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附表1 腐败与国家特征：殖民者死亡率
注：关于数据来源的信息，可参见正文中的表2。死亡率数据来自Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson（2001），是指1604—1848年期间殖民者的死亡率。
*** 表示显著性水平为1%； ** 表示显著性水平为5%； * 表示显著性水平为10%。
附表2 腐败与国家特征：社会主义法律体系
注：关于数据来源的信息，可参见表2。社会主义法律体系是一个二值变量（0和1），来自La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny（1999），当公司法或者商业法典的法律起源是社会主义取值为1。
*** 表示显著性水平为1%； ** 表示显著性水平为5%； * 表示显著性水平为10%。
附表3 腐败与国家特征：法国法律体系
注：关于数据来源的信息，可参见表2。法国法律体系是一个二值变量（0和1），来自La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny（1999），当公司法或者商业法典的法律起源为法国取值为1。
*** 表示显著性水平为1%； ** 表示显著性水平为5%； * 表示显著性水平为10%。
附表4 腐败与国家特征：穆斯林（人口比例）
注：关于数据来源的信息，可参见表2。穆斯林指1980年该国的穆斯林人口比例（对于刚成立的国家，数据取自1990—1995年），数据来自La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny（1999）。
*** 表示显著性水平为1%； ** 表示显著性水平为5%； * 表示显著性水平为10%。
附表5 腐败与国家特征：天主教（人口比例）
注：关于数据来源的信息，可参见正文中的表2。天主教指1980年该国的天主教人口比例（对于刚成立的国家，数据取自1990—1995年），数据来自La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny（1999）。
*** 表示显著性水平为1%； ** 表示显著性水平为5%； * 表示显著性水平为10%。
I am grateful for comments and suggestions by Nicola Gennaioli, Assar Lindbeck, Torsten Persson and David Strömberg, as well as editors James Hines, Andrei Shleifer, Timothy Taylor and Michael Waldman.The views expressed here do not represent the official opinion of the World Bank.
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