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Joseph Man Chan
WTO, like its predecessor GATT, is first and foremost an agent of economic globalization (Waters, 1995).By its agreements, market is the mechanism that integrates the world’s economy whereby both goods and services become tradable across national boundaries.Dictated by WTO—principles such as transparency, fairness and reciprocity, the economic configuration of its member countries will likely converge.At the heart of the global economic system is the transnational corporations (TNCs) which, as defined by Dunning (1993) are enterprises owning value-added activities in two or more countries.It is TNC’s nature to endorse the market and many other principles of WTO because they together foster an environment facilitating the free flow of goods and services around the world.Given the affinity between global organizations such as WTO and TNCs and their roles in integrating the world economy, they are often discussed in connection with the issue of globalization.Given the correlations among WTO, TNCs and globalization, it is difficult to imagine how one may endorse the WTO principles or the activities of TNCs and reject the idea of globalization at the same time.
As conceptualized by Jenkins (1987), there are four theoretical perspectives on the TNCs in terms of their basic tenets and policymaking implications. The first is the neoliberal perspective which rests on the relative efficiency of the TNCs and their capacity to rectify market imperfections that pervade mostly in the developing world.The second is the global reach perspective which emphasizes the TNCs’ preference for oligopoly and extending it internationally.The policy recommendations under this perspective are for the government of the host state to use regulations to ensure that their activities are to its benefits.The third is the neoimperialist perspective which views the TNC as an agent that drains state-resources and creates monopolistic structures within the host state, thereby forming an obstacle to the socialist transformation of society and ending in long-term underdevelopment.The policy implications are for the developing world to dissociate itself from the dominating West. The fourth is the neofundamentalist perspective shared by some Marxists and neo-Marxists who, in the belief that capitalist production dynamics will provide the material base for socialism, regard TNCs as positive and progressive agents of social change. The neoliberalists and the neofundamentalists are similar in their assessment of the economic roles of TNCs.But they envision diametrically opposite outcomes.As outlined here, the neoliberalists are outright globalists whereas the neoimperialists are hard-core anti-globalists.Both the neofundamentalist and global reach perspectives represent compromises that try to harness TNCs for self-aggrandizement on the part of the host state.
In the domain of mass media, TNCs take the form of transnational media corporations (TNMCs) which are among the best-known global brands, including News Corporation, Bertelsmann, Universal Studio, Walt Disney, and Sony. Without any exception, they are by themselves major media corporations in their home countries. By one’s outlook on socio-economic order and the nature of power relations in it, Comor (2002), identifies two major approaches to the study of media corporations: the liberal marketplace and the critical structuralist approach.Spearheaded by researchers such as Pool (1966) and Lerner (1963), the former is akin to the neoliberalist perspective mentioned earlier. It has great faith in the market as the arbiter of information in all social contexts. TNMCs are considered to be progressive forces in making information available and modernizing the perspectives of people in the developing world. Proponents of this perspective believe that media corporations should be subjected to as little regulation as possible.
In stark contrast to this outlook on TNMCs is the critical structuralist approach which tends to focus on the broader context in which they operate—capitalism and its global expansion.Instead of having unquestioned faith in the market, market failures consequential to ownership and monopolization tendency are often analyzed.Research in this tradition can be traced to the early works of Herbert Schiller (1969, 1976) and the contemporary works of Herman and McChesney (1997), among others.In their conception, the TNMCs are the agents of an imperialist cultural empire that thrives on the support of their home states for their expansionist strategy.As Herman and Chesney view it, GATT and NAFTA agreements have fortified privatization and forced the opening of economies to foreign investment, thereby paving the way for the globalization of media. The central features of media globalization have been “larger cross-border flows of media outputs, the growth of media TNCs and the tendency towards centralization of media control, and the spread and intensification of commercialization”.(p.8) The critical impact of globalization and media TNCs is the implantation of the commercial model of communication which is intensifying with the bottom-line pressures. This model, in their estimation, will erode the public sphere and create “a culture of entertainment” that tends to undermine the democratic cause.The operation of this commercial model does not result in a competitive marketplace but more of cartel-like global environment (McChesney, 1999).
The above review represents the academic discourses on TNCs in general and TNMCs in particular in the West. The ebb and flow of these discourses are indicative of the changes as expressed in people’s political awareness, social contexts and policy preferences.One way to explore the condition of globalization is to examine how countries conduct their discourses on a globalizing agent or event.In a study of how the media and elites debate over the government’s decision to co-build a Disneyland in Hong Kong, Chan (2002) finds that economization is the overriding theme.Accompanying the conspicuous absence of the idea of cultural imperialism in the discourse is the lopsided emphasis on the accounting and economic benefits of the joint-venture. If the case of Hong Kong is illustrative of a small capitalist society that enthusiastically embraces cultural globalization through economization, how about the case of China, a big socialist country that is being marketized?
