在美国全力以赴与之战斗的敌人中，日本人是最琢磨不透的。这个主要对手，其行动和思维习惯与我们如此迥然不同，以至我们必须认真对待，这种情况在其他战争中是没有的。正如前此1905年的沙俄（指日俄战争）一样，我们作战的对手是一个不属于西方文化传统，而又充分武装和经过训练的民族。西方国家所公认的那些基于人性的战争惯例，对日本人则显然不存在。这就使得太平洋上的战争不仅是一系列岛屿登陆作战和困难卓绝的后勤工作问题，从而使了解“敌人的性格”成为一个主要问题。为了与之对抗，我们就必须了解他们的行为。

困难是巨大的。自从日本锁国的大门被打开以来的七十五年间，对日本人的描述总是使用一系列令人极为迷惑的“但是，又……”之类的词句，远非对世界其他民族的描述可比。一个严肃的观察家在论及其他非日本民族时，是不大会既说他们彬彬有礼，又加上一句说：“但是，他们又很蛮横、倨傲。”他也不会既说该民族无比顽固，又说“但是，他们又极易适应激烈的革新”；也不会既说该民族性格温顺，又说他们不轻易服从上级的控制；也不会既说他们忠诚、宽厚，又宣称“但是他们又心存叛逆，满腹怨恨”；也不会既说他们本性勇敢，又描述他们如何怯懦；也不会既说他们的行动完全出自考虑别人的评价，即自己的面子，又说他们具有真诚的良心；也不会既讲他们在军队中接受机器人式的训练，又描述那个军队的士兵是如何不服管教，甚至犯上作乱；也不会既讲该民族热诚倾慕西方文化，又渲染他们顽固的保守主义。他不会既写一本书，讲这个民族如何普遍爱美，如何对演员和艺术家给予崇髙荣誉，如何醉心于菊花栽培，又另外写一本书来补充说，该民族崇尚刀剑和武士的无上荣誉。

然而，所有上述这些矛盾却成为有关日本论著中纵横交织的经纬。而且，都是千真万确。刀与菊，两者都是一幅绘画的组成部分。日本人生性极其好斗而又非常温和；黩武而又爱美；倨傲自尊而又彬彬有礼；顽梗不化而又柔弱善变；驯服而又不愿受人摆布；忠贞而又易于叛变；勇敢而又懦怯；保守而又十分欢迎新的生活方式。他们十分介意别人对自己行为的观感，但当别人对其劣迹毫无所知时，又会被罪恶所征服。他们的士兵受到彻底的训练，却又具有反抗性。

了解日本既已成为美国的当务之急，我们就不能对这些矛盾以及其他许多同样令人烦躁的矛盾置之不理了。严重的事态接二连三地出现在我们面前。日本人下一步将采取什么行动？能否不进攻日本本土而使其投降？我们是否应该直接轰炸皇宫？从日军俘虏身上，我们可以期望得到些什么？在对日本军队及日本本土进行宣传时，我们将宣传些什么才能拯救美国人的生命，并削弱日本人那种顽抗到最后一个人的意志？这些问题在日本通中也引起了相当大的分歧。如果和平降临，为了维持秩序，日本人需要永远实行军事管制吗？我军是否要准备在日本深山老林的要塞中与那些疯狂的顽抗分子进行战斗？在世界和平有可能到来之前，日本会不会发生一次法国或俄国式的革命？谁将领导这次革命呢？或者，日本民族只有灭亡？我们对这些问题的判断肯定是众说纷纭的。

我于1944年6月接受委托从事研究日本的工作。我受命使用文化人类学家所能使用的一切研究技术，弄清日本民族是什么样的民族。那年夏初，我国对日本的大规模反攻刚刚展开。在美国，许多人认为对日战争还要持续三年，也许十年，以至更长时间。在日本，有的人则认为这次战争会成为百年战争。他们说，美军虽然取得了局部胜利，但是新几内亚、所罗门群岛距离日本本土还有几千英里。日本的公报根本不承认日本海军的战败，日本国民仍然以为他们是胜利者。

然而，进入六月以后，形势开始有了变化。欧洲开辟了第二战场，最高司令部两年半以来给予欧洲战场的军事优先权已全部兑现，对德战争的胜利已经指日可待。在太平洋上，我军已经在塞班岛登陆。这是预告日军终将彻底失败的大战役。在这以后，我们的士兵便日益与日军短兵相接。而且，在新几内亚，在瓜达卡纳尔、缅甸、阿图、塔拉瓦、比亚克的这些战役中，我们已经清楚地知道，我们所面对的是何等可怕的敌人。

因而，到了1944年6月，我们对有关我们的敌人——日本的许多疑问急需作出解答。这些疑问，不管是军事上的还是外交上的，也无论是出自最高决策的要求，还是为了在日军前线散布宣传小册子的需要，都必须提出真知灼见。在日本发动的总体战中，我们必须了解的，不仅是东京当权者们的动机和目的，不仅是日本的漫长历史，也不仅是经济、军事上的统计资料。我们必须弄清楚，日本政府对日本人民能指望些什么？我们必须了解日本人的思维和感情的习惯，以及这些习惯所形成的模式。还必须弄清这些行动、意志背后的制约力。我们必须把美国人采取行动的那些前提暂且抛在一边，并且尽可能不要轻易地认为，在某种情况下，我们会怎样做，日本人也会怎样做。

我所接受的任务是困难的。美国与日本正处在交战状态。在战争中把一切都归咎于敌国，这是容易的；但要想知道敌人自己心目中对人生的看法就难得多了。而这个任务又必须完成。问题是日本人将如何行动，而不是我们处在他们的境遇时将如何行动。我必须努力把日本人在战争中的行为，作为了解他们的“正值”即有用的资料来加以利用，而不是作为“负值”即不利条件来看待。

