Abstract： The dynamics of collective remembering are examined by analyzing what happens when a “blank spot” in history is filled with information that had previously not been available or publicly acknowledged. Taking Russian accounts of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 as a case study，it is argued that “schematic narrative templates” that shape deep collec-tive memory give rise to a tendency to maintain this memory and help it overcome the “narrative rift” that occurs when embarrassing episodes from the past are publicly acknowledged.Schematic narrative templates are set forth as underlying strong conservative forces that resist change in collective memory at a deep level.It is suggested that debates grounded in formal history may help overcome this resistance to change but that such efforts will be limited as long as the forces of deep collective memory are not recognized.

Keywords： Collective Memory National Narrative Russia Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The Soviet Union was well known for treating certain episodes and personalities in its history as “blank spots.” In some cases，these were literally blank，as in photos where people’s images had been painstakingly airbrushed out of existence（King，1997）；in other instances，the notion was more figurative，having to do with what could—and could not—be discussed in a public setting. Regardless of their form，these blank spots were understood by Soviet citizens as involving something that could not be mentioned—even when they dealt with someone who had been at the center of public discourse just the day before. During the last few decades of the Soviet Union’s existence，these blank spots in history became the object of increasing debate and protest，at least in private settings. Indeed，some people thought，perhaps naively，that if these blank spots could only be publicly acknowledged and filled with accurate information，truth would then replace falsehood and omission once and for all.

For many people living in the Baltic region of the former Soviet Union，the most obvious blank spot in history was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. For decades there had been little doubt in their minds that this infamous pact included secret protocols that lay behind the forced annexation of Estonia，Latvia，and Lithuania by Soviet forces in 1940. However，the existence of these protocols was officially denied by Soviet leaders，including Mikhail Gorbachev，up until the final years of the USSR’s existence. While enjoined from discussing this matter in public，many Estonians，Latvians，and Lithuanians were insistent，at least in private，that this was an episode of forced annexation and violence，the memory of which would not be lost，and the true story of which would eventually come out.

In what follows，I shall examine Russian accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In particular，I shall be concerned with the pact’s secret protocols in which Hitler and Stalin agreed to carve up Eastern Europe，and I shall argue that in post-Soviet Russia，the transformation of the memory of this pact did not occur in a single step yielding a final，fixed account. Instead，it involved a process of change that has undergone two stages，and this change has given rise to an account that is clearly not what the people of the Baltic countries remember. I shall also argue that to account for the dynamics of this transformation it is useful to invoke the notions of “schematic narrative templates” and “deep collective memory.”

I base my analysis on an examination of high school history textbooks from Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. As I have noted elsewhere（Wertsch，2002），text-books are only one reflection of a wider set of cultural and political processes involved in defining official history，and as such they compete with other sources of information，like film and the popular press，for impact on young generations. They provide a good starting point，however，for examining official，state-sanctioned accounts of the past.

The first question to pose about these accounts is whether they really are about history，at least history in any strict sense of the term. Instead of speaking of blank spots in history ，it will become obvious that it may be more appropriate to speak of blank spots in collective memory . In reality，“history” instruction in Soviet and post-Soviet schools—as well as in virtually every other country in the world—involves a complex mixture of what professional historians would consider to be a sound interpretation of past events based on the objective，balanced review of evidence on one hand，and an effort，on the other，to promulgate collective memory，or a usable past，as part of a national identity project. In this context，notions of history and collective memory clearly overlap. Both ways of representing the past deal with events occurring before the lifetime of the people doing the representing，and in both cases there is the assumption that the accounts being presented are true. Furthermore，both rely on narratives as “cultural tools”（Wertsch，1998）. The upshot is that it is often difficult to separate history from collective memory，and what we routinely call “history” textbooks almost always involve a mixture of the two.

This，however，does not mean that no useful distinction can be made between history and collective memory. Indeed，it is essential to distinguish between them. The father of modern collective memory studies，Maurice Halbwachs（1980，1992） made this point in the 1920s in his discussion of “formal history” and how it differs from collective memory. Before Halbwachs’ time it came up in other discussions；for example，it was an object of debate in the nineteenth century in writings by the philosopher Ernest Renan（1882/1990），who viewed serious historical research as often posing a threat to popular efforts at collective remembering.

In contemporary debates，this discussion has continued in historiography，where history and collective memory are often viewed not just as different，but as being in basic conflict. The reason for this is the different aspirations of the two modes of relating to the past. For its part，history aspires to provide an objective and distanced（i.e.，non-“presentist”） account of the past，even if this means giving up favored and often self-serving narratives. In contrast，collective remembering inevitably involves some identity project in the present—remembering in the service of constructing a preferred image of a group—and is resistant to change even in the face of contradictory evidence. As Assmann（1997，9） noted，in collective remembering “the past is not simply ‘received’ by the present. The present is ‘haunted’ by the past and the past is modeled，invented，reinvented，and reconstructed by the present.”

In short，formal history and collective memory must be kept distinct for several reasons. Collective memory tends to reflect a single，subjective，committed per-spective of a group in the present，whereas formal history strives to be objective and to distance itself from the present and any particular perspective currently in favor. In addition，collective memory leaves little room for doubt or ambiguity about events and the motivations of actors（Novick，1999），whereas formal history strives to take into account multiple，complex factors and motives that shape events.

A final property that characterizes collective remembering is that it tends to be heavily shaped by “schemata”（Bartlett，1932/1995），“implicit theories”（Ross 1989），or other simplifying organizational frameworks. To be sure，such frameworks also shape formal history，but in the case of collective memory they take on a particu-larly important role，meaning that accounts of the past often are quite schematic and include little in the way of detailed information，especially information that conflicts with the basic narrative that supports an identity project. In collective remembering，such conflicting evidence is often distorted，simplified，and ignored. Sy33IDipkJW2pgagq2tBW0CEpXatUjS+f7L1Sdi6/DoV1yud+blKTvku/gltcEny