Starting at 9 pm on 10th November 2001, CCTV ran a five-hour direct relay of the signing ceremony of China’s accession to WTO in Doha. This is followed by the publication of an editorial in the People’s Daily celebrating this historic event and lengthy special reports in other newspapers.Celebratory in tone (Zhao，2003; Lee，2003), all these reports reflected China’s pride in weathering rounds of difficult negotiations in finally winning membership in the global association. China’s entry into WTO has also sparked off a series of discussion on its impact on the Chinese mediascape and how China should respond among media academics.The resulting discourse on media reforms turns out to more subdued in tone and somewhat pessimistic in outlook.This deviation shows that the academics have higher autonomy in expressing their views, especially in specialized venues such as journals and books.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the Chinese academics relate to WTO and TNMCs, the two important agents of globalization, in their discourse on media reforms. The answer to this question will shed light on the conditions of globalization on the one hand and the ideological orientations of a sector of Chinese elites on the other. Discourse should not and cannot be equated to reality, but its importance in media reforms should not be slighted, especially in China where CCP has a long tradition of preceding its policy changes with theorization.To Mao, revolution starts with the creation of public opinion.To Confucius, persuasiveness starts with the use of the right label.Concepts have to be coined and rationales have to cast in such a way that they rhyme with what is ideologically acceptable. The Chinese system is especially sensitive to alien concepts, often reading political implications into them.Even the simple notion of “audience” was problematic because it differed from the traditional idea of “mass” (qunzhong) which denoted the subordination of readers and viewers to the CCP (Zhang, 2000). The term “audience” was legitimized only after academics and practitioners took efforts to overcome ideological resistance in their discourse.Their cause was aided by the development of the advertising industry which can hardly function without the concept of “audience” and audience figures.Such interactions between theoretical discourse and industrial formation have been a common feature of the process of media reforms in China.
Media reforms have come quite a long way since the CCP shifted its gears from class struggle to economic development in the late 1970s.In a marketized environment, the media have come to rely on advertising as the source of revenue.Structurally, traditional mass media such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines have prospered, multiplying in the number of outlets (Lee，2000; Wu，2000).New media such as the Internet and cable-satellite communication have also cropped up, carving a new mediascape in China (Chan, 2003).The audience’s wants and needs are no longer taken for granted but are studied and catered to as media competition intensifies.Instead of focusing on ideological indoctrination, the media content extends into the realms of entertainment and social information (Chan, 1993; Zhao，1998; Chang，2002).Social problems that stopped short of casting doubt the Chinese communist system as a whole are sometimes exposed and discussed.Indeed, it has its own versions of investigative journalism (De Burgh，2003).Compared with the early 1980s, the Chinese enjoy much more freedom in speaking their minds in interpersonal exchanges and online.Organizationally, the media have become more flexible in its management practices, allowing economic incentives and granting more autonomy to practitioners.At the same time, media outlets are merged to form conglomerates (Zhao，2000).In the journalism domain, journalists have developed some form of professionalism (Pan and Lu，2003; Pan and Chan, 2003).What remains unchanged is CCP’s ultimate control over the media, exercising its authority through the appointment of key personnel, the holding of media licenses and dispatching of decrees and directives.All these changes constitute what are called media reforms in China.It is against this background that I proceed to examine how the Chinese academics relate to WTO and TNMCs.
Media reforms can be the result of both directives handed down from the central authorities and bottom-up pressure posed by the practitioners.For minor changes, practitioners improvise and play “edge-balls”，pushing innovations to the limit of ideological boundaries without falling over (Pan, 2000).The minor changes may accumulate and call for the authority’s formal recognition and endorsement.For major changes, the central authority plays a more active role; they often take the form of policies responding to the needs of strategic development and the field in general.As China opens up, discussion on reform issues are not just held in closed doors.They proliferate in academic discourse, as evidenced in venues such as journals, books and websites.
For this analysis, my focus is on reforms in audiovisual media in general and television in particular.I first retrieved articles bearing the term WTO that are included in the electronic archive of CCTV’s research unit which covers many journals, including the majors such as Modern Communication, Journal of Chinese Television, Chinese Journalists and the like.I have also looked over relevant articles in some journals that are published in more recent years, including Media, China Media Report, and Contemporary Communication.I have collected a set of books on the subject that are available in the market, including anthologies and focused works.I have also checked out relevant articles carried by www.mediachina.net, a website dedicated to media studies in China.While I do not think that my search is complete, I believe I have covered the major works that is published in the runup to and after China’s accession to WTO. To give me a better understanding of the dynamics of discourse, I have talked to more than twelve academics who are active promoters of media reforms in China.
