削弱所有他们无法统治的权势中心,以便减少来自任何可能对手的威胁。”Kennan paper,“Draft of Information Policy on Relations with Russia,” July 22,1946,Dean Acheson Papers,Box 27,“State Department Under Secretary Correspondence,1945—1947,” Harry S.Truman Library.丹尼尔·耶金将凯南描述为一位他所称的“里加公理”(Riga axioms)的倡导者。“里加公理”是一种对苏联行为的以意识形态为基础的解释,令人吃惊的是它过于简单化。参见Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: 1977),pp.27—28,170。

[84] “长电报”发表于 FR: 1946, VI, 696—709。

[85] 参见Larson, Origins of Containment ,pp.52—57。

[86] Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950 (Boston: 1967),pp.292—295,354—367.

[87] “X”[George F.Kennan],“The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, XXV(July,1947),566—582.

[88] Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, p.215.

[89] JCS 1769/1,“United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security,” April 29,1947, FR: 1947,I,740.

[90] 对这一点的最好论述仍是William Hardy Mcneill, America,British & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941—1946(London: 1953),pp.753—757,尽管其注解中引用的谢里、史密斯和康弗斯的著作表明了,麦克尼尔某种程度上夸大了美国军方取代英国权势的热情。

[91] JIC 250/7,“Capabilities and Intentions of the U.S.S.R.in the Post-War Period,” February 7,1946,Army Staff Records,ABC 336 Russia 22 Aug 43 Sec 1-B,Modern Military Records Branch,National Archives; Robert Murphy to H.Freeman Matthews,April 3,1946,Department of State Records,861.00/4-346,Box 6462, Diplomatic Branch,National Archives; War Department intelligence review,“Soviet Foreign Policy: A Summation,” May 2,1946,Elsey Papers,Box 63,“Foreign Relations—Russia 1946—Report—Folder 3”; Joint Chiefs of Staff to Truman,July 26,1946,Clark M.Clifford Papers,Box 14,“Russia(folder 3),”Harry S.Truman Library; George F.Kennan lecture to Foreign Service and State Department personnel ,September 17,1946,George F.Kennan Papers,Box 16,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University; Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretaries of Army and Navy,March 13,1947, FR:1947, V,111—112.

[92] 林肯将军在执行会议上的证词,1947年4月2日,U.S.Congress,Senate,Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine (Washington: 1973),p.160。“苏联仍不期望战争,”国务院顾问哈利·A.诺特(Harley A.Notter)在7月份指出:“但相信尽管有我们,他们仍能实现其对战略目标的控制,不只是在欧洲和亚洲的心脏地带,而且事实上是在这些大陆的海岸边的从海洋到空中的每一个重大的脆弱点。”Notter to Dean Rusk,July 14,1947,U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947,IV,p.578.

[93] State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee “Ad Hoc” Committee report,“Policies,Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries,” April 21,1947, FR: 1947, III,217.

[94] Clayton memorandum,“The European Crisis,” May 27,1947, ibid., p.231.

[95] JCS 1769/1,April 29,1947, ibid., I,739.尽管是出于发动战略性轰炸进攻的目的,但现在清楚的是,五角大楼的决策者们仍认为中东地区的基地最为重要。Converse,“United States Plans for a Postwar Military Base System,” pp.211—219.

[96] 例如参见Dean Acheson's speech to the Delta Council,Cleveland,Mississippi,May 8,1947, Department of State Bulletin, XVI(May 18,1947),991—994。 Clayton's May 27,1947,memorandum, FR: 1947, III,231; also Joseph M.Jones to William Benton,February 26,1947,Joseph M.Jones Papers,Harry S.Truman Library; the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee “Ad Hoc” report,April 21,1947, FR: 1947,III,209—210。

[97] 参见Robert A.Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945—1950(New York: 1985),pp.60—61,246—252; Geir Lundestad, America,Scandinavia,and the Cold War,1945—1949 (New York: 1980),p.32。

[98] 参见Acheson to Marshall,February 21,1947, FR: 1947,V,30; “Report of the Committee Appointed to Study Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey,” February 26,1947, ibid., pp.51—52; Clayton memorandum,March 5,1947,Frederick J.Dobney,ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton (Baltimore: 1971),pp.198—200; Acheson statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,March 24,1947,U.S.Congress,Senate,Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Washington: 1947),pp.23—24。

[99] Kennan,March 28,1947,lecture,转引自Kennan, Memoirs: 1925—1950, p.319。

[100] 讨论最充分的著作参见Gaddis, Strategies of Containment,passim。

[101] 新近最明显的英文著述就是Nikolai V.Sivachev and Nikolai N.Yakovlev, Russia and the United States, translated by Olga Adler Titlebaum(Chicago: 1979),especially Chapter Six。

[102] 有关这一“修正主义”的最纯正模式的讨论,参见Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943—1945(New York: 1968); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy,1945—1954 (New York: 1972)。其他强调“反应过度”的程度问题,参见William A.Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Revised Edition(New York:1962); Lloyd C.Gardner ,Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy,1941—1949 (Chicago: 1970); Thomas G.Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: 1973);以及最新的Yergin, Shattered Peace。

[103] Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, especially pp.306—313.也可参见Taubman, Stalin's American Policy,passim。

[104] Ibid., pp.74,129.

[105] Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, pp.306,310—311.

[106] Lundestad, America,Scandinavia,and the Cold War, pp.32,335.也可参见Geir Lundestad,“Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe,1945—1952,” Journal of Peace Research, XXIII(1986),263—277。

[107] George Allen to Loy Henderson,July 6,1946,quoted in Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p.345.Kuniholm's book sees a similar pattern in Turkey and Greece.

[108] Terry H.Anderson, The United States,Great Britain,and the Cold War, 1944—1947(Columbia,Missouri: 1981); Robert M.Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944—1947(New York: 1981).这一观点也可见于Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (New York: 1983),especially pp.347—348,394。

[109] 除了安德森、布洛克等书中提到的,关于这一点参见Peter G.Boyle,“The British Foreign Office View of Soviet-American Relations,1945—1946,” Diplomatic History, III(Summer,1979),307—320。

[110] 更深刻的讨论参见Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, pp.6—12,105—108,115—118。值得指出的是,在这一对关系中,凯南和英国1946年初驻莫斯科代办弗兰克·罗伯特(Frank Robert)的观点的相似性。有关这一点可参见Peter G.Boyle,“The British Foreign Office View of Soviet-American Relations,1945—1946,” Diplomatic History, III(Summer 1979),p.310;以及Robert M.Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944—1947(New York: 1981),pp.369—371。

[111] Ibid., pp.529—530; Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport,Connecticut: 1981),pp.48—79;以及Lawrence S.Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington,Kentucky: 1984),pp.49—64。

[112] The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, translated and edited by A.A.Brill(New York: 1938),p.163. ERXBo9um2DObHGgjzxfZd03eTRle8LaVtOWeV484mjBS9zSUEkB8h3P0Of0INg5O

点击中间区域
呼出菜单
上一章
目录
下一章
×