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The term “demonstrative” is considered a semantic category rather than a word class. It is defined as a deictic word that indicates which entity the speaker refers to and thus demonstrativeness is intrinsic to its linguistic meaning. It encodes a sense of pointing, which involves a speaker, an entity pointed to, and a hearer. The pointing process starts from the speaker, or the speaker's ego, goes through the speaker's perception of the referent (and the way in which the speaker orients the hearer's attention to the referent), and ends with the hearer's recognition of the referent.
With the application of the demonstrative, the speaker fulfills a communicative goal through the following several steps: he/she relates the referent to himself/herself, shows their relationship and distance, and urges the hearer to follow the meaning conveyed by the signal to investigate the relative position from the speaker, in order to locate the referent. In the following pages, I will analyze each component of the referring event.
The speaker is the starting point and the final deciding agent. He also fills a role that is important to the referring action, because it is the speaker who picks out an entity from other entities to refer to and whose point of view decides the specific method of the referring. The reason why the speaker selects an entity and the way in which the speaker perceives the referent are both subjective. There is no objective standard to follow for choosing an entity. Nor is there an absolute rule to describe the conditions whereby referents should be defined as either physically or emotionally close to or far from the speaker.
It is hard to set boundaries regarding the vicinity of the object to the other actors. One's vicinity can be out of another's sight and reach. We cannot judge that one individual's perception is correct and the other one's is wrong, since it is impossible to stand in someone else's position and to know exactly what he is thinking or wishes to convey. It depends on the speaker's ego, which is the speaker's self. Education, background, likes and dislikes, and everything that defines the speaker make up the ego. The speaker, as the source of the pointing action, points in the direction of the referent, and perceives the physical or emotional distance relatively, based on the speaker's position at the moment of the utterance. Therefore, the demonstratives equip the speaker with an orienting power that embeds a deictic guide in the utterance that is perceived by the hearer. They are encoded with the speaker's point of view and are thus relative and dependent on the speaker's perception of the distance. The main issue is that the objectivity of the speaker is encoded in the demonstrative based on the relative contexts of the speaker and the referent at the time of communication. The concept that the speaker is an indispensable part of the pointing activity is supported by the egocentric and orientational features of the demonstratives.
The pointing process, graphically, is “the arm and finger gesture of a man” that directs the attention to a place or an entity (Bühler, 1990, p.93) and represents the speaker's egocentricity, which implies the speaker's position at the moment of the utterance, which “serves as the deictic center” (Wu, 2004, p.33). The pointing is generated from the deictic center, or the speaker's ego, and signals demonstrativeness, which can be regarded as a deictic force, which the speaker uses to urge the hearer's attention to the referent. The difficulty of the pointing activity is related to the relative distance from the speaker's ego to the referent.
There are two steps involved in the pointing: first, locating where the deictic center and the referent are; and second, referring the referent from the deictic center. Here there is a dual sense of subjectivity entailed in both steps. On one end, locating the referent cannot be separated from the context the speaker is in and it changes along with the moving of the deictic center. On the other end, referring from the deictic center depends on the speaker's perception of distance to the referent and how the speaker prefers to direct the hearer's attention. As discussed earlier, the pointing process involves the speaker's intentionality and also needs to take the speaker's individuality into account.
The demonstratives usually take place in the process of pointing, have the entailment of the deictic reference-signaling power, and serve as the determiner that aids in providing more clues to locate and identify the referent with which the speaker is concerned. In both steps of the activity of pointing, the demonstratives not only are able to locate and refer to the referents, but can also track the referent from the speaker's position at the moment of the utterance (Nunberg, 1993). If the speaker changes location, the change of demonstratives which refer to the same referent will also track the relative distance between the speaker and the referent.
The opposition between the proximity-signaling and non-proximity-signaling demonstratives entails what is called contrastiveness ; there is no proximity if it is not contrasted against non-proximity. The reason for this is that either physical distance or emotional distance is relative and there is no clear boundary that separates proximity from non-proximity.
The referent, or the potential target of the pointing process, can either be a place or an entity. It may be found in the vicinity or non-proximity of the speaker's position. It is the final destination of the demonstration. The pointing process can be regarded as successful only if the referent is recognized or identified by the hearer. This means, the referent, either a place or an entity, cannot be indefinite (Lyons, 1977). If the referent were indefinite, there could not be any demonstrativeness in which definiteness is presupposed; there would not be any intention, since an intention can only be directed to a definite destination.