Unlike the mass media where the discourse on WTO was dominated by the party and urban elites (Zhao，2003; Lee, 2003), the overall tone of the corresponding discourse among media academics is sobering.I cannot find any article that wholeheartedly celebrates the accession to WTO when its implications for Chinese media are discussed.The discursive patterns are quite readily identifiable as many articles overlap in their themes.They tend to examine the impact of WTO first, to be followed by measures proposed to face its challenges. Most of the articles see the entry into WTO both as “opportunities” and “challenges”.The “opportunities” are sometimes mentioned as if the authors do not want to sound pessimistic or defeatist and deviate too far from the official celebratory mood. Meanwhile, the “challenges” are at times stressed to the extent that their proponents are accused of “crying wolf” —exaggerating the threat posed by WTO (Liu, 2002; Pan，2002).In the sections below, I will analyze how the Chinese academics evaluate these challenges and how they relate them to media reforms.
For a country that is still ruled by a communist party, the discourse is noted first for the conspicuous absence of what Jenkins (1987) refers to as the neo-imperialist position.In my collection, only one article (Meng，2001) mentions “cultural imperialism” in its title. Even here, “cultural imperialism” is enclosed in inverted commas, possibly as a sign of the author’s ambivalence towards the notion and as a way to sum up the potential threat of the accession to WTO for Chinese media. Instead of providing a plan for an alternative socialist media system, he argues for protectionist measures to buy time for the successful implementation of market-based reforms. That virtual absence of critical concepts such as cultural imperialism in the discourse speaks first to the diminishing currency of the Marxist and Maoist ideology.The academics no longer find it necessary to give their ideas and observations a Marxist ideological peg. Another reason is that they probably do not want to stray too far from the official line of the party—state which takes the WTO entry as a global recognition of China’s economic-political status.
In place of critical concepts is the notion of globalization that permeates the discourse.Globalization, as a force associated with WTO, is perceived to be inevitable and irresistible. To most academics, China’s entry into WTO will open the floodgate for foreign media to enter China.Although some realize that the current terms of agreement do not allow this to happen, they expect it to happen sooner or later (e.g.Yu，2002, Huang，2003). Globalization has become a positive term in China, often referring to its need to get internationalized and to be one the same track with the world (yu shijie jiegui).To measure up to the world in terms of excellence and civilization is at the core of the idea of globalization as used in the discourse on media reforms (e.g., Jin and Zheng, 2002; Zhang, Huang and Hu，2002; Yu，2002). While the discourse participants want to protect the Chinese culture from foreign domination, they want to compete with the world too.That is why there is also the concern among the elites as to how to export Chinese culture. The global popularity of Ang Lee’s movie Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is sometimes cited to illustrate this possibility.
While the Chinese academics appear to be receptive to the idea of globalization and the general principles of WTO, they are by no means globalists advocating the elimination of national borders and the free flow of cultural products.In fact, the discourse is rather nationalistic in orientation, marked by a keen concern over the asymmetrical relationship between Western and Chinese media.For the discourse participants, the major issue is what can be done to save Chinese media from being overwhelmed by the TNMCs and to enable China to“enter the world” on an equal footing with the West (Duan,2001; Li,2003). As we shall see later, virtually everyone agrees that China should adopt measures to give the Chinese media enough time to get ready before opening up the market.It suffices to note here that WTO, as an agent of globalization, serves to bring out the nationalist sentiment of Chinese academics when they relate to it. It is against nationalist sentiment as such that TNMCs are portrayed as “wolfs”.
To some interviewees and discourse participants, the accession to WTO signifies the intrusion of the “wolfs” —the TNMCs—into crowds of “lambs” as represented by the Chinese media (Li，2003). The latter is assumed to lose out once they come into direct competition with one another.In the Marxist perspective, TNMCs are the agents of imperialist domination.They are criticized for their exploitative role in the international division of labor.Since the reform years, TNMCs have begun to assume a very different image.The Chinese’s first contact with TNCs could be traced to their advertisement broadcast in the early years of reform and the consumption of their products in later years. The global brands that have gained huge popularity include Coke, McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Sony, Walt Disney, and so on.
By the existing WTO agreements, China will be opening only a limited part of its media market (Hua，2003; Liu，2002; Chen，2001; Yin and Xiao，2002). Foreign interests are allowed to have controlling stakes in operations in the distribution of print media three years after China’s entry. They can also engage in sales of publications, expanding on a scheduled basis in terms of time, cities and number of operations. In advertising, foreign capital can have controlling stakes in joint ventures two years after China’s accession and can run subsidiaries two more years later.For audiovisual products, foreigners can form joint ventures in the distribution of videos, provided that China’s censorship right is not infringed. Foreign interests are allowed to own up to 49% of stakes in cinema operation. The annual import quota of movies will expand from 20 over the years.In telecommunications, foreigners will be able to own operations providing Internet service and content.