我必须观察他们对战争本身的进行方式，并且暂且不看作军事问题，而看作文化问题。与平时一样，日本人在战时的行为也自有其日本特色。他们对待战争表现了哪些生活方式和思维方式的特征？他们的领导人激励士气、消除国民惶惑，以及在战场上调兵遣将的方式——所有这些都显示了他们自以为可资利用的力量是什么？我必须认真研究战争中的各个细节，来观察日本人如何一步一步地显露自己。

但是，我们两国正在交战，这一事实难免对我严重不利。这意味着我必须放弃实地调査，而这种调査乃是文化人类学者最重要的研究方法。我无法在日本人的家庭中生活，用自己的眼睛观察他们日常生活中的种种作风，并区分出哪些是关键性的，哪些是非关键性的。我无法观察他们作出决定时的复杂过程。我无法观察他们的下一代是如何培育的。约翰·恩布里写的《须惠村》是人类学家实地观察后写出的唯一一部有关日本村落的专著，很有价值，但我们在1944年遇到的有关日本的许多问题，那本书却还没有提到。

尽管有上述重重巨大困难，但作为一个文化人类学家，我相信，还可以运用一些研究方法和公认的假设或前提。至少可以利用文化人类学家最倚重的方法一一与被研究的人民直接接触。我国有许多在日本长大的日本人。我可以询问他们亲身经历的许多具体事例，发现他们如何进行判断的方法，来填补我们知识上的空白；我认为，这对人类学家了解任何一种文化都是必不可少的。当时，从事日本研究的其他社会科学家，大都利用图书文献，分析历史事件和统计资料，并从日本的文字宣传或口头宣传的词句中追踪其发展。我则确信，许多问题的答案大都隐藏在日本文化的规则及其价值之中，研究生活在这种文化中的人，答案会更加满意。

这并不意味我不看书，或没有受到在日本生活过的西方人士的教益。论述日本的丰硕文献以及在日本居住过的许多西方优秀的观察家，对我帮助极大，这是到亚马逊河发源地或新几内亚高原等地对无文字部落进行研究的人类学家们所无法享受的。那些民族没有文字，无法用文笔记录。西方人的论述也是凤毛麟角，浮光掠影。没有人知道他们过去的历史。实地调査的学者们必须在没有任何先驱学者的帮助下，探索他们的经济生活方式、社会阶层状况，以及宗教神灵等等。我研究日本却有许多学者的遗产可以继承。在嗜古好奇的文献中充满了生活细节的描述。欧美人士详细记载了他们的生动经历，日本人自己也撰写了许多不寻常的自我记录。日本人与其他东方民族不同，有强烈描写自我的冲动，既写他们的生活琐事，也写他们的全球扩张计划，其坦率实在令人惊异。当然，他们并没有和盘托出。没有一个民族会这样做。日本人描述日本会略去许多重要事情，因为这些对他们太熟悉了，如同呼吸空气一样，习而不察了。美国人写美国时也一样。尽管如此，日本人仍然是喜欢显示自己的。

我阅读这些文献时，如同达尔文说他在创立物种起源理论时的那种读书方法，即特别注意那些无法了解的事情。对议会演说中那一大堆观念的罗列，我必须了解些什么？他们为什么对一些无足轻重的行为大肆攻击，而对骇人听闻的暴行却毫不介意，这种态度的背后到底隐藏着什么？我一边阅读，一边不断提问，“这幅绘画的毛病到底何在？”“为了理解，我必须知道些什么？”

我还看了不少在日本编写、摄制的宣传片、历史片以及描写东京和农村现代生活的影片，然后再和一些在日本看过同样影片的日本人一起仔细讨论。他们对电影中男女主角以及反面角色的看法与我的看法并不一样。我感到迷惑不解的地方，他们觉得没有什么。他们对剧情和写作动机的理解与我也不一样，他们是从整部电影的结构来理解的。正如阅读小说，我的理解和在日本长大的他们就有很大的差距。在这些日本人中，有些人动辄为日本的风俗习惯进行辩解；有些人则痛恨日本的一切。很难说哪一种人使我受教最多。但他们所描绘的日本生活规范的景象则是一致的，不论是欣然接受者，还是痛加排斥者。

如果只是直接从其所研究的文化对象（人民）搜集资料并寻求解释，那么，这位人类学家所做的也就是那些在日本生活过的一切西方出色的观察家们所做过的事。如果他的贡献仅止于此，那就不能指望他对以往外国居留者有关日本的卓越著述做出新的贡献。不过，文化人类学家由于所受训练而具有某些特殊能力，花费一些精力，以求对这一拥有众多学者和观察家的领域增添他的贡献，看来是值得的。

人类学家知道多种亚洲和太平洋的文化。日本有许多社会习俗和生活习惯，甚至与太平洋岛屿上的原始部落极为相似。这些相似，有些是在马来诸岛，有些是在新几内亚，也有些是在波里尼西亚。当然，根据这些相似来推测古代也许有过移民或相互接触，这是很有趣的。但对我来说，了解文化相似性之所以有价值却并不在于这类可能发生的历史关联，而在于能够凭借这些类似或差异，获得理解日本生活方式的启示。这是因为，我懂得这些风俗习惯在那些简单的文化中如何起作用。我对亚洲大陆的暹罗、缅甸和中国也多少有些知识，因而可以把日本与其他民族进行比较，这些民族都是亚洲伟大文化遗产的一部分。人类学家在有关原始民族的研究中，已反复地证明，这种文化比较是何等有价值。一个部落的正式习俗也许百分之九十与邻近部落相同，却仍可能需要作些修改来适应周围民族不相同的生活方式和价值观念。在这一过程中有可能必须排斥某些基本习俗，不论其在整体中的比率是多么小，都可能使该民族的未来向独特的方向发展。对于一个人类学家来说，研究这种在整体上具有许多共性的各民族之间的鲜明差异是最有益的。

