Conclusion：The Conservatism of Collective Memory

In looking at the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact，I have pur-posefully chosen a case where one might expect a fundamental revision in collective memory. People in the Baltic countries，as well as elsewhere，had expected—or at least hoped—that making these secret protocols public would be a sufficiently powerful embarrassment to existing Russian accounts to lead to such a revision. What turned out to be the case，however，was something quite different. After an initial period of relatively superficial disruption in the official narrative（i.e.，the narrative rift of step 1），an account emerged that smoothed over the awkwardness and prevarication of the narratives of that period.

I have argued that this narrative repair in step 2 was heavily shaped by a cultural tool that mediates deep collective memory in Russia，namely，the “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” schematic narrative template. Like schematic narrative templates in any society，this one reflects a particular worldview and interpretative perspective in the effort after meaning. The power of this perspective is obvious to those with competing interpretations of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. However，because schematic narrative templates operate at a nonconscious level and are especially transparent to their users，members of the Russian mnemonic community usually operate on the assumption that they are simply telling what really happened rather than coauthoring an account with a narrative tool.

The fact that the Expulsion of Foreign Enemies storyline is so jarring to others provides a reminder of the strong emotional attachment and identity commitments typically associated with such narrative templates. They are by no means neutral cognitive instruments. Instead，they are cultural tools deeply embedded in the more general project of developing and maintaining an image that supports a collective identity.

All this is not to deny the noticeable change in textbook accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact during the late Soviet and post-Soviet years，beginning with a period of apparent unease over how to rewrite the narrative in light of the acknowledgment of the secret protocols. However，this initial step did not last long，and perhaps more important，the new version of the secret protocols that eventually emerged was not the sort of basic revision in an official account that people in the Baltics had hoped for. Instead，the narrative repair that characterizes step 2 amounted to patching over the rift created by acknowledging the secret protocols. It did this by embedding them in an effort after meaning，the general underlying pattern of which was already well established.

These developments suggest that deep collective memory is very conservative and resistant to change，something that runs counter to observations about the radically new public versions of the past that emerged with the breakup of the USSR. It is indeed important to recognize that post-Soviet Russian history text-books include assertions that would have landed their authors in prison a few decades earlier. However，focusing on this alone fails to take into account the important difference between a surface level of narrative organization，where radical changes in specific narratives may be found，and the schematic narrative templates that mediate deep collective memory. While the specific narratives about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact may have changed in some surprising and seemingly radical ways，the underlying schematic narrative has been a very conservative force.

This would appear to be sobering if not depressing news for those dedicated to overcoming differences and resolving conflict between groups. Are people in countries like Estonia and Russia doomed to continued，intractable opposition over interpretations of the past？ Is this the case for places like India and Pakistan or Turkey and Armenia as well？ Efforts by historians in these and other such troubled cases suggest that one way forward may be to switch the discussion away from collective memory and toward a heavier reliance on formal history. As noted earlier，official accounts found in history textbooks are typically a mixture of the two，but the relative contributions from each may vary widely. When trying to resolve differences over the interpretation of past events，one useful means may be to introduce a heavier dose of objectivity and complexity into such textbooks.

Professional historians such as Romila Thapar（2005） in India and Taner Aksam（2007） in the case of Turkey have stepped forward in recent years to argue that professional historians must reassert control of at least part of the public discourse about the past. This would involve shifting the discussion away from narratives that support emotionally laden identity claims toward narratives whose standing rests on a more balanced，objective consideration of evidence. This suggests a different role for historians than is often assumed in academic discourse，and some historians resist precisely because they fear that it could lead to the elision of the distinction between collective memory and formal history that they have been so assiduous in maintaining.

Principled and courageous attempts to introduce the rigor of formal history into discussions about the past do seem to provide some hope for moving debates between opposing perspectives to a calmer and more productive plane. However，this is hardly a panacea，given that historians themselves often cannot agree over what narrative applies to past events. As Cronon（1992） has noted，two competent professional historians can use the same basic archives and “facts” to arrive at quite different historical accounts，and this reflects the basic claim by philosophers of history such as Mink（1978） that no amount of objective evidence can alone reveal the narrative that must be told about the past.

Hence，a move toward formal historical analysis may be an important step in overcoming intractable differences between groups’ understanding of the past，but an appreciation of the deep memory of each group may be another necessary component. A failure to recognize the powerful conservative forces of narrative templates as an inherent part of the process may mean that even the best efforts to resolve differences based on formal historical analysis are destined to fail.

Principled and courageous attempts to introduce the rigor of formal history into discussions about the past do seem to provide some hope for moving debates between opposing perspectives to a calmer and more productive plane.

If the events surrounding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact show anything，they show that people are not likely to arrive at a common understanding of the past simply because they are exposed to a common body of objective information. Given how central deep memory is to collective identity，this should be no surprise. So the best hope we may have is to recognize the existence and power of the narrative templates as a first step and then proceed to harness formal history in an effort to adjudicate differences over “what really happened” in the past.

Notes

1. The two major works by Halbwachs in English， On Collective Memory （1992） and The Collective Memory （1980），are compilations of French publications from the 1920s，1930s，and early 1940s. Halbwachs died in Buchenwald concentration camp shortly before the end of World War Ⅱ.

2. Note that Stalin and associates like Molotov were out of official favor in 1970 and hence no longer appeared in such accounts.

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[1] James V.Wertsch is Marshall S.Snow Professor of Arts and Sciences at Washington University in St.Louis，where he is also director of the McDonnell International Scholars Academy.His current research is concerned with language，thought，and culture，with a special focus on collective memory，national narratives and identity，and culture.His most recent book is Voices of Collective Remembering ，Cambridge University Press，2002.
Note：An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference “Memory and War” at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in January 2003.The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
DOI：10.1177/0002716207312870. Rnz7kYJ1YXEDyqaIAHOgTMtCI5zYLlTp6a6cqdzAL56lH2AW7M5Uk1/9T9zHX6Mc