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近年来，有关发展中国家腐败问题的微观研究不断涌现，一系列文献为我们展示了一些基本的经济概念如何应用于腐败问题的研究。即使是在腐败的环境下，腐败官员也会对激励和惩罚威胁做出反应。腐败官员间的策略性互动也会影响腐败水平：如果他们相互竞争，会压低贿赂金额；如果需要支付多项贿赂，而且官员之间无法有效协调，将提高贿赂金额。最近的研究还表明，腐败官员是有韧性的：随着时间推移，他们会适应新的环境，并寻找新的租金来源，在一些情况下冲销了反腐败政策的效果。
虽然这些例子表明官员的适应性随时间而增强，但也有一些情形，使得反腐败政策的长期效果超过短期。一种情况是透明化改革：信息披露程度的提高，会激励官员更好的工作绩效，同时吸引更有才能的人进入政府系统。
需要注意的是，对于当今世界出现的大多数反腐败政策而言，我们的研究仍知之甚少。为了治理国内的腐败问题，许多国家成立了高级别的、相对独立的反腐败机构，并赋予它们一定的检察权。在全球范围内，人们付出大量努力，试图提高政府透明度（比如《增强掠夺性行业透明度的倡议》，Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative），以及限制外国企业的行贿行为（比如OECD的《反贿赂公约》和美国的《外国腐败行为法案》）。虽然近来有关腐败的研究有所进展，但我们对这些国内和国际性的反腐政策效果怎样，以及腐败官员如何应对这些政策，仍所知甚少。
总体来讲，关于发展中国家腐败问题已有的和正在进行的研究表明，对这一问题的探讨是一个很有前景的重大议题。研究者提出了一些富有创意的腐败衡量方法，而经济理论为我们设计反腐败政策也提供了理论指导。此外，个人揣摩监管者意图的能力，要求我们收集更多数据，来分析不同情境下反腐败政策的短期和长期效果。
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