人类学家还必须使自己最大限度地适应自身文化与其他文化之间的差异，其研究技术也必须为解决这一特殊问题而加以磨炼。他们凭借经验知道，不同文化的人们在遇到某些情况，并必须对其含义作出判断时，其方式，在不同的部落和民族之间是有巨大差异的。在某些北极乡村或热带沙漠地区，他们会遇到以血缘责任或财务交换为基础的部落习俗，远非任何奔放的想象力所曾设想的。人类学家必须进行调査，不仅要调查亲属关系或交换关系的细节，而且要弄清这种习俗在部落行为中的后果，以及每一代人如何从小就受其制约，身体力行，世代相传，如同其祖先所做的那样。

人类学者对这种差异、制约及其后果的关注，在研究日本时也可加以利用。现在，无人不感到美国与日本在文化上的根深蒂固的差异。我们甚至出现这种关于日本的说法：凡是我们干的，他们就一定反其道而行之。一个研究者如果相信这种说法并简单地认为，差异太离奇，根本不可能了解那种民族，这当然是危险的。人类学家根据自己的经验充分证明，即使最离奇的差异也不会妨碍研究者对它的理解。人类学家比其他社会科学家能够更好地把差异作为一种有用的资料来利用，而不是看作障碍。制度和民族之间的差异表现越是离奇，他们就越加注意。对他所研究的部落的生活方式，任何东西他都不会视为当然，这就使得他不会只注意少数选出的事例，而是面向每件事物。在有关西方各民族的研究中，缺乏比较文化学训练的人往往忽视许多行为的整个领域。他们总是过于视为理所当然，对日常生活中的细小习惯以及人们对熟悉事物的公认说法都不进行研究。然而，正是这类习惯或公认说法大面积地投射在该民族的银幕上，影响该民族的未来，其作用远远超过外交官所签订的各种条约。

人类学家必须发展研究日常琐事的技术，因为，他所研究的部落中的这些日常琐事，与他本国相应的事物相比截然不同。当他想理解某一部落中被视为最恶毒的或另一部落中被视为最胆怯的行为时，当他试图了解在特定情况下，他们将如何行动、如何感受时，他就会发现，必须大力进行观察并注意细节，这些，在对文明民族进行研究时常常是不大注意的。人类学家有充分的理由相信，这些乃是最关键的，并且也知道如何进行挖掘。

这种方法值得运用于研究日本。因为只有高度注意一个民族生活中的人类日常琐事，才能充分理解人类学家这一论证前提的重大意义：即任何原始部落或任何最先进的文明民族中，人类的行为都是从日常生活中学来的。不论其行为或意见是如何奇怪，一个人的感觉和思维方式总是与他的经验有联系的。我越是对日本人的某种行为迷惑不解，就越认为在日本人生活中一定有造成这种奇特行为的某种极为平常的条件在起作用。我的研究越深入到日常交往细节就越有用处。人正是在日常细节中学习的。

作为一个文化人类学家，我还确信这样的前提，即：最孤立的细小行为，彼此之间也有某些系统性的联系。我十分重视数以百计的单项行为如何构成覆盖总体的多种模式。一个人类社会总必须为它自身的生活进行某种设计。它对某些情况的处理方式及评价方式表示赞可，那个社会中的人就把这些结论视为全世界的基本结论。无论有多大困难，他们都把这些结论融成一体。人们既然接受了赖以生活的价值体系，就不可能同时在其生活的另一部分按照相反的价值体系来思考和行动，否则就势必陷于混乱和不便。他们将力求更加和谐一致。他们为自己准备了种种共同的理由和共同的动机。一定程度的和谐一致是必不可少的，否则整个体系就将瓦解。

这样，经济行为、家庭活动、宗教仪式以及政治目标就像齿轮一样都相互啮合在一起。一个部门发生较其他部门更急剧的变化，其他部门就会受到巨大压力，而这种压力正是来自实现和谐一致的需要。在追逐权力统治的无文字社会，对权力的意志不仅表现在经济交往及与其他部落的关系之中，也同样表现在宗教活动之中。在有古代文字经典的文明民族中，教会必然保留过去年代的语录。无文字的部落则不是这样。但是，随着经济、政治权力的公开认可日益增强，在那些与此相抵触的领域，教会就放弃了自己的权力。词句虽然保留，内容则已改变。宗教教义、经济活动和政治，并不是处在各有堤防隔离开来的小池之中，它们总是溢过假想的堤防，互相融汇而分不开。由于这是常理，学者们越是把他的调查扩散到经济、性生活、宗教，以至婴儿抚育等领域，就越能探究他所研究的社会中发生的事情。他就能有效地在生活的任何领域设立假说并搜集资料。他就能学会把任何民族所形成的要求，不论是用政治的、经济的，还是用道德的术语来表达，理解为他们从其社会经验中学来的思维方式和习惯的表现。因此，我这本书并不是一本专门论述日本宗教、经济生活、政治或家庭的书，而是探讨日本人有关生活方式的各种观点。它只描述这些观点在各种活动中如何自我表露，不管当时是什么样的活动。它是一本探讨日本何以成为日本民族的书。

二十世纪所面临的障碍之一就是我们仍然怀有模糊不清、以至偏颇的观念，不仅对日本何以成为日本民族，而且对美国何以成为美利坚民族，法国何以成为法兰西民族，俄国何以成为俄罗斯民族也是如此。各国之间由于缺乏这方面的知识而彼此误解。有时，纠纷仅仅是细微的毫厘之差，我们却担心是无法调解的分歧。而在一个民族基于其整个经验和价值体系，在思想上已形成一套与我们的设想异常不同的行动方针时，我们却侈谈共同的目标。我们根本不找机会去了解什么是他们的习惯和价值。如果去了解，我们也许会发现，某一行动方针并非必然是坏的，因为它并不是我们所了解的那一种。

