购买
下载掌阅APP,畅读海量书库
立即打开
畅读海量书库
扫码下载掌阅APP

Abstract

The research question is:How does the board of directors influence R&D input and its internal mechanism? It attempts to explore the board of directors of Chinese listed companies on the impact of enterprise technology innovation and add the executive and executive market as moderator to research the effect between them,which is beneficial to promoting the enterprise R&D investment and enhancing the innovation ability through the improvement of the governance mechanism,the introduction of external resources,the stimulation of the executive incentive mechanism and the alleviation of the agency conflict.

This dissertation contains four studies.Based on the theory of principal-agent,this dissertation explores the structural characteristics of the board of directors by using the empirical research method of sample statistics.Based on the 6950 observation data of 955 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share from 2007 to 2015,behavioral characteristics and incentive characteristics of the six dimensions of the companies′ innovation and R&D investment.Secondly,in order to further explore the above research results,this dissertation uses the six indicators to measure the characteristics of the board of directors to study the relationship between board efficiency and R&D investment,and introduce executive incentive,executive market supply and employment tendency as moderator,Using the same research methods and sample data for the empirical test.Thirdly,based on resource dependence theory,board capital and R&D investment are studied.Finally,we choose multiple case studies methodology and uses four cases(Alibaba,Haier,Lenovo and Gree) to describe the impacting mechanism of board of directors on R&D investment.The results of the study are as follows:

Firstly,the characteristics of board of directors and R&D investment research found that the board size and R&D investment significantly negative correlation,the board size is too large will cause the board to reduce operational efficiency.Although the external independent directors guarantee a certain degree of independence of impartiality,the majority of independent directors of listed companies are set up to meet the requirements of the CSRC because of the improvement and development of the board governance mechanism.The combination of the chairman and the general manager will result in excessive concentration of power,which leads to the failure of the board of directors to function properly in consulting and supervising the strategic decision of senior executives.An increase in the number of board meetings does not necessarily promote better board oversight,and board members are not able to effectively monitor oversight through simple board meetings.Whether the directors take short-term salary incentives or long-term equity incentive will help to enhance the enthusiasm of board members and stimulate the effectiveness and scientificity of the board's decision-making on innovation strategy.

Secondly,the board of directors efficiency and R&D investment research found that a certain size of the board structure,the proportion of appropriate independent directors,the appropriate frequency of board meetings,chairman and general manager of the separation of two positions and the board of directors of appropriate remuneration and equity The board of directors will effectively inspire the overall oversight function of the board of directors so that the role of the board will be reflected,the efficiency of work can be enhanced to strengthen the board of directors R&D innovation strategy and investment decision-making supervision and recommendations to make the company's long-term development of the right decisions.The more sufficient supply of executives in the market,the efficiency of board of directors to R&D investment effect of the stronger.In addition to executive incentive internal governance mechanism,the external supply and competition in the executive market exerts some external pressure on the executives to play an effective external constraint.The stronger the tendency of the company to recruit executives from the external executive market,the greater the effect of board efficiency on R&D investment.When the company's four external executives market tend to hire executives higher,the greater the pressure on the incumbent executives,the more effective the external executive market restraint mechanism,the more the board and the executives according to the long-term interests of shareholders R&D investment and other strategic decision-making.

Thirdly,the human capital of the board and the social capital of the board of directors are significantly positively correlated with the R&D input of the enterprise,that is,the board industry experience(board human capital) and the director of board of directors(board of directors social capital) will promote enterprise R&D investment to a certain extent.The influence of CEO equity incentive on the influence of human capital on R&D investment of the board of directors is positive regulation effect,and the higher the proportion of CEO ownership,the more obvious the effect of CEO stock incentive on the influence of human capital on R&D investment.CEO equity incentive on the board of directors of social capital on the impact of enterprise R&D investment relationship there is a negative regulatory effect.CEO may be loyal to their own professionalism and ability,is not optimistic that the chain of directors for enterprise R&D investment brings valuable information and resources.

Lastly,the mechanism of R&D investment in the board of directors is mainly embodied in the model of “board drive-board function play-agent conflict mitigation-R&D decision promotion”.The board's human capital and social capital as well as the board's efficiency work together to drive the board's functions.In the efficiency and resources of the board of directors,the board of directors plays a supervisory and advisory functions:strategic functions,service functions,consulting functions and control functions.Under the influence of the board capital and the function of the board of directors,the agency conflict between the board and the executive has different degree of relaxation and the agency cost is also reduced.Executives are influenced by the internal incentive mechanism and the supply of resources,thus reducing the tendency of self-interest behavior,improving the selection of effective information in the process of strategy formulation and making innovative strategies and R&D decisions.

This dissertation also discusses the contribution of these studies to the governance of board of directors,R&D investment,executive market theory,management revelation of perfecting the board governance mechanism,hiring external directors and introducing the senior management market mechanism,and the limitations of this research and future research direction. apdvW4BCGOoeuJXeOKRGjaeQcB2UGJQMARB6aGeA+HuY55Yo9dYn05l9n2+tZWM4

点击中间区域
呼出菜单
上一章
目录
下一章
×