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Narrative Repair as Step 2 in Post-Soviet Revision

Awkwardness and disjointedness characterized the first step in moving beyond Soviet accounts of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact;during the second stage a kind of “narrative repair” emerged to reestablish coherence based on a new narrative. As was the case in step 1 of the revision process,this new version moved beyond official Soviet accounts in that it made no attempt to deny the existence of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Indeed,it freely admitted them. It also moved beyond the awkward and evasive formulation that characterized the narrative rift in step 1.

The narrative repair that occurred at this stage involved a story that might be titled “Stalin’s Difficult Choice”. This narrative took several forms in the emergence of post-Soviet Russian collective memory of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,and in fact several of its elements had long been part of the discussion of Stalin’s actions leading up to World War II. Hence,using it in the late Soviet period amounted to dusting off some existing “off-the-shelf” narrative tools and putting them to new use in official discourse.

An early post-Soviet version of “The Difficult Choice” narrative can be found in a 1998 history textbook for ninth-graders by Danilov and Kosulina.

A difficult choice.... While not giving up on a resolution of the “Polish question” through force,Hitler also proposed to the USSR to begin negotiations toward concluding an agreement of non-aggression and dividing up spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Stalin was confronted with a difficult choice:either reject Hitler’s proposal,thereby agreeing to have German forces move to the borders of the USSR in case Poland was defeated in a war with Germany,or conclude an agreement with Germany that would provide the possibility for pushing borders back from its west and avoid war for some time.... And thus the agreement was signed. On August 23,1939 the entire world was shocked by the news that the USSR and Nazi Germany had signed a treaty of non-aggression. This was also wholly unexpected for the Soviet people. But no one knew the most important fact—secret protocols had been added to this treaty. In these secret protocols Moscow and Berlin divided up Eastern Europe among themselves into spheres of influence....In the fall of 1939 the Soviet Union concluded treaties of mutual assistance with Estonia,Latvia,and Lithuania. In accordance with these treaties Soviet forces were introduced into these countries. In the summer of 1940 the Soviet leadership,using propitious external conditions,demanded that the Baltic countries accede to the introduction of additional forces,a replacement of governments,and emergency parliamentary elections.... The new organs of power,which had been selected under the control of Soviet representatives,turned to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with the request to receive Lithuania,Latvia,Estonia,and Besarabia into the composition of the Soviet Union. This request was of course granted,and on the map of the USSR there appeared new union republics:the Latvian,Lithuanian,Estonian,and Moldavian Republics. In this fashion,almost all the western provinces that had earlier been in the Russian empire,with the exception of Poland and Finland,were returned.(pp.324-326)

In contrast to official Soviet accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,this text does not deny the existence of the secret protocols. Indeed,it highlights them. And in contrast to the narrative rift characteristic of step 1,there is relatively little awkwardness or prevarication in this case,although some,to be sure,remains. Instead,the events are represented in such a way that the motives that lay behind them are no longer an embarrassment to Russian collective memory. “The Difficult Choice” story made it possible to explain events that had previously either been omitted or had given rise to awkwardness and a narrative rift in official Soviet accounts. The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were presented as a decision forced on the Soviet Union by the fact that Germany was about to attack Poland,allowing the German army to approach the borders of the USSR. And the choice is presented as somehow easier by the fact that the USSR was returning to borders that had previously defined the Russian Empire. But the main thrust of such accounts is that even though the Soviet Union was reluctant to expand its borders,it was simply forced to do so to ensure the defeat of a German nation that was a threat to the entire world.

Before turning to the forces that gave rise to the narrative repair in step 2,it is worth emphasizing that “The Difficult Choice” story is by no means the only one that can be imagined about these events. For example,one Baltic version of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has disputed the assertion that it lessened the chance of war between Germany and the Soviet Union,arguing instead that “it was one of the direct causes of World War II”(Vizulis 1988,vii). And Kestutis Girnius(1989) has argued that instead of seeking to create a buffer against German invasion,the pact was motivated by long-standing tendencies of Russian territorial expansionism.

There is little doubt that the Soviet government hoped to profit from the growth of tensions in Eastern Europe to regain land that was formerly part of the Russian empire. The Soviet Union made clear its interest in the Baltics in the early stages of its negotiations with France and Great Britain. Soviet negotiators were so insistent on the matter that they were willing to risk a breakdown in the talks rather than renounce their aims. German willingness to satisfy demands that the Western democracies would not countenance seems to have been an important factor in determining Moscow’s decision to cooperate with the Nazis.(p.2)

Interpretations such as these are what people in the Baltic countries hoped would emerge and be widely accepted once the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were made public. However,the narrative repair in post-Soviet Russian collective memory clearly did not move in this direction. It instead moved steadfastly toward one or another version of “The Difficult Choice” story. BV2/22/W1hjN1PeoiLIht/uabnmMTL9q/jDzUj8tIoQ/yEZPTDjQJaHuCgJQF5M9

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