各民族关于自己思想和行动的说法是不能完全指靠的。每个民族的作家都努力描述他们的民族，但这并不容易。任何民族在观察生活时所使用的镜片都不同于其他民族使用的。人们在观察事物时，也很难意识到自己是透过镜片观察的。任何民族都把这些视为当然，任何民族所接受的焦距、视点，对该民族来说，仿佛是上帝安排的景物。我们从不指望戴眼镜的人会弄清镜片的度数，我们也不能指望各民族会分析他们自己对世界的看法。当我们想知道镜片的度数时，我们就训练一位眼科大夫，他就会验明镜片。毫无疑问，有朝一日，我们也会承认，社会科学工作者的任务就是为当代世界各个民族做眼科大夫那样的工作。

这项工作，必须同时具备某种坚定精神和宽容态度。有些善意人士有时指责我们的坚定精神。这些“世界大同”的鼓吹者们坚信并且向全世界各地人们灌输这种信念：即“东方”和“西方”，黑人和白人，基督教徒和伊斯兰教徒，这些差异都是表面现象，实际上，凡是人，想法都是相似的。这种观点有时被称作“四海之内皆兄弟”。但是，我却不理解，为什么信奉“四海之内皆兄弟”，就不能说日本人有日本人的生活方式，美国人有美国人的生活方式。看来这帮软心肠的先生们有时似乎认为，全世界各民族都是一张底片印出来的，如若不然，亲善主义就无从建立。但是强求接受这种单一性，作为尊重其他民族的条件，就好比强求自己的妻子儿女要同自己一模一样，这就未免太神经质了。有坚定精神的人认为差异应当存在。他们尊重差异。他们的目标是确立一个能容纳各种差异的安全世界。美国可以是地道的美利坚而不威胁世界和平；法国、日本也是如此。企图以外部压力来抑制这类人生态度的成长，对于自己也不相信差异就是悬在人类头上的达摩克利斯剑的任何研究者来说，这类想法都是荒谬的。他也无需担心采取这种立场就会使世界僵死不变。鼓励文化上的差异，并不意味使世界静止。英国在伊丽莎白时代之后有安妮女王时代及维多利亚时代，并未因此丧失其英国性。这正因为英国人一直是英国人，因而能够在不同世代，承认不同标准和不同民族气质的存在。

对民族差异进行系统研究，既需要有某种坚定精神，也需要有某种宽容态度。人们只有自己具有坚定不移的信仰，才会有不寻常的宽容。只有这时，宗教的比较研究才能发展。他们也许是耶稣教徒或阿拉伯学者，或不信教者，但绝不是偏狂者。文化的比较研究也是一样，如果人们还在战战兢兢地保卫自己的生活方式，并只相信自己的生活方式是世界上唯一的解决办法时，文化的比较研究就不能发展。这种人绝不会懂得，获得其他生活方式的知识会增加对自身文化的热爱。他们把自身置于愉快和丰实的体验之外。他们是如此保守自持，以至只能要求其他民族采纳他们的特殊方式，别无其他选择。作为美国人，他们就强求一切民族接受我们所喜欢的信条。但是，其他民族难以接受我们所要求的生活方式，就好比我们无法学会用十二进位制来代替十进位制进行计算，或者无法学会像东非某些土著那样以金鸡独立式进行休息一样。

因此，本书乃是一本阐述日本习惯（预期的和公认的）的书。它将论述日本人对自己的要求，诸如他们在哪些情况下能指望得到恭维，在哪些情况下则不能；什么时候会感到惭愧，什么时候会感到尴尬等等。本书所论述的事项，要说最理想的根据，也许就是平凡的街谈巷议者，什么人都有。这并不意味着这些人都曾置身于书中提及的每一特殊情况，而是说这些人都会承认在那种情况下就会如何如何。如此进行研究，其目的是要描绘出思想、行为深处的态度。也许未达到这种目的，但这是本书的理想。

在这项研究中，研究者很快就会发现，再增加多少调查材料，也不会提供更多的确实性。譬如，某人在何时对谁行礼，就没有必要对整个日本人进行统计研究。这种公认的习惯性行为，任何一个日本人都可以向你证明，再有几个确证就行了，不需要从成千上万的日本人中获得同一结论。

研究者若想弄清日本生活方式所赖以建立的那些观点，他的工作就远比统计证实要艰巨得多。人们迫切要求他报告的是，这些公认的行为和判断是如何形成日本人观察现存事物的镜片的。他们必须阐述日本人的观点如何影响他们观察人生的焦距和方法。他还必须努力使那些用完全不同的焦距来观察人生的美国人也能听得明白。在这种分析工作中，最有权威的法庭并不一定就是“田中先生”——即任何一位日本人。因为“田中先生”并不能说清楚自己的观点。在他看来，为美国人写的那些解释，过于刻意分析，无此必要。

美国人对社会的研究，很少注意研究文明民族文化所赖以建立的各种前提。大多数的研究都认为这些前提是自明的。社会学家和心理学家大都全神贯注在意见和行为的“分布”上，他们拿手的研究方法是统计法。他们对大量调查资料、调查答卷、交谈者的回答、心理学的测定等等，进行统计分析，试图从中找出某些因素的独立性或相互依存关系。在舆论调查领域中，可以在全国使用用科学方法选出的有效的抽样调査技术，这种方法在美国已达到高度完善。通过这种方法，就可以了解对某一公职候选人或某项政策各有多少支持者和反对者。支持者或反对者又可以按乡村或城市、低薪收入或髙薪阶层、共和党或民主党来进行分类。在一个实行普选、并且由国民的代表起草颁布法律的国家里，这种调査结果具有实践的重要性。