There is no question that the threat induced by WTO is not immediate and direct. However, most academics in the discourse treat the threat as real.They tend to assume that opening to the West is inevitable because the media environment in China will be transformed consequential to its entry into WTO (Zhu，2002; Yu，2002; Huang，2003; Shen，2002).The concepts of transparency, fairness, reciprocity, market openness, non-interventionism, and market primacy will give rise to a new environment for media operation. The influence from the TNMCs will be strongly felt as they will be allowed to engage in distribution and advertising, the sources of media’s lifeblood.Foreign media and advertising agencies will set a new standard for the Chinese counterparts.Foreign capital will find its way into various ventures and expand its control over Chinese media.Digitization and the rise of the Internet will render the content controls much less effective, if not obsolete, thereby opening the China media market to the rest of the world.
Why are the TNMCs depicted as wolfs? In the eyes of the Chinese academics, the TNMCs enjoy monopolies within and across media, within and across countries.Armed with huge assets, rich management knowledge and high technology, they can flex their muscles around the world.The foremost image of TNMCs is big and powerful.Discourse participants like to cite examples to illustrate how the Chinese media are dwarfed by their Western counterparts.For instance, Yang and Zhang (2002) observe that in 1999, CCTV, the largest national television in China, is ranked only 49th in the world.The advertising income of Time Warner is reported to be six times of the whole advertising revenue of China in the year 2000 (Yu，2003).The number of production units in China is five times that of the US, yet movie production per year is just one fifth of the US (Huang et al，2003b).Indeed, not only do the Chinese media compare palely with their Western counterparts, they are also seen to lag behind in terms of management, practices, ideas, quality of practitioners, education in journalism and communication.Walt Disney, for one, is observed to have been feeding on the brands that it has established.This leads Huang (2003) to ask rhetorically if China possess any comparable brands.
Despite that there are investment figures indicating that the TNMCs are not really that interested in the China media market (Sparks, 2003), the discourse participants are impressed by their apparent aggressiveness.In their assessment, the China media market is a pie waiting to be split (Yin and Xiao，2002).It owes its attraction to its huge potential in terms of population size, advertising revenue, economic growth and relative media underdevelopment. The only way for the TNMCs to seek greater profit is to go overseas as their domestic markets are getting increasingly saturated. In television, the nascent market of China carries 1.1 billion audience, and 100 million cable households. Few TNMCs can resist this temptation. The expansionism of TNMCs such as Walt Disney and News Corp is observed to have been increasing over the years (Lu，2002). To the wolf criers, the Western powers are already inside China, with many more waiting at the doorstep (Pan, 2002).The frequent visits of the CEOs of TNMCs such as Viacom, Time Warner, News Corp, Walt Disney and Bertelsmann are better known examples.Other evidences in this regard include joint ventures in audiovisual production, magazine publication, the airing of foreign programs, and the downlinking of overseas television channels in Guangdong, including the Hong Kong—based Galaxy TV and Rupert Murdoch’s partially—owned Phoenix TV.
It is interesting to note that Rupert Murdoch is portrayed as the contemporary “Napoleon” of the media world who has turned his eyes toward the China market (Yu，2002). To the Chinese academics, News Corp is the most aggressive TNMC extending its empire into China. The incoming of Rupert Murdoch is expected to be raising the capital entry threshold in China and internationalizing the standards for the evaluation of media products (Yu, 2002).Sub-Hollywood products will have a hard time in retaining the attention of the Chinese audience, especially when foreign media fare takes up a significant market share. In the eyes of the discourse participants, the TNMCs try every possible means to crack open the Chinese market. While some have chosen to appease the Chinese leaders politically in order to gain special favor, others have resorted to forming joint ventures with Chinese interest. Not only are the TNMCs powerful in terms of capital, they are also advanced in technology, marketing knowhow, distributional network and content archive. Reinforcing this image of TNMCs are the legendary successes of Titanic, Who Wants to be a Millionaire, Survivor, Mulan, Harry Porter, and Lords of the Rings that have been in circulation among academics, policymakers and media practitioners.The strength and the ambition of the TNMCs displayed in the discourse do not only add to the fear of the Chinese regulators and media operators but also creates a sense of crisis.
The sense of crisis is crystallized in the use of metaphors. In some cases, the TNMCs are described as “wolfs” that are ready to jump onto the “lambs” as represented by the Chinese media at the signal of WTO (Li，2003).In the discussion on conglomeration, it is often observed that the Chinese media groups are not so strong as they appear.They are merely “sampans” administratively forged together; they fail to measure up to the real strength of the “carriers” — the TNMCs (Yu，2003). The Chinese media are sometimes compared to “greenhouse flowers” which will not be able to withstand the real test of weather, as when they come into open competition with the world (Duan，2001). Among my interviewees is an academic who likens a Chinese media group to “300 miles of tents that are connected through administrative orders”. Head-to-head competition with TNMCs is like igniting a tent and the fire will spread in no time.All these metaphors point at the odds in favor of the TNMCs.