As stated in Lyons (1991), “there is an ontological distinction to be drawn between entities and places,” because “places (as distinct from spaces) are ontologically secondary, being identifiable as such by virtue of the entities that are located in or near them” (p.142). This shows the distinction between the place-referring and entity-referring demonstratives, given that the entity-referring demonstratives “encode relation to both entity and location in a broad sense from the speaker's point of view” (Wu, 2004, p.31). For example, the English entity-referring demonstrative this signals the meaning that the referent is in vicinity of the speaker, a.k.a. here , which is the English place-referring demonstrative. An NP made of an entity-referring demonstrative, for example “this” and “book,” can be glossed as “the book here,” or “the book which is relatively close to the speaker” (Brown, 1995).
Moreover, Kirsner (1993) claims that “the ‘imperative-like character’ of the English demonstratives apply equally well to the Dutch ones (p.94; Wierzbicka, 1980, p.37 fn. 20). The “imperative-like character” of the demonstratives is not limited to the locative information of the referent, but rather a “directive force” which makes the locative information “more immediate” than in “putative paraphrases” (Kirsner, 1993, p.94). In order to find out whether the same holds true in German, I carried out a survey among six native speakers of German at UCLA. I presented the following sentences to them, and asked them which one they would use if they want to sell this car in question.
My informants state that they all would use the first sentence, because they feel that the second sentence sounds strange. It is because not only the repetition of “das Auto” is confusing, but also sentence 2.1b sounds as if it were a pure description rather than a promotion or a piece of exciting news. If we replace das Auto with das andere ‘the other one,’ informants claim that sentence 2.1b is still not a promotion.
In German and Chinese, there are proximity-signaling and non-proximity-signaling demonstratives to refer to both place and entity. Thus, each of the three languages has four different demonstratives for the combinations: a proximity-signaling and entity-referring demonstrative, a proximity-signaling and place-referring demonstrative, a non-proximity-signaling and entity-referring demonstrative, and a non-proximity-signaling and place-referring demonstrative. The table below is a summary of the demonstratives in the three languages (cf. Wu, 2004, p.31):
As shown in the table above, the Chinese demonstratives, either place-referring or entity-referring, start with the same syllables or, more clearly, with the same characters: all proximity-signaling demonstratives start with zhe ‘this’ and all non-proximity-signaling ones start with na ‘that.’ As such, the Chinese place-referring demonstratives can be seen as a combination of zhe ‘this’ or na ‘that’ and a possible word with the meaning “place”: either er ‘place’ or li ‘place’; and the entity-referring ones are either zhe ‘this’ or na ‘that’ by themselves, or a combination of zhe ‘this’ or na ‘that’ and a classifier or measure word, such as xie ‘some’ signaling plurality in the table (with its English cognate ‘these’ and ‘those’).
The pointing action will not be considered successful until the hearer is able to obtain correct information from the conversation or the demonstrative used in the utterance, and locate the referent that is pointed to. To be able to follow the speaker's orientation, the hearer needs to share a joint platform with the speaker, for the reason that the demonstrative used by the speaker signals the relative distance between the speaker and the referent at the moment of the utterance. Therefore, the distances, as well as the demonstratives, are temporal and only valid for a limited time until the speaker's position changes. In this sense, proximity-signaling demonstratives signal temporal proximity and non-proximity-signaling demonstratives signal temporal non-proximity. As for emotional distance, it can be interpreted as the speaker's attitude towards the referent (cf. Lyons, 1977, pp.100, 647). If the referent is emotionally close to the speaker, it indicates the speaker's intimacy to the referent. If the referent is emotionally detached from the speaker, it shows that the referent is definitely not to the speaker's liking. Adamson (1994a, 1994b, 1995b) also points out that in English narratives, a substance that is temporally or spatially remote but is preceded by a proximity-signaling demonstrative that has the empathy of the speaker.
The hearer, in addition to having to decode the meaning conveyed by the demonstrative, has to locate and identify the referent in the speaker's concern (cf. Janssen, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). Note here that a referent associated with a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative does not necessarily mean that the referent is out of the speaker's sight. Nor does it mean that the referent is within reach of the speaker's vision if the referent is referred to by the speaker with a proximity-signaling demonstrative. Again, the relative distance is not objective but subjective, perceived by the speaker, and thus should not be judged by the reach of one's vision. Also, adding emotional distance into consideration, the proximity-signaling-demonstratives denote a more immediate focus on and a stronger interest in the referent; whereas a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative indicates that the speaker is less interested in or indifferent to the referent.
It may be more difficult for the hearer to locate a referent associated with a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative, because a referent is easier to physically identify if it is closer to the speaker. There is an asymmetry as a referent within the reach of the speaker's vision can be either referred to with a proximity-signaling demonstrative or a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative, but a referent beyond the speaker's sight is most likely referred to with a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative. Despite this asymmetry, a referent associated with a proximity-signaling demonstrative is more accurate and explicit than a referent associated with a non-proximity-signaling demonstrative. For example, in English:
2.2a) Don't take this! Take this !