美国人可以用投票方式调査美国人的意见，并了解调查的结果。但他们能够这样做，有一个十分明显却无人道及的前提条件，那就是他们都熟悉美国生活方式并且认为它是天经地义、理所当然的。舆论调査的结果只不过是对我们已知的事情再增加一些而已。要了解另一个国家则必须先对那个国家民众的习惯和观点进行系统的质的研究，然后投票方式才能有用处。通过审慎的抽样调査，可以了解支持政府和反对政府的人各有多少。但是，如果事先不弄清他们对国家抱有什么样的观念，抽样调査结果又能告诉我们什么呢？只有在了解了他们的国家观之后，我们才能弄清各个派别在街头或国会中到底在争论些什么。一个民族对政府所持的观点，要比标志各政党势力的数字具有更普遍、更持久的重要性。在美国，不管是共和党还是民主党，都认为政府几乎是一种摆脱不了的祸害，它限制个人的自由。对一个美国人来说，也许战争年代是例外，政府官员并不比在民间事业中任职者社会地位更高。这种国家观与日本人简直不可同日而语，甚至与欧洲许多国家也有很大差异。我们首先必须了解的，正是他们这类看法。他们的观点表现在风俗习惯、对成功者的评论以及有关他们民族历史的神话、民族节日的辞令中。根据这些间接表现也可以进行研究，但必须是系统的研究。

如同我们对选举要研究赞成票、反对票各占多少一样，我们对某一民族在生活中所形成的基本观点以及他们所赞同的解决方式，也要仔细、详尽地进行研究。日本正是这样的国家，其基本观念十分值得我们研究。我确实发现，一旦我们弄清了西方人的观念与他们的人生观不相符合，掌握了一些他们所使用的范畴和符号，那么西方人眼中经常看到的日本人行为中的许多矛盾就不再是矛盾了。我开始明白，为什么对某些急剧变化的行为，日本人却认为是完整一贯的体系中的组成部分。当我认识到这一点，我就发现那些日本同事最初用的一些奇特词句和概念，一变而为具有重大含义，并充满长年积蓄的感情。道德、罪恶，与西方人所了解的完全不同。他们的体系是独特的，既不是佛教的，也不是儒教的，而是日本式的——这既是他们的优势，也是他们的弱点。

THE JAPANESE were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking. Like Czarist Russia before us in 1905, we were fighting a nation fully armed and trained which did not belong to the Western cultural tradition. Conventions of war which Western nations had come to accept as facts of human nature obviously did not exist for the Japanese. It made the war in the Pacific more than a series of landings on island beaches, more than an unsurpassed problem of logistics. It made it a major problem in the nature of the enemy. We had to understand their behavior in order to cope with it.

The difficulties were great. During the past seventy-five years since Japan's closed doors were opened, the Japanese have been described in the most fantastic series of 'but also's' ever

used for any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about peoples other than the Japanese and says they are unprecedentedly polite, he is not likely to add, 'But also insolent and overbearing.' When he says people of some nation are incomparably rigid in their behavior, he does not add, 'But also they adapt themselves readily to extreme innovations.' When he says a people are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily amenable to control from above. When he says they are loyal and generous, he does not declare, 'But also treacherous and spiteful.' When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others' opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly terrifying conscience. When he describes robot-like discipline in their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their fervid conservatism. When he writes a book on a nation with a popular cult of aestheticism which gives high honor to actors and to artists and lavishes art upon the cultivation of chrysanthemums, that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige of the warrior.

All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a part of the picture. The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways. They are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt but are also insubordinate.

When it became so important for America to understand Japan, these contradictions and many others equally blatant could not be waved aside. Crises were facing us in quick succession. What would the Japanese do? Was capitulation possible without invasion? Should we bomb the Emperor's palace? What could we expect of Japanese prisoners of war? What should we say in our propaganda to Japanese troops and to the Japanese homeland which could save the lives of Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last man? There were violent disagreements among those who knew the Japanese best. When peace came, were the Japanese a people who would require perpetual martial law to keep them in order? Would our army have to prepare to fight desperate bitter-enders in every mountain fastness of Japan? Would there have to be a revolution in Japan after the order of the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution before international peace was possible? Who would lead it? Was the alternative the eradication of the Japanese? It made a great deal of difference what our judgments were.

In June, 1944, I was assigned to the study of Japan. I was asked to use all the techniques I could as a cultural anthropologist to spell out what the Japanese were like. During that early summer our great offensive against Japan had just begun to show itself in its true magnitude. People in the United States were still saying that the war with Japan would last three years, perhaps ten years, more. In Japan they talked of its lasting one hundred years. Americans, they said, had had local victories, but New Guinea and the Solomons were thousands of miles away from their homo islands. Their official communiques had hardly admitted naval defeats and the Japanese people still regarded themselves as victors.

In June, however, the situation began to change. The second front was opened in Europe and the military priority which the High Command had for two years and a half given to the European theater paid off. The end of the war against Germany was in sight. And in the Pacific our forces landed on Saipan, a great operation forecasting eventual Japanese defeat. From then on our soldiers were to face the Japanese army at constantly closer quarters. And we knew well, from the fighting in New Guinea, on Guadalcanal, in Burma, on Attu and Tarawa and Biak, that we were pitted against a formidable foe.

In June, 1944, therefore, it was important to answer a multitude of questions about our enemy, Japan. Whether the issue was military or diplomatic, whether it was raised by questions of high policy or of leaflets to be dropped behind the Japanese front lines, every insight was important. In the all-out war Japan was fighting we had to know, not just the aims and motives of those in power in Tokyo, not just the long history of Japan, not just economic and military statistics; we had to know what their government could count on from the people. We had to try to understand Japanese habits of thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell. We had to know the sanctions behind these actions and opinions. We had to put aside for the moment the premises on which we act as Americans and to keep ourselves as far as possible from leaping to the easy conclusion that what we would do in a given situation was what they would do.