While the overwhelming portrait of TNMCs is fearful, it is fair to say that there are some observations that see potential in the Chinese media.In an analysis of the movie industry, Yin and Xiao (2002) base their faith in the future of the Chinese movie industry on the fact that local movies are in a better position to reflect the sentimentality of a society moving towards modernity. In addition, the difference in language will be an important cultural barrier that tends to favor the consumption of local movies. The protectionist policies of the Chinese government will also buy time for the Chinese movie industry to grow and mature.By the same token, Yu (2002, 2003) does not think that China will lose out on all fronts because the Chinese media have an edge in understanding the local audience.A major weakness of the TNMCs is the relative lack of nuanced understanding of the China market. But such observations are insignificant when compared with perceived superiority of TNMCs.
In summary, to the Chinese academics, the TNMCs look fearful because of the huge capital, content, technology and marketing power that it commands.Once they are allowed to enter China, they are expected to wipe out the local operators.This does not only raise the possibility of losing China’s media industry to foreigners, but also subjects the Chinese to the influence of alien ideologies.What stands out is the highlight on the competitiveness of the TNMCs around the world.The burning issue for China is how to face this pending formidable competition and to beat the TNMCs in their own game.One handy way, in the eyes of Chinese academics, is to learn from China’s competitors, the TNMCs themselves.
Ever since the last Qing Dynasty, China has been in a love-and-hate relationship with the West. In more sobering moments, China feels the need to learn from the West.To the Chinese academics, TNMCs is a good source of inspirations for media reforms.Among the benefits of entering WTO is that it will bring in the most advanced knowledge about media operations (Yu, 2002). The important task for China now is to learn from the future competitors. Media development is assumed to take stages, with China trailing behind the West (Yu, 2002).It is this association of the West with modernity that leads the Chinese academics to read “inevitability” or “laws” of media development into the experience of the West.The teachings of CEOs of TNMCs are regarded with respect. The best known CEO is Rupert Murdoch who has been a persistent coveter of the China market. Epitomized as a brilliant CEO who has successfully made News Corp the fifth largest media conglomerate around the world within a span of fifty years, he is noted for his effective strategies in acquisition, localization, integration and alliance.
The discourse on WTO does not end at national protectionism. While it is crying that the wolfs are coming, it argues for media liberalization, posited as the best way to meet with the looming challenge from the TNMCs in the wake of entry into WTO. What China needs, according to Zhang (2001:85), is “the courage and wisdom to dance with the wolf”.By this, he means that Chinese television should seek economy of scale, brand marketing, conglomeration, marketization, rule of law, etc.China’s entry into WTO further promotes the market perspective. By the same token, Yu (2002:38) advocates that China should learn “wisely and anxiously” about how to use the perspective of the market, capital and the natural laws of media development in integrating the media resources in order to make the Chinese media stronger and bigger in the post-WTO world.
The challenge of the West is so severe in the case of WTO that many Chinese academics are calling for innovations at the institutional or systemic level.The accession to WTO is to some the second reform movement after the CCP’s decision to redirect its course towards economic development in 1978. It signifies an institutional reform in which China will open up to the world actively, reciprocally and on all fronts. To meet with the corresponding challenge in communication, Shen (2002) argues that the key lies in deepening and expanding media’s institutional innovations which have been taking place since the 1980s. The principles embodied in WTO can serve as the frame of reference for such innovations.In this perspective, WTO is not only a trade and legal entity but also a cultural system that informs the generation and evaluation of institutional innovations such as allowing mergers media and regions and abolishing administrative restrictions.All these innovations will not be possible without diminishing the role of the government and granting more autonomy to the media operators.
The threat of WTO is to some so critical that it is time for China to take a strategic and institutional approach to media development in China too (Yu,2002; Huang et al,2003a). The piecemeal approach no longer meets the needs when the media industry is making strides on a large scale.The need for institutional innovation becomes more urgent as China’s media market is getting more internationalized.For Chinese television to survive, Li (2003) proposes that China should introduce reforms on a systemic level in light of the “laws” of television development.Without this, he envisions that Chinese television will trail the path of state enterprises into oblivion. As Shen (2002) observes, what counts most is not the use of capital, technology, talents, industrial production, marketing knowhow, and post-production techniques but how they combine to form the larger system of Hollywood culture.The way out is to mobilize the whole society culturally in the bid to make systemic reforms and to learn from Hollywood, a system that is supposedly more mature and advanced.By the same token, Yin and Xiao (2002) maintain that what China needs is not so much technology but the mechanism that will improve Chinese movies’s competitiveness as an industry. In their estimation, the mechanisms will liberate the productive force by promoting creativity and activeness of movie practitioners. This will not be achieved unless the planned economy model of the movie industry is successfully transformed into a market model. In another context, Duan (2001) calls for media reforms ranging from diversification of investments, the provision of incentives for practitioners, rewarding the capable and reducing redundant personnel, to competition across regions and across media.What all this amounts to is the need for institutional innovations on a large scale.