2.2b
Don't take that! Take
that
!
The second sentence in the example sounds ambiguous in the sense that the hearer is not necessarily able to figure out which object is supposed to be taken. In the first sentence, both referents are referred to with ‘this’ and are in the boundaries of the speaker's immediate focus and better knowledge; they are easier for the hearer to locate and identify. In contrast, in the second sentence, both referents are referred with ‘that’ and are both outside the boundaries of specificity. As discussed earlier, a referent has to be definite to be identified. Neither referents in sentence 2.2b are familiar to the speaker, nor are either of a higher specificity, which would serve as “a facilitating factor in locating the referent,” both references in sentence 2.2b would require other information or other actions, such as pointing to the referent or providing more detailed information, to enable the hearer to locate them and then fulfill the communicative goal of the conversation (Wu, 2004, p.42).
What can also be derived from the example is that the opposition of the proximity-signaling and non-proximity-signaling demonstratives is not exclusive, but inclusive.
Admittedly, stating that an entity or a place is not in the proximity naturally entails non-proximity in the entity or in the place. But by stating that an entity or a place is not ‘there’ does not mean that it is ‘here,’ given that non-proximal demonstratives do not carry the strong sense of contrast that proximal demonstratives do (Lyons, 1977; Brown, 1995).
To make it easier, an entity or a place that is not in the vicinity of the speaker is not close to the speaker, but an entity or a place that is not in the non-proximity of the speaker does not necessarily indicate that it is near the speaker. ‘Here’ is practically limited because it is tied to a speaker. On the other hand, the concept of ‘there’ must be infinite.
Some languages, such as Korean and Armenian, make a three-way distinction among demonstratives, which serves as evidence of the notion that the concept of there can be finite. A demonstrative, in such languages, can either signal proximal (referent close to the speaker), medial (referent close to hearer), or distal (referent not in proximity of either). In these languages, it is clear that an entity or a place that is considered proximal is neither medial nor distal . However, an entity or a place that is considered either not medial or not distal does not necessarily mean it is proximal , but may be distal (not proximal ) or medial (not proximal ). To illustrate the inclusive opposition, another example can be provided here:
2.3a) The bag is not there, but there !
2.3b
The bag is not here, but
here
!
Sentence 2.3b does not communicate its meaning well unless the speaker points to the bag since ‘here’ refers to a finite space whereas ‘there’ refers to infinite space. Therefore, negating an entity that is ‘here’ automatically bears the fact that the entity is ‘there.’ On the other hand, negating an entity that is ‘there’ does not necessarily mean that it is ‘here.’
Just as it is the speaker who decides the boundaries of the vicinity, whether an entity or a place is close to the speaker, depends on how the speaker perceives the spatial or temporal or emotional distance; or, how the speaker naturally or intentionally conceptualizes the referent: the speaker's point of view, or the deictic center, a.k.a. the speaker's ego. And Wu (2004) maintains that
[T]he egocentric point of view involved renders the relationship between the perceiver and the entity perceived and conceptualizes it into one between the observer and the observed. (p.41)
This provides evidence for the above argument that the relative distance does not depend on the actual distance between the speaker and the referent, but rather depends on how the speaker perceives and conceptualizes it.
It seems that “one cannot perceive the ‘real world as it is’”; rather, people perceive the real world as they want to perceive it and as they are conditioned to perceive it (Jackendoff, 1983, p.26; cf. Garcia, 2009). Of course, one would not “see a horse out of a deer” (cf. Sima, 91BC). But it is undeniable that one may perceive a diamond out of a square. One may argue that this perception may be because one has not encountered a square before and a diamond matches more closely to the prototypical representation of the shape from one's prior experience. However, it still provides evidence that different people may have various perceptions of the same entity.
Similarly, human cognition plays an essential role in the assessment of distance between one and the entity or place involved and is mostly contributed by the mind (cf. Langacker, 1987, 1995). In some situations, one may ignore some characteristics of a referent, but in other situations, one pays more attention to other features of a referent (cf. Talmy, 1983). And because of ego-centricity, when people measure the distance between themselves and the entity, there is an “egocentric viewing arrangement,” in which “the natural interest that most people have in themselves” and “the relations they bear to entities around them” are accommodated in building the meaning that will be reflected in the semantics of the utterance, i.e. the use of demonstratives (Langacker, 1985, p.12). Hence, demonstratives encode the spatial conceptualization of the speaker, and “represent that part of language which maps onto the innate properties of human cognition” (Wu, 2004, p.41). And, demonstratives are part of the “rather deeply seated, innate properties of the human organism and the perceptual apparatus, properties which determine the way in which the world is conceived, adapted, and worked on” (Bierwisch, 1967, p.3).
