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Management incentive arrangement is the core content of corporate governance.In the face of the international economic situation is not optimistic,and the pressure from the public,to strengthen the supervision and regulation of state-owned enterprise management incentive is the main trend in developed economies.Different with foreign country,government regulation run through the reform of state-owned enterprise compensation institution in our country.The regulation of emolument(ROE)have significant differences in goal,the realization form,specific means,management organization and the management pattern between our country and others.ROE as a policy can directly affect management incentive change,what means should be taken to regulate,the level of control,whether these policy is achieve the desired effect?At present the above question dispute among our academic,and lack of system and specific empirical test results.
Empirical evidence shows that foreign governments,general will according to the ownership of state-owned enterprises,the different function orientation and monopoly status adopting differential compensation regulation mode.In November 2003,“the central enterprise operating performance evaluation”issued by the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission mentioned the classified appraisal of state-owned enterprise management.In August 2014,“central management enterprise compensation institution reform”pointed out that the central state-owned enterprises pay will adopt differential ROE mode.After the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee,the“1+N”state-owned enterprises reform series documents was gradually completed.In December 2016,“Management performance appraisal method of the central enterprise”issued by the State Council cleared that should according to the different function orientation of state-owned enterprises implementing different standard of appraisal for improving the scientificity and pertinence.Therefore,how the Chinese government according to the function orientation of state-owned enterprises,degree and level of government control adopting differential ROE impact on the management incentive adjustments and related economic consequences?These are worth our attention.
Our study found that the degree of ROE will change with the related policies of state-owned enterprise management compensation implementing.The government will depend on the function orientation of stateowned enterprises,and the degree or level of government‘s control adopting differential ROE measures.The government motivation of implementing the ROE mainly includes local marketization degree,financial income,employment level,the gap between rich and poor,growth factors.From the aspect of management incentive adjust,the government ROE policies do not push state-owned enterprises management incentive adjust in its desired direction,level,speed and structure.From the aspect of economic consequences,while the government ROE actions can reduce the space of management compensation self-decision in a certain extent,lower the management compensation stickiness,but the government ROE at the same time also led to a decline in the executive compensation performance sensitivity and enterprise future performance.The above results show that our country government ROE policy may be invalid.We further study found that the state-owned enterprises main business in unsufficient competitive industries,the government direct control of state-owned enterprises and the central state-owned enterprises,the negative effect of the government ROE significantly reduced or disappeared.This suggests that the main business in unsufficient competitive industries,the government direct control of state-owned enterprises and the central state-owned enterprises,the government should strengthen the regulation.And for the others,the government should deregulate.The government differential ROE model will be good for the state-owned enterprises.The research conclusion of this book will further expand the academic understanding of government intervention,promoting the reform of state-owned enterprise management incentive system.
Key words: differential regulation of emolument(ROE),stateowned enterprises,management incentive,structural adjustment,the adjustment effect