In short, the discourse stops short of calling for media privatization. What is almost unanimous is the urge for liberalization at the systemic level—granting greater media autonomy and pursuing further marketization. In the following paragraphs, I will examine how the discourse participants pertain to some of the key specific issues on media reforms: industrialization, conglomeration, cross-media and cross-regional acquisition, capitalization, and the streamlining of the regulatory regime.
Mass media constitute part of the cultural industry, which is taken for granted in many parts of the world.But in China, calling the media an industry has been problematic because the word industry is associated more with economic activities that are considered to be non-ideological in nature.For industries, they are run more like enterprises and have little to do with the CCP’s political mission. The compromise in the midst of media commercialization in China is to run media as enterprises and recognize them as political entities (shiye danwei, qiye guanli).However, according to Huang (2002), a promoter of the industrialization idea, media reforms in China have reached a bottleneck the breakthrough of which requires reforms at the industrial level.Drawing on the experience of the West where media are treated as industries, he asserts that once the Chinese media are treated as such, they will be in a better position to argue for diversified investment, conglomeration across media and regions, and other reforms.By the same token, Yin and Xiao (2002) have found the Chinese movie in the “pre-industrialization” stage, still suffering from the lack of industrial models and mechanisms. Its development is plagued by the lingering planned economy approach.Without industrialization, the competition between China and Hollywood will be like a fight among soldiers using swords against those with machine guns. At the insistence of Huang and other discourse participants, the Propaganda Department appears to have given up its attempts to prohibit referring to media as an industry.
Capitalization is another keyword in the discourse on the impact of WTO and media industrialization.It refers to where and how the media can derive its funding.By communist ideology and by necessity, the Chinese academics acknowledge the pivotal role of capital in media development.However, the Propaganda Department is keen on holding the reigns over capital.The party-state formally does not allow the media to accept capital from the social sector. However, media operators have incentive to expand their capital by all means. One concern among academics is whether capital from the social sector and abroad should be allowed to get into media industry.With some strong control mechanisms at the disposal of the CCP, Sun (2003) argues that China can relax the control over the inflow of capital on a gradual basis and on a case-by-case basis, starting with capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao.Citing Time Warner as an illustration of the importance of diversified investment, Cai and Zhang (2002) advocate that media should be allowed to increase its funds through public listing, resource integration and diversified investment.
Industrialization is possible if the media are allowed to have more autonomy and to be regulated by more rational rules. The discourse also witnesses frequent calls to streamline the regulatory regime. It is recognized that the WTO principles of transparency, fairness, reciprocity, market openness, non-interventionism, and market primacy will give rise to a new environment for media operation. The task for media practitioners therefore is to initiate reforms consistent with these concepts (Zhu，2002). Meanwhile, the regulators should set up laws that will fairly apply to everyone, separate the operators from the regulators, and fully meet the dictates of the market mechanism. Other suggestions in this connection include turning the media outlets into independent legal person, extending capitalization beyond state capital, and setting up rules and laws to facilitate the formation of conglomerates across region and media (e.g.Lu and Xia，2000; Yu，2002).
Although ideological issues remain sensitive topics in China, the discourse on media reforms has witnessed some calls for de-emphasis on ideology in the regulation and production of information and entertainment. Serving as the agents of globalization are TNMCs which, according to Gu (2002), carry two characteristics: First is the paramount importance of the profit motive for which the TNMCs tend not to commit its loyalty to a single nation-state. Second, TNMCs no longer view foreign cultures as alien.To profit, they are ready to learn from and to adapt to foreign cultures. In contrast to depoliticization as such is China’s tendency to read ideology into Hollywood products with a Cold War mindset. It is envisioned that the Chinese movie industry will lose out in its battle with Hollywood if it continues to do so. There are even attempts to liberalize the production of news, the most sensitive genre. Noting the huge gap between the information capacity of China and the West, Sun (2002) suggests that China should seize the grace period allowed by WTO to upgrade its information capacity by increasing the freedom of information on a gradual basis, first through relaxing the propaganda controls in South China and Internet news.To ensure that journalists can report news they deem fit, journalism laws protecting their rights should be established. Acknowledging the indirect influence of WTO on Chinese media, Tong (2001) in a seminar asserts that China should adjust the conception of news and treat it as commodity. In the same vein, Liu (2002) envisions that there will be a growing need for objective and fair journalism and urges the media to take the initiative to change accordingly.
