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To focus on Putin’s “crazy” statements or “cold，calculating personality” is to miss a crucial point when trying to understand his actions. Instead of focusing on him as though he were an “atomistic”（Taylor，1985） or “unencumbered”（Sandel，2010） individual，we need to examine the narrative tools that shape his thinking；instead of putting him “on the couch，” we need to consider how his thinking reflects his membership in the Russian mnemonic community.
In this view narrative tools are a kind of “co-author” for Putin’s utterances，and to understand what these utterances mean we must understand the tools behind them. In many respects the deep divide that separates Putin from Western leaders reflects a more general divide between mnemonic communities and the narrative tools they employ. And it turns out that this is more than just an “academic exercise” since understanding these issues holds an important key to finding ways to rein in dangerous confrontations such as that which has arisen between Russia and the West over Ukraine.
The approach that I take to symbolic mediation draws on the writings of Vygotsky（1934，1978，1982），but it important to contextualize Vygotsky in a broader discussion that was going on in Russia，Germany，and Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is a discussion heavily shaped by figures such as Gustav Gustavovich Shpet（1927），a Russian student of Husserl and one of Vygotsky’s teachers in Moscow，and the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer（1944，1946，1955）. Although Cassirer was often dismissed by official Marxist-Leninist psychologists of the Soviet era for not being sufficiently materialist in his orientation，his insights had an important impact on Vygotsky，Bakhtin（1986），and many others who lived and wrote in the Soviet context.
The general line of reasoning that guided these figures is that humans are tool-using animals and that in order to understand discourse and thought it is essential to take the contribution of “mediation，” or “cultural tools”（Wertsch，2002） into account. For Vygotsky and others like Luria（1976，1980），this meant turning first and foremost to natural language. Following in the footsteps of Wilhelm von Humboldt，Ernst Cassirer，and others in philology and semiotics，Vygotsky and Luria expanded the line of reasoning by examining psychological methods in a way that allows us today to incorporate insights from psychology and cognitive science into the broader picture of national memory.
At several points in his writings Vygotsky was quite explicit about the centrality of mediation（oposredstvovanie） in his thinking，and in my view it is the key to understanding much of the unique power of his ideas（Wertsch，1985，1991）. Near the end of his life，for example，he asserted，“A central fact of our psychology is the fact of mediation”（1982，p.166）. This had actually been a core part of his thinking for years，and a focus on mediation，especially as it concerns “signs” or “psychological tools” can be found throughout his writings. In a 1930 account of “The Instrumental Method in Psychology”，he included under the general heading of signs：“language；various systems for counting；mnemonic techniques；algebraic symbol systems；works of art；writing；schemes，diagrams，maps，and mechanical drawings；all sorts of conventional signs”（p.137）.
Such cultural tools are “by their nature... are social，not organic or individual”（ibid.），which means that by mastering them our speaking and thinking are socialized into a particular cultural and historical order. Vygotsky emphasized that this mastery involved transforming rather than simply facilitating social and mental functioning that already would have occurred：“By being included in the process of behavior，the psychological tool alters the entire flow and structure of mental functions. It does this by determining the structure of a new instrumental act just as a technical tool alters the process of a natural adaptation by determining the form of labor operations”（1981，p.137）.
Vygotsky’s ideas echo Cassirer’s in several important respects，and drawing on both yields some useful synergies. For Cassirer，a starting point was the rejection of “the naïve copy theory of knowledge”（p.75）. When talking about the ways in which science engages with the world around us，for example，he noted that “the instruments with which it propounds its questions and formulates its solutions，are regarded no longer as passive images of something given but as symbols created by the intellect itself”（p.75）. From this perspective human cognition and action are deeply shaped by “symbolic forms” which include，but are not limited to language.
A crucial point whereCassirer’s line of reasoning goes beyond Vygotsky’s comes from his claim that using symbolic forms introduces the “curse of mediacy” meaning that this use comes at a cost—a cost that often goes unrecognized. From this perspective using narrative tools is a double-edged sword because “all symbolism harbors the curse ［that］... it is bound to obscure what it seeks to reveal”（1946，p.7）. Taken together with Vygotsky’s analyses of language as mediation in social and mental life，this means that to be human is to use cultural tools that are destined both to empower and limit our understanding，including our understanding of the past. The aphorism by W.J.T.Mitchell（1990） that there is “no representation without taxation” comes to mind，and it applies nowhere more forcefully than in national narratives and memory.
Cassirer developed his insights by outlining how particular symbolic forms such as myth，art，and science hold the key to understanding the historical emergence and current state of human social and mental life. One of his most important interpreters，Susanne Langer（1958），summarized several of his points by noting that for Cassirer：
The history of thought consists chiefly in the gradual achievement of factual，literal，and logical conception and expression. Obviously the only means to this end is language. But this instrument，it must be remembered，has a double nature. Its syntactical tendencies bestow the laws of logic on us；yet the primacy of names in its make-up holds it to the hypostatic way of thinking which belongs to its twin-phenomenon，myth. Consequently it led us beyond the sphere of mythic and emotive thoughts，yet always pulls us back into it again；it is both the diffuse and tempered light that shows us the external world of “fact” and the array of spiritual lamps，light-centers of intensive meaning，that throw the gleams and shadows of the dream world wherein our earliest experiences lay.（pp.391-392）
To some degree，this line of reasoning is echoed in the ideas that guided Vygotsky and his student and colleague Luria as they conducted their empirical studies in Central Asia in the 1920s. Employing oppositions that echoed those between the syntactical and hypostatic tendencies of language，they wrote of how “theoretic” and “practical” forms of thinking differ and how “higher” forms of mental functioning emerge out of “elementary” processes. However，in contrast to Vygotsky，who emphasized that the achievements of higher mental functioning can be distinguished from elementary forms，Cassirer focused on how even the most advanced forms of abstract thinking retains elements of what Langer called “the sphere of mythic and emotive thoughts”.
Taken together，the ideas of Vygotsky and Cassirer suggest a world in which speaking and thinking are fundamentally shaped by the symbolic mediation，or cultural tools provided by historical，institutional，and cultural contexts. It is a world in which human mental and social life is socioculturally situated because of its reliance on these tools，including narratives，and these tools shape our thinking and speaking in multiple complex ways. And in this context the “double nature” of language as an instrument plays a complicating role in shaping narratives and memory. On the one hand，what Langer called the “syntactic tendencies” inject an element of logic into our understanding of the past，but on the other，these same narrative tools “pull us back” to “hypostatic ways of thinking” associated with myth.
It is worth noting that in this approach cultural tools do not mechanistically determine human discourse and thinking. Instead，the very notion of a tool implies an active user and suggests an element of variability and freedom stemming from the unique contexts of performance. Bakhtin made this point in his account of the speech utterance or “text”. For him，any text involves a tension between two poles：a pre-existing “language system” that provides the “repeatable” moment of an utterance，on the one hand，and a particular instance of speaking in a unique setting，which provides the “nonrepeatable” moment，on the other. All utterances reflect the influence of these two poles，but their relative weighting can vary widely. For example，a military command relies heavily on a language system and leaves little room for spontaneity，whereas informal discourse in everyday life relies more heavily on the unrepeatable，spontaneous pole.