My assignment was difficult. America and Japan were at war and it is easy in wartime to condemn wholesale, but far harder to try to see how your enemy looks at life through his own eyes. Yet it had to be done. The question was how the Japanese would behave, not how we would behave if we were in their place. I had to try to use Japanese behavior in war as an asset in understanding them, not as a liability. I had to look at the way they conducted the war itself and see it not for the moment as a military problem but as a cultural problem. In warfare as well as in peace, the Japanese acted in character. What special indications of their way of life and thinking did they give in the way they handled warfare? Their leaders' ways of whipping up war spirit, of reassuring the bewildered, of utilizing their soldiers in the field-all these things showed what they themselves regarded as the strengths on which they could capitalize. I had to follow the details of the war to see how the Japanese revealed themselves in it step by step.

The fact that our two nations were at war inevitably meant, however, a serious disadvantage. It meant that I had to forego the most important technique of the cultural anthropologist: a field trip. I could not go to Japan and live in their homes and watch the strains and stresses of daily life, see with my own eyes which were crucial and which were not. I could not watch them in the complicated business of arriving at a decision. I could not see their children being brought up. The one anthropologist's field study of a Japanese village, John Embree's Suye Mura, was invaluable, but many of the questions about Japan with which we were faced in 1944 were not raised when that study was written.

As a cultural anthropologist, in spite of these major difficulties, I had confidence in certain techniques and postulates which could be used. At least I did not have to forego the anthropologist's great reliance upon face-to-face contact with the people he is studying. There were plenty of Japanese in this country who had been reared in Japan and I could ask them about the concrete facts of their own experiences, find out how they judged them, fill in from their descriptions many gaps in our knowledge which as an anthropologist I believed were essential in understanding any culture. Other social scientists who were studying Japan were using libraries, analyzing past events or statistics, following developments in the written or spoken word of Japanese propaganda. I had confidence that many of these answers they sought were embedded in the rules and values of Japanese culture and could be found more satisfactorily by exploring that culture with people who had really lived it.

This did not mean that I did not read and that I was not constantly indebted to Westerners who had lived in Japan. The vast literature on the Japanese and the great number of good Occidental observers who have lived in Japan gave me an advantage which no anthropologist has when he goes to the Amazon headwaters or the New Guinea highlands to study a non-literate tribe. Having no written language such tribes have committed no serf-revelations to paper. Comments by Westerners are few and superficial Nobody knows their past history. The field worker must discover without any help from previous students the way their economic life works, how stratified their society is, what is uppermost in their religious life. In studying Japan, I was the heir of many students. Descriptions of small details of life were tucked away in antiquarian papers. Men and women from Europe and America had set down their vivid experiences, and the Japanese themselves had written really extraordinary self-revelations. Unlike many Oriental people they have a great impulse to write themselves out. They wrote about the trivia of their lives as well as about their programs of world expansion. They were amazingly frank. Of course they did not present the whole picture. No people do. A Japanese who writes about Japan passes over really crucial things which are as familiar to him and as invisible as the air ho breathes. So do Americans when they write about America. But just the same the Japanese loved self-revelation.

I read this literature as Darwin says he read when he was working out his theories on the origin of species, noting what I had not the means to understand. What would I need to know to understand the juxtaposition of ideas in a speech in the Diet? What could lie back of their violent condemnation of some act that seemed venial and their easy acceptance of one that seemed outrageous? I read, asking the ever-present question: What is 'wrong with this picture? ' What would I need to know to understand it?

I went to movies, too, which had been written and produced in Japan-propaganda movies, historical movies, movies of contemporary life in Tokyo and in the farm villages. I went over them afterward with Japanese who had seen some of these same movies in Japan and who in any case saw the hero and the heroine and the villain as Japanese see them, not as I saw them.When I was at sea, it was clear that they were not. The plots, the motivations were not as I saw them, but they made sense in terms of the way the movie was constructed. As with the novels, there was much more difference than met the eye between what they meant to me and what they meant to the Japanese-reared. Some of these Japanese were quick to come to the defense of Japanese conventions and some hated everything Japanese. It is hard to say from which group I learned most. In the intimate picture they gave of how one regulates one's rejected it with bitterness.

In so far as the anthropologist goes for his material and his insights directly to the people of the culture he is studying, he is doing what all the ablest Western observers have done who have lived in Japan. If this were all an anthropologist had to offer, he could not hope to add to the valuable studies which foreign residents have made of the Japanese. The cultural anthropologist, however, has certain qualifications as a result of his training which appeared to make it worth his while to try to add his own contribution in a field rich in students and observers.

The anthropologist knows many cultures of Asia and the Pacific. There are many social arrangements and habits of life in Japan which have close parallels even in the primitive tribes of the Pacific islands. Some of these parallels are in Malaysia, some in New Guinea, some in Polynesia. It is interesting, of course, to speculate on whether these show some ancient migrations or contacts, but this problem of possible historical relationship was not the reason why knowledge of these cultural similarities was valuable to me. It was rather that I knew in these simpler cultures how these institutions worked and could get clues to Japanese life from the likeness or the difference I found. I knew, too, something about Siam and Burma and China on the mainland of Asia, and I could therefore compare Japan with other nations which are a part of its great cultural heritage. Anthropologists had shown over and over in their studies of primitive people how valuable such cultural comparisons can be. A tribe may share ninety per cent of its formal observances with its neighbors and yet it may have revamped them to fit a way of life and a set of values which it does not share with any surrounding peoples. In the process it may have had to reject some fundamental arrangements which, however small in proportion to the whole, turn its future course of development in a unique direction. Nothing is more helpful to an anthropologist than to study contrasts he finds between peoples who on the whole share many traits.

Anthropologists also have had to accustom themselves to maximum differences between their own culture and another and their techniques have to be sharpened for this particular problem. They know from experience that there are great differences in the situations which men in different cultures have to meet and in the way in which different tribes and nations define the meanings of these situations. In some Arctic village or tropical desert they were faced with tribal arrangements of kinship responsibility or financial exchange which in their moments of most unleashed imagination they could not have invented. They have had to investigate, not only the details of kinship or exchange, but what the consequences of these arrangements were in the tribe's behavior and how each generation was conditioned from childhood to carry on as their ancestors had done before them.

This professional concern with differences and their conditioning and their consequences could well be used in the study of Japan. No one is unaware of the deep-rooted cultural differences between the United States and Japan. We have even a folklore about the Japanese which says that whatever we do they do the opposite. Such a conviction of difference is dangerous only if a student rests content with saying simply that these differences are so fantastic that it is impossible to understand such people. The anthropologist has good proof in his experience that even bizarre behavior does not prevent one's understanding it. More than any other social scientist he has professionally used differences as an asset rather than a liability. There is nothing that has made him pay such sharp attention to institutions and peoples as the fact that they were phenomenally strange. There was nothing he could take for granted in his tribe's way of living and it made him look not just at a few selected facts, but at everything. In studies of Western nations one who is untrained in studies of comparative cultures overlooks whole areas of behavior. He takes so much for granted that he does not explore the range of trivial habits in daily living and all those accepted verdicts on homely matters, which, thrown large on the national screen, have more to do with that nation's future than treaties signed by diplomats.

The anthropologist has had to develop techniques for studying the commonplace because those things that are commonplaces in the tribe he was studying were so different from their counterparts in his own home country. When he tried to understand the extreme maliciousness of some tribe or the extreme timidity of another, when he tried to plot out the way they would act and feel in a given situation, he found he had to draw heavily on observations and details that are not often noted about civilized nations. He had good reason to believe they were essential and he knew the kind of research that would unearth them.

It was worth trying in the case of Japan. For it is only when one has noted the intensely human commonplaces of any people's existence that one appreciates at its fun importance the anthropologist's premise that human behavior in any primitive tribe or in any nation in the forefront of civilization is learned in daily living. No matter how bizarre his act or his opinion, the way a man feels and thinks has some relation to his experience. The more baffled I was at some bit of behavior, the more I therefore assumed that there existed somewhere in Japanese life some ordinary conditioning of such strangeness. If the search took me into trivial details of daily intercourse, so much the better. That was where people learned.

As a cultural anthropologist also I started from the premise that the most isolated bits of behavior have some Systematic relation to each other. I took seriously the way hundreds of details fall into over-all patterns. A human society must make for itself some design for living. It approves certain ways of meeting situations, certain ways of sizing them up. People in that society regard these solutions as foundations of the universe. They integrate them, no matter what the difficulties. Men who have accepted a system of values by which to live cannot without courting inefficiency and chaos keep for long a fenced-off portion of their lives where they think and behave according to a contrary set of values. They try to bring about more conformity. They provide themselves with some common rationale and some common motivations. Some degree of consistency is necessary or the whole scheme falls to pieces.

Economic behavior, family arrangements, religious rites and political objectives therefore become geared into one another. Changes in one area may occur more rapidly than in others and subject these other areas to great stress, but the stress itself arises from the need for consistency. In pre-literate societies commited to the pursuit of power over others, the will to power is expressed in their religious practices no less than in their economic transactions and in their relations with other tribes. In civilized nations which have old written scriptures, the Church necessarily retain the phrases of past centuries, as tribes without written language do not, but it abdicates authority in those fields which would interfere with increasing public approval of economic and political power. The words remain but the meaning is altered. Religious dogmas, economic practices and politics do not stay dammed up in neat separate little ponds but they overflow their supposed boundaries and their waters mingle inextricably one with the other. Because this is always true, the more a student has seemingly scattered his investigation among facts of economics and sex and religion and the care of the baby, the better he can follow what is happening in the society he studies. He can draw up his hypotheses and get his data in any area of life with profit. He can learn to see the demands any nation makes, whether they are phrased in political, economic, or moral terms, as expressions of habits and ways of thinking which are learned in their social experience. This volume therefore is not a book specifically about Japanese religion or economic life or politics or the family. It examines, Japanese assumptions about the conduct of life. It describes these assumptions as they have manifested themselves whatever the activity in hand. It is about what makes Japan a nation of Japanese.

One of the handicaps of the twentieth century is that we still have the vaguest and most biased notions, not only of what makes Japan a nation of Japanese, but of what makes the United States a nation of Americans, France a nation of Frenchmen, and Russia a nation of Russians. Lacking this knowledge, each country misunderstands the other. We fear irreconcilable differences when the trouble is only between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, and we talk about common purposes when one nation by virtue of its whole experience and system of values has in mind a quite a different course of action from the one we meant. We do not give ourselves a chance to find out what their habits and values are. If we did, we might discover that a course of action is not necessarily vicious because it is not the one we know.

It is not possible to depend entirely upon what each nation says of its own habits of thought and action. Writers in every nation have tried to give an account of themselves. But it is not easy. The lenses through which any nation looks at life are not the ones another nation uses. It is hard to be conscious of the eyes through which one looks. Any country takes them for granted, and the tricks of focusing and of perspective which give to any people its national view of life seem to that people the god-given arrangement of the landscape. In any matter of spectacles, we do not expect the man who wears them to know the formula for the lenses, and neither can we expect nations to analyze their own outlook upon the world. When we want to know about spectacles, we train an oculist and expect him to be able to write out the formula for any lenses we bring him. Some day no doubt we shall recognize that it is the job of the social scientist to do this for the nations of the contemporary world.

The job requires both a certain tough-mindedness and a certain generosity. It requires a tough-mindedness which people of good will have sometimes condemned. These protagonists of One World have staked their hopes on convincing people of every corner of the earth that all the differences between East and West, black and white, Christian and Mohammedan, are superficial and that all mankind is really like-minded. This view is sometimes called the brotherhood of man. I do not know why believing in the brotherhood of man should mean that one cannot say that the Japanese have their own version of the conduct of life and that Americans have theirs. It sometimes seems as if the tender-minded could not base a doctrine of good will upon anything less than a world of peoples each of which is a print from the same negative. But to demand such uniformity as a condition of respecting another nation is as neurotic as to demand it of one's wife or one's children. The tough-minded are content that differences should exist. They respect differences. Their goal is a world made safe for differences, where the United States may be American to the hilt without threatening the peace of the world, and France may be France, and Japan may be Japan on the same conditions. To forbid the ripening of any of these attitudes toward life by outside interference seems wanton to any student who is not himself convinced that differences need be a Damocles'sword hanging over the world. Nor need he fear that by taking such a position he is helping to freeze the world into the status quo. Encouraging cultural differences would not mean a static world. England did not lose her Englishness because an Age of Elizabeth was followed by an Age of Queen Anne and a Victorian Era. It was just because the English were so much themselves that different standards and different national moods could assert themselves in different generations.

Systematic study of national differences requires a certain generosity as well as tough-mindedness. The study of comparative religions has flourished only when men were secure enough in their own convictions to be unusually generous. They might be Jesuits or Arabic savants or unbelievers, but they could not be zealots. The study of comparative cultural too cannot flourish when men are so defensive about their own way of life that it appears to them to be by definition the sole solution in the world. Such men will never know the added love of their own culture which comes from knowledge of other ways of life. They cut themselves off from a pleasant and enriching experience. Being so defensive, they have no alternative but to demand that other rations adopt their own particular solutions. As Americans they urge our favorite tenets on all nations. And other nations can no more adopt our ways of life on demand than we could learn to do our calculations in units of 12's instead of 10's, or stand on one foot in response like certain East African natives.

This book, then, is about habits that are expected and taken for granted in Japan. It is about those situations when any Japanese can count on courtesy and those situations when he cannot, about when he feels shame, when he feels embarrassment, what he requires of himself. The ideal authority for any statement in this book would be the proverbial man in the street. It would be anybody. That does not mean that this anybody would in his own person have been placed in each particular circumstance. It does mean that anybody would recognize that that was how it was under those conditions. The goal of such a study as this is to describe deeply entrenched attitudes of thought and behavior. Even when it falls short, this was nevertheless the ideal.

In such a study one quickly reaches the point where the testimony of great numbers of additional informants provides no further validation. Who bows to whom and when, for instance, needs no statistical study of all Japan; the approved and customary circumstances can be reported by almost any one and after a few confirmations it is not necessary to get the same information from a million Japanese.

The student who is trying to uncover the assumptions upon which Japan builds its way of life has a far harder task than statistical validation. The great demand upon him is to report how these accepted practices and judgments become the lenses through which the Japanese see existence. He has to state the way in which their assumptions affect the focus and perspective in which they view life. He has to try to make this intelligible to Americans who see existence in very different focus. In this task of analysis the court of authority is not necessarily Tanaka San, the Japanese 'anybody.' For Tanaka San does not make his assumptions explicit, and interpretations written for Americans will undoubtedly seem to him unduly labored.

American studies of societies have not often been planned to study the premises on which civilized cultures are built. Most studies assume that these premises are self-evident. Sociologists and psychologists are preoccupied with the 'scatter' of opinion and behavior, and the stock technique is statistical. They subject to statistical analysis masses of census material, great numbers of answers to questionnaires or to interviewers' questions; psychological measurements and the like, and attempt to derive the independence or interdependence of certain factors. In the field of public opinion, the valuable technique of polling the country by using a scientifically selected sample of the population has been highly perfected in the United States. It is possible to discover how many people support or oppose a certain candidate for public office or a certain policy. Supporters and opponents can be classified as rural or urban, low income or high income, Republicans or Democrats. In a country with universal suffrage, where laws are actually drafted and enacted by he people's representatives, such findings have practical importance.

Americans can poll Americans and understand the findings, but they can do this because of a prior step which is so obvious that no one mentions it: they know and take for granted the conduct of life in the United States. The results of polling tell more about what we already know. In trying to understand another country, systematic qualitative study of the habits and assumptions of its people is essential before a poll can serve to good advantage. By careful sampling, a poll can discover how many people are for or against government. But what does that tell us about them unless we know what their notions are about the State? Only so we know what the factions are disputing about, in the streets or in the Diet. A nation's assumptions about government are of much more general and permanent importance than figures of party strength. In the United States, the Government, to both Republicans and Democrats, is almost a necessary evil and it limits individual freedom; Government employment, too, except perhaps in wartime, does not give a man the standing he gets from an equivalent job in private enterprise. This version of the State is a far cry from the Japanese version, and even from that of many European nations. What we need to know first of all is just what their version is. Their view is embodied in their folkways, in their comments on successful men, in their myth of their national history, in their speeches on national holidays; and it can be studied in these indirect manifestations. But it requires systematic study.

The basic assumptions which any nation makes about living, the solutions it has sanctioned, can be studied with as much attention and as much detail as we give to finding out what proportion of a population will vote yes and no in an election. Japan was a country whose fundamental assumptions were well worth exploring. Certainly I found that once I had seen where my Occidental assumptions did not fit into their view of life and had got some idea of the categories and symbols they used, many contradictions Westerners are accustomed to see in Japanese behavior were no longer contradictions. I began to see how it was that the Japanese themselves saw certain violent swings of behavior as integral parts of a system consistent within itself. I can try to show why. As I worked with them, they began to use strange phrases and ideas which turned out to have great implications and to be full of age-long emotion. Virtue and vice as the Occident understands them had undergone a sea-change. The system was singular. It was not Buddhism and it was not Confucianism. It was Japanese-the strength and the weakness of Japan. gK0ah4tHk8WfyetcKYkr49zdGjYeXfDG3WrAtcWaV4AMfn3bAAPIZfFCaJklN+3q