To the Chinese academics, merging is all positive.The merger between AOL and Time Warner is hailed as the single most important event signifying the importance of merging. Examples of this kind have led Zhang (2001:83) to this conclusion: “Media monopoly is the primary mode of media in advanced Western countries.It cuts across media, industries and nations.In face of these competitors, no one can slight them and respond by doing nothing. The only way is to wake up and stay alert, reform and adjust in order to catch up. Passivity will result only in disaster.” Based on the experience of the West, Ouyang (2003:91) also observes that acquisition is by far the most efficient way to achieve growth, economy of scale, enhanced competitiveness, risk spreading and brand recognition.The concentration of capital is to him the way to be, for both the Western and Chinese media.Rupert Murdoch’s success in making leaps and bounds in developing his media empire and the rapid rise of the Hong Kong-based Tom.com through merging are cited to strike home the lesson of acquisition.
The professed goal of media conglomeration in China was “to be big and strong”. The Chinese policymakers never hide their intention of competing with TNMCs.Xu Guangcun, head of the State Administration of Radio, TV and Film, is quoted to have said that conglomeration is the only method that can enable the Chinese media to compete with TNMCs at the launching ceremony of the Beijing Conglomerate of Radio, TV and Film (Huang，2003).Virtually all the Chinese academics agree that the urgent task for China is “to create carrier-like conglomerates” (Huang, 2003) that can withstand the shock waves caused by international media giants in post-WTO China.
There is no question that the media groups in China have become bigger in size.The common concern is whether they are really that strong when compared with their Western counterparts.It does not take long before the discourse participants discover that the Western conglomerates are the results of intense competition and merging over a long period of time.What seems needed is to let the groups emerge out of a genuinely competitive environment. In the words of Huang (2003), the existing “monopolistic competition” should be replaced by “free competition”. It is with the operation of the market that conglomerates will become bigger in size and more competitive in strength. Without real strength, they will not be able to match the TNMCs.As of now, conglomeration in China is confined to a media type and administrative region.This sharply contrasts with the TNMCs which are free to cross most of these boundaries.The solution is to let the media merge with whoever they find the most profitable, regardless of the media types and their locations (e.g.Huang et al，2003a; Duan，2001; Yu，2002; Lu and Xia，2000).In the eyes of the discourse participants, what makes this solution more urgent is the pending competition from the TNMCs consequential to China’s entry into the WTO.
The attempts of some cross-border television channels such as Phoenix TV and Star TV to crack open the China market and the permission they have obtained in downlinking their programs to the cable systems in Guangdong are cited as illustrations of the aggressiveness of TNMCs. However, very few TNMCs appear to have made heavy investments in China (Sparks, 2003), raising questions as to whether they are really that interested in the China market. In addition, by the existing WTO agreements, China’s compromise is rather limited (Liu，2002). China will continue to maintain its control over media ownership and content. By the WTO agreement, China will have to review the terms 15 years after its accession. However, no mandatory opening is assumed (Chen，2001). Attested by the case of France, China can still resort to the argument that media products are not regular commodities and should be exempted from the free flow principle, thereby making it possible for restricting the importation of audiovisual products and subsidizing the domestic audiovisual industry (Liu，2001).If exceptionism can apply to an advanced capitalist country such as France, it follows that China, as a socialist third world country, can make even stronger claims.
An assessment of the media situation in post-WTO China tends to confirm the claim that the wolf criers are exaggerating the threat of WTO.Indeed, shortly after China’s accession to WTO, the Propaganda Department, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and the State Press and Publications Administration issued a decree, document number 17, to lay down the major ideas on media reforms.It reaffirms the dualistic nature of mass media, as a regular enterprise and as CCP’s ideological arm for maintaining national security and political stability.As Wei (2003:297) concludes, “Under no circumstances will the media be changed in its role as the party’s mouthpiece and in its subordination to the party’s control over the appointment of personnel and editorial direction”.The decree further states that all news media will not accept any foreign and private capital. With the exception of what is allowed in the WTO agreement, the decree takes pains to list all the activities that prohibit the involvement of foreign capital.Another unnoticed but important policy introduced in recent years is to openly designate the party as the ultimate controller of media.Although this policy may have separated the media from the state, which is more in tune with the arrangement assumed by WTO, it serves to formalize CCP’s control over the media.
