下载掌阅APP，畅读海量书库
立即打开
Sunzi's Art of War ( Sunzi bingfa ), is an ancient classic on war. It consists of 13 chapters in about 6,000 characters. Sun Wu, respectfully called Sunzi, was born sometime between 550 and 540 BC, or toward the end of the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 BC). He was a native of the State of Qi but later moved to the State of Wu, where he became the king's trusted strategist. As many of the book's contents bear features of the Warring States Period (475-221BC), some scholars believe the book was probably written in the middle of that period. It represents the theories of war of the Sunzi School originated by Sun Wu.
Of the more than 3,000 books on war from the pre-Qin (before 221 BC) period to the Qing Dynasty (1616-1911), Sunzi's Art of War stands out as the greatest classic. It excels over the other books in terms of strategy design, philosophical grounding and in tactical application. Over the centuries it has been respected as "the source for all books on war."
Of the rich strategic thoughts of Sunzi, we have selected just a few for illustration.
The first example is, "Planning before going to war." Before entering a war, one must compare and analyze all factors of both sides. These mainly include: morale, climate, terrain, commanders, and rules. "Morale" refers to the approval or disapproval of the people. The army that has the approval of the people will gain their support, while one without endorsement will lose their support. "Climate" refers to seasonal conditions at the time of war. "Terrain" refers to the distance (far or near), position (ease or difficulty of access), size (large or small), and height (high or low) of the topography for war. Consideration must also be given to the degree of security or danger in the area. "Rules" refer to regulations governing the army, "Who should carry out orders? What are the respective strengths of the soldiers? Who is responsible for training the troops? Who decides rewards or punishments?" The five aspects for consideration during war were echoed by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a German war expert, as "strategic factors." One or two of these factors are insufficient for one to judge the feasibility and consequences of a war. Consideration must be given to all these factors and their combinations. Such holistic thinking is a special feature of Sunzi's Art of War .
The second example is, "One can fight and win a hundred wars if one knows both oneself and the enemy." This is probably the most widely quoted concept from Sunzi's Art of War .
The purpose of considering the five aspects, as introduced above, is actually to know the real situations on both sides. It is not easy to get to know the enemy, because they do their best to keep their secrets and resort to all sorts of deception. Getting to know oneself is not easy, either. What do the people think about the war? What is the capability and state of mind of the commander? How is the morale and training of the troops? These factors are not usually self-evident without thorough analysis, and one may be misled by false impressions. There have been more than a few cases in history where the commander received permission from the ruler to go to war, but without reporting to him that the army was in fact incapable of fighting. The result, needless to say, was always total destruction of the army. This is why Sunzi said, "One can fight and win a hundred wars if one knows both oneself and the enemy. The odds for winning are half and half if one knows oneself but not the enemy. And one is bound to fail if one knows neither oneself nor the enemy." He added, "The odds for winning are half and half if one knows that one's troops are able to attack but does not know the enemy troops are invulnerable to attack. The odds for winning are half and half if one knows that the enemy troops are vulnerable to attack but does not know that one's own troops are not in a position to attack. The odds for winning are half and half if one knows that the opponent is vulnerable to attack and that one's troops are in a position to attack but does not know that the terrain is unsuitable for fighting. Thus an expert of war does not leave anything unclear when declaring war, and also has all sorts of methods to deal with any situation. Victory is certain, if one knows both oneself and the enemy; victory will be complete, if one further knows seasonal and topographic conditions."
The third example, "The army survives by treachery." Sunzi said, "The use of force is actually the use of treachery." In his discussion of "strategy" in On War , Carl von Clausewitz attributes its origin to "treachery."
By "treachery" Sunzi meant that the army "should appear to be incompetent when it is competent, appear to be unprepared to fight when it is prepared, appear to be retreating when it is advancing, appear to be advancing when it is retreating." In other words, it is crucial to deceive the enemy with false impressions.
By treachery, one should "tempt the enemy with gains, attack the enemy when they are in disorder, be prepared for the enemy when they are equal in strength, avoid the enemy when they are stronger, (further) aggravate the enemy when they are angry, cause the enemy to become arrogant when they are prudent, tire the enemy when they are at rest, sow discord among the enemy when they are united." In a word, treachery is meant to entice the enemy to make all sorts of mistakes, defeating them after they fall into a state of chaos. It also means "attacking the enemy at an unexpected time and place."
It is by using treachery that an expert of war devises strategies at headquarters while directing his army a thousand miles away to victory.
The fourth example is, "Winning a war without fighting it." Sunzi did not approve of large-scale killing and destruction, which he regarded as the worst strategy. To Sunzi, the purpose of a war is to win victory, not to kill as many people as possible. On the contrary, one should avoid destroying the enemy stronghold and avoid destruction of life as much as possible. It is best to take over a city intact and to win victory through minimal killing. This is the principle of a "decent victory." Sunzi went on to say, "Winning every war one fights is not the best one can do; winning a war without fighting is the best one can do. Therefore, the highest art of war is to outwit the enemy strategically, the second level is to foil their diplomacy, the third level is to attack their army, and the lowest level is to attack their city. Attacking the city can only be used as the last resort." In other words, it is not plausible to fight and win wars. It is ideal to achieve victory through means other than war, such as politics, diplomacy, and other deterrent measures. Attacking the city is the least preferable, because, especially in Sunzi's time, the city was host to many ancestral temples and tombs. The defensive side would often fight to their death, resulting in extensive casualties and destruction. These ideas of Sunzi reflect his deep understanding of what we today call "holistic war."
Bamboo strips inscribed with the text of Sunzi's Art of War . Discovered buried in a tomb from early Western Han Dynasty on Mount Yinque, in today's Shandong Province, this is the earliest version of the book discovered so far.
The rich philosophical thought in Sunzi's Art of War has aroused greater and greater attention from scholars of ancient Chinese philosophy.
Situations of war are changeable at every moment, perhaps the most changeable of all things in the world. To win a war, the commander must be able to keep abreast of and adapt to such changes. Sunzi said, "There is no fixed way of using force, just as there is no fixed form to water. He who can win a victory by adapting to changes in enemy forces is a master of the art of war." Sunzi draws special attention to the changing dynamics in the opposite direction, saying, "Chaos compares with order, cowardice with bravery, and weakness with strength." These contrasting situations may change into their opposites. Thus, it is not uncommon for an army to turn failure into victory or vice versa. Sunzi reminded commanders to consider gains and losses from both positive and negative sides. He said, "Some routes can be taken but should not be, some enemy troops are vulnerable but should not be attacked, some enemy cities can be captured but should not be, and some enemy territory can be obtained but should not be." This is a warning to commanders to be aware not only of potential gains but also of potential losses. Sunzi further advised commanders, "Do not intercept the enemy on their retreat to their home country, leave a gap when besieging the enemy, and do not approach a desperate enemy." In other words, Sunzi was against going beyond the limits in military operations, because things would turn into their opposites once they reached their extreme.
In analyzing changes in opposing factors in war, Sunzi also emphasized pushing them into their opposites for the benefit of one's own troops. He said, "When we know the enemy situation but they do not know ours, we can keep our troops together while they have to keep them separate. Now that our troops are in one place while the enemy troops are dispersed in ten places, we can strike them with tenfold force. In this way, our troops enjoy an absolute majority while the enemy suffers an absolute minority." Sunzi's Art of War is full of such dialectical thinking. Sunzi said, "By taking a tortuous route deliberately while tempting the enemy with small gains, we can arrive earlier despite having started later than the enemy. This is the strategy of turning a tortuous route into a straight one." As a kind of synopsis, Sunzi said, "The expert commander is able to make the enemy follow his direction, not the other way round."
As a military classic, Sunzi's Art of War provides a complete set of strategies and tactics for winning a war. Paradoxically, the book does not encourage rulers to be bellicose but rather warns them again and again to refrain from waging a war without careful consideration.
At the very beginning, the book points out, "The use of force is a matter of life or death for the soldiers, the people and the country." Such a matter can never be taken lightly. At the end of the book, Sunzi raised the warning once more, "A head of state must not wage a war spurred by a momentary anger, and the commander and general must not wage a war spurred by a momentary bad mood. They must take into consideration overall national interests for declaring war or desisting from war. Anger can turn into delight and a bad mood can change into a good mood, but a country lost is lost forever and those killed are dead forever. Therefore, a wise ruler must handle matters of war with extreme care, and good commanders and generals must handle them with the greatest caution as well. This is the cardinal principle for safeguarding the country and the army."
Sunzi's cautions against war were continued in Sun Bin's Art of War (Sun Bin bingfa) , by a strategist in the middle of the Warring States Period. While teaching military professionals how to fight and win wars, Sun Bin (birth and death dates unknown) also cautioned that, fighting and winning every war is not a good thing; those who are bellicose and intent on winning victory through wars are bound to fail and only bring shame on themselves.
Sunzi's Art of War and Sun Bin 's Art of War both warn readers of the great dangers of war. Such thoughts represent, as great strategists, their concern and care for human life. As nuclear war looms larger in today's world, the cautions of Sunzi and Sun Bin certainly deserve the serious attention of those who have the power to push "the button."
The Fanyang sword, a weapon widespread in the late Warring States Period, unearthed in Luoyang, Henan Province
Sunzi's Art of War was introduced abroad from the Tang Dynasty (618-907) onwards. A Japanese student named Kibimakibi took the book home in 734 or 752. It was introduced to Korea in the 15th century during the Joseon Dynasty. Up to the 17th century, more than 170 books on the study of Sunzi's Art of War were published in Japan. In 1772, Jean-Joseph-Marie Amiot (1718-1793), a Jesuit missionary from France, published in Paris his French translation of the book. That year, Napoleon Bonaparte I (1769-1821) was only three years old. A Russian translation was published in 1860. Later translations of the book include English, German, Italian, Czech, Vietnamese, Hebrew, and Romanian.
After World War II, famous strategists and scholars from different countries took a new interest in Sunzi's Art of War . Bernard Law Montgomery (1887-1976), British field marshal during that war, declared that all military academies in the world should include the book as required course material. New translations and more research works on the book have been published since that time.
With the spread of Sunzi's Art of War , its influence has gone beyond the military to many other fields, including economics, politics, culture, and diplomacy. Many people regard the book not only as a military work, but also as a work on the philosophy of strategy, referring to the application of military strategies as general methods and principles in all areas of social life. In 2001, online bookseller Amazon listed the book as one of the bestsellers in the humanities category. Many contemporary scholars regard Sunzi's wisdom to be as universal as Confucius' wisdom.