All these considerations beg the question as to why WTO is portrayed as a big threat. Many discourse participants believe that, in the context of globalization and technological advances, the opening up of China to the world in the cultural domain is inevitable.The accession to WTO marks the beginning of what appears to be the eventual opening of the Chinese media market.The intrusion of foreign media, albeit gradually, will cultivate new standards for the evaluation of media performance among the Chinese audience. The foreign media will serve as new sources of inspiration for institutional innovations. The policies that the situation demands, in the academics’ evaluation, are to rid the system of its ideological constraints and render it more marketized.The academics appear to be seizing the potential threat of WTO to press for more fundamental reforms in the direction of commercialization.The near-consensus is to apply the market principle more deeply and extensively.It is believed that only when that is done can China’s media industry stand up to the challenge from the TNMCs.What stands out is the general faith the Chinese academics have in the market mechanism.Crying wolf is functional in making the liberalization proposals more convincing and urgent. Resorting to external threat has been common in justifying for more liberal policies in Guangdong in the past.It is the competition from Hong Kong-based radio that was used to argue for giving greater autonomy to the then newly established Pearl River Economic Radio as an attempt on the part of the Guangdong authority to reclaim the audience lost in the radio war across the border (Chan，1994; Zhao，1998). Only this time, the WTO factor applies to the whole of China and all the media.The appeal to external threat, real or imagined, serves the same purpose of domestic liberalization.
The discourse is in general nationalistic in overtone.Casting the calls for liberalization as a response to external threat is not merely a reflection of the academics’ state of mind, it renders their arguments all the more politically acceptable. Indeed, very few discourse participants advocate the opening of China to TNMCs. They tend to argue for protectionist measure that will give China enough time to grow to match the foreign competitors (e.g.Shen，2002; Liu，2002; Chen，2001). These measures include setting import quotas, ownership restrictions, censorship and subsidizing the domestic cultural industry.The Chinese media conglomerates appear to be satisfied with the present monopoly arrangement and abhor the idea of opening up to the outside world.They have their vested interests to protect.It is therefore no surprise at all to find that the top media operators in South China all say they prefer keeping the China market closed to themselves when they are asked by a professor, an interviewee, if they really want to open it to the world. What they do want is the freedom to compete across media and regions and to form conglomerates without administrative restrictions.The major concerns of Chinese academics are to prevent the TNMCs from crushing the Chinese media before they even have the chance to grow to maturity.
Treating the discourse on TNMCs and WTO as one as cultural globalization, it poses at best a partial resistance discourse.On the one hand, it can hardly qualify as a reflection of what Jenkins (1987) has called the neoimperialist perspective because orthodox Marxism and Maoism appear to have lost their centrality as the source of ideological justification.It also fails to qualify as an extension of the neofundamentalist perspective as the purpose of socialist transformation is rarely mentioned in the discourse. It never occurs to the discourse participants that TNMCs can serve to provide the material basis for the socialist cause of China. On the other hand, the discourse cannot be grouped under the neoliberal perspective either because the Chinese academics are not ready to carry the commercial logic to its end and apply the free flow principle to its own national boundary. The discourse is still dualistic in orientation which views the media as both enterprises and cultural-political entities.Neither can we group the Chinese academics under the global reach perspective because they tend to block out the TNMCs with protectionist measures.
While the Chinese discourse does not fit any category perfectly, it tends to stand out a type by itself. First, it is nationalist in orientation. Socialist or not, what the discourse participants advance is to promote the competitiveness of the Chinese media to match that of TNMCs. It demonstrates that nationalism is replacing Marxism and Maoism as the most relevant ideology. The case of China testifies that it is premature to say that nationalism and for that matter, the nation-state, is losing out during globalization as some globalists have claimed. Economization of culture has gained currency, but it does not apply totally to China, a big country with a strong tradition and a lingering socialist ideology. Second, the discourse participants have faith in the oligopoly and monopoly associated with TNMCs.To the critical researchers in the West, TNMCs are often accused for effecting monopoly, homogenization of content, diminishing diversity, and over-commercialization.However, these negative aspects are rarely noted.If it all, monopoly is treated as something positive. What they care is how to achieve monopoly through free market competition. Third, to the Chinese academics, the TNMCs serve as role models in acquisition, diversified investment, brand marketing, global distribution, resource integration, expansionist strategies, and conglomeration.The aggressiveness and powerfulness of TNMCs pose pressure on the Chinese media to learn from them through site visits, book studies and indirect competition. In effect, what China wants most is to keep the TNMCs at arm’s length and to learn from them and beat them at their own game.
However, the endorsement of the market logic itself helps pave way for the convergence of media in terms of industrial configuration and content format, to say the least. This means that while China may be able to keep the TNMCs at a safe distance, the pressure for globalized competition is still on. The question for China in the long term is whether it has enough time to re-engineer itself and become wolfs in the world stage themselves.
〔Joseph Man Chan(陈韬文)系香港中文大学
新闻与传